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This dissertation examines the early history of philanthropic enterprise in the United States. I use 
the legal and administrative records of nineteenth-century philanthropic foundations, as well as 
the popular debates they inspired amongst legislators and social reformers, to argue that 
American philanthropy did not begin as a “private” practice outside of government. Rather, 
public officials, reformers, and the wealthy collaborated and competed to utilize and regulate the 
administration of private wealth for public works. As Americans moved away from the early 
modern system of European patronage that prioritized the private funding of public works, they 
created public-private partnerships to distribute private wealth for national development. I 
demonstrate that the nation’s first major philanthropic institutions—from Congress’ creation of 
the Smithsonian Institution (1846) to the chartering of the Rockefeller Foundation (1913)—
developed as public-private partnerships that worked across business, benevolence and 
governance. It was only in the twentieth century, that philanthropy became the purview of 
private foundations that operated with little government oversight. 
Philanthropic enterprise has been at the center of American state and economic 
development from the very beginning. While historians have credited later, Progressive-Era 
foundations, including the Russell Sage Foundation, the Carnegie Corporation of New York, and 
the Rockefeller Foundation, with adapting the financial and legal technologies of corporate 
capitalism to create the nation’s first foundations, my research shows that these philanthropists 
based their strategies on the Smithsonian. The Smithsonian was the true archetype for American 
foundations; its legal form laid the groundwork for the expansive corporate privileges we 
associate with modern philanthropy. Congress itself decided how to regulate the Smithsonian—
choosing between operating it as a government agency, a quasi-governmental institution, or a 
private foundation. In the end, Congress made the Smithsonian a “public trust,” meaning that its 
capital came from a private trust, but public officials managed it for a distinctly public purpose. 
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Government officials populated its board, while private citizens served in leadership roles. This 
model made the Smithsonian and future public trusts more powerful with their proximity to 
government officials, but it also imbued private wealth with an explicitly public character. 
George Peabody adapted this model to promote public education in the South during 
Reconstruction, and in the Gilded Age, Rockefeller and Carnegie created public trusts to fund 
agricultural development and scientific research.  
By the twentieth century, the public-trust model would change dramatically though. 
Philanthropists came to see themselves as trustees for the nation, rather than mere contributors of 
public benefactions. While the founders of public trusts envisioned government officials as the 
trustees of the funds they created, with the rise of corporate capitalism, wealth increasingly 
became its own source of power in American society—a source that could aggregate capital and 
outspend state entities on social welfare. Under these conditions, increasing pressure from 
philanthropists and public officials to separate their public works from their business operations 
and from the government, I argue, led to the rise of a new species of corporation more akin to the 
private foundations we know today.  
This transformation of American philanthropy marks a critical shift in the regulatory 
vision for private wealth for public works. Amidst twenty-first-century debates about the 
corroding impact of private wealth on democratic institutions, this history offers an account of 







The Rise and Fall of the Public Trust
 
 
Towards the end of his life, Benjamin Franklin added a codicil to his will that left £1000 sterling 
each, in trust, to the municipalities of Philadelphia and Boston.
1
 And in a nod to the cumulative 
possibilities of compound interest, he laid out what, at the time, must have seemed like an almost 
fantastical scheme: for both cities to manage their trusts for the next 200 years. City officials, he 
explained, were to lend out the funds in small sums at five percent to young artisans. After one-
hundred years, he predicted, the cities would have accumulated £131,000, and by the terms of his 
will, he instructed them to expend £100,000 of these funds on “public works,” such as the 
construction of bridges and buildings.
2
 During the next century, city officials were to continue 
lending out the remaining £31,000. In another 100 years, each state would have £4,000,061 that 
they could use according to their own wishes.
3
 
                                                          
1
 For more on the history of Franklin’s codicil, see Bruce H. Yenawine, “Benjamin Franklin’s Legacy of Virtue: 
The Franklin Trusts of Boston and Philadelphia.” PhD diss., Syracuse University, 1995; Peter Dobkin Hall, 
“Benjamin Franklin and the Origins of Secular Voluntarism,” Documentary History of Philanthropy and 
Voluntarism in the United States, 1600-1900, Hauser Center on Nonprofit Organizations at the John F. Kennedy 
School of Government, Harvard University website, https://www.hks.harvard.edu/fs/phall/10.%20Franklin.pdf 
(accessed October 19, 2016). 
2
 The American Philosophical Society holds the original copy of the final version of Benjamin Franklin’s will. 
For a transcript, see Yenawine, “Benjamin Franklin’s Legacy of Virtue,” 261-265.  
3
 Two hundred-years after Franklin’s death, in 1990, the states of Massachusetts and Philadelphia were left with 
$4.5 million and $2 million respectively. For more on debates about what to do with the leftover funds see, Fox 
Butterfield, “From Ben Franklin, a Gift That’s Worth Two Fights,” The New York Times, April 21, 1990. 
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 Franklin envisioned the establishment of these private trusts for public purposes as an 
experiment. He was not sure if it would work, and he implied as much at the end of the codicil, 
referencing the many accidents over the course of 200 years that might derail what he called his 
“vain fancy.”4 In retrospect, however, his experiment seems like quite a bit more than fancy. 
Franklin was well known for his experiments in civic improvement, and this exercise was likely 
intended to instruct Americans on the benefits of savings and well-managed credit.
5
 More 
importantly, though, Franklin was attempting to introduce the cumulative powers of compound 
interest to the young nation’s citizens. In 1785, Franklin had been corresponding with French 
economist and philanthropist Charles Joseph Mathon de la Cour.
6
 In response to Franklin’s Poor 
Richard’s Almanack, which was popular with French intellectuals, Mathon de la Cour had 
written Téstament de Fortuné Ricard, maître d’arithmétique à D**, and he shared a copy with 
Franklin. The testament is a fictional will composed by M. Fortuné Ricard, who leaves 500 livres 
in trust for 500 years, a portion of which is to be distributed at the end of each century for 
increasingly grand public works.
7
 Mathon de la Cour’s vision inspired Franklin to make the 
fictional trust a reality in the United States.  
There might not be a better place to begin the history of modern American philanthropy. 
This was Benjamin Franklin extolling the virtues of disciplined capital accumulation, for the 
benefit of American cities. He was yoking capitalist activity to the wealth of the nation. More 
subtly, it is a quintessentially American process, because American philanthropy has been for 
                                                          
4
 At the end to the codicil of his final will, Franklin wrote, “Considering the accidents to which all human 
Affairs and Projects are subject in such a length of Time, I have, perhaps, too much flattered myself with a vain 
Fancy, that these Dispositions, if carried into execution, will be continued without interruption and have the Effects 
proposed.” See Yenawine, “Benjamin Franklin’s Legacy of Virtue,” 264. 
5
 Major histories of Franklin’s life and work include: J. A. Leo Lemay, The Life of Benjamin Franklin, vols. 1-3 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006-2009) and Edmund S. Morgan, Benjamin Franklin (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2002).  
6
 Franklin served as the Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States in France from 1778-1785. Subsequently, 
he maintained a number of acquaintances and correspondence with European officials and thinkers, including 
Mathon de la Cour. For more context see, Yenawine, “Benjamin Franklin’s Legacy of Virtue,” chapter 2.  
7
 Franklin encouraged the translation and printing of Mathon de la Cour’s essay in the United States. It was 
included in the appendix of Richard Price, Observations on the Importance of the American Revolution, and the 
Means of Making it a Benefit to the World (Dublin: L. White, 1785).  For context see Yenawine, “Benjamin 
Franklin’s Legacy of Virtue.” 
3 
 
hundreds of years a story about the development of giving within an array of corporate vehicles. 
Indeed, Franklin had to name corporate bodies to manage his trusts.
8
 If he did not, then his will 
likely would not have passed muster in American courts.  
For many centuries in England, trust law governed the passing of wealth across 
generations to fuel a system of aristocratic patronage. Most American states, by contrast, 
repealed the British Charitable Statutes altogether in the early national period. In fact, the safest 
method of making a bequest for public works in the United States was actually to leave funds to 
a corporate body, in trust. So when Franklin wrote up his codicil, in Boston he provided for 
“Select Men, united with the Ministers of the oldest Episcopalian, Congregational, and 
Presbyterian Churches” (churches being corporate entities) to manage their trust. 9 And because 
Philadelphia was an incorporated municipality, in its case, he sanctioned the city itself, as a body 
corporate, to manage the funds.
  
These may seem like minor details or questions of semantics, but as corporations became 
the vehicles through which American philanthropy was conducted and, also, sanctioned by 
government, those corporate entities gained not only capital, but legitimacy as well. As 
                                                          
8
 Much has been written on how trust law shaped the emergence of American philanthropy. For more on 
relevant case law and context, see: Lawrence M. Friedman, Dead Hands: A Social History of Wills, Trusts, and 
Inheritance Law (Redwood City: Stanford University Press, 2009); Thomas E. Blackwell, “The Charitable 
Corporation and the Charitable Trust,” Washington University Law Review 24, no. 1 (1938); Stanley N. Katz, Barry 
Sullivan, and C. Paul Beach, “Legal Change and Legal Autonomy: Charitable Trusts in NY, 1777-1893,” Law and 
History Review 3 (Spring 1985). For more on the history of corporate law, see: Morton J. Horowitz, The 
Transformation of American Law, 1870-1960 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992); Susan Pace Hamill, 
“From Special Privilege to General Utility: A Continuation of Willard Hurst’s Study of Corporations,” American 
University Law Review 49 no. 1 (1999); Simon Eden Baldwin, “History of the Law of Private Corporations in the 
Colonies and States,” in Select Essays in Anglo-American Legal History, eds. Committee of Association of 
American Law Schools  (Boston: Little Brown, 1909); Joseph Stancliffe Davis, Essays in the Earlier History of 
American Corporations, 2 vols. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1917); Irwin G. Wyllie, "The Search for an 
American Law of Charity, 1776-1844," The Mississippi Valley Historical Review 46 (Sept 1959); Gareth Jones, 
History of the Law of Charity, 1532-1827 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960); Howard S. Miller, The 
Legal Foundations of American Philanthropy, 1776-1844 (Madison: State Historical Society of Wisconsin, 1961); 
Ronald E. Seavoy, “The Public Service Origins of the American Business Corporation," Business History Review, 
52, no. 1 (Spring, 1978); Norman I. Silber, A  Corporate Form of Freedom (Boulder: Westview Press, 2001); Peter 
Dobkin Hall, “What the Merchants Did with Their Money: Charitable and Testamentary Trusts in Massachusetts, 
1780-1880,” in Entrepreneurs: The Boston Business Community, 1700-1850, eds. Conrad Edick Wright and Kathryn 
P. Viens (Boston: Mass Historical Society, 1997). 
9
 See Benjamin Franklin’s will, where he explicitly describes the corporate bodies intended to manage his trust.  
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Americans neither intended to manage philanthropy through aristocratic patronage nor through a 
federal agency; public officials and the wealthiest Americans were left to devise the legal and 
financial technologies that would make American philanthropy possible in the nineteenth 
century. And as they designed the nation’s first philanthropic institutions, they experimented 
with corporate, financial, and administrative technologies to create corporate bodies that could 
undertake business, benevolence, and governance functions.
10
 
The corporate bodies that facilitated American philanthropy fostered a public-private 
partnership model that would have a lasting influence on the shape of the American nonprofit 
sector. As Jonathan Levy has recently explained, “If there is one continuity to the history of 
American philanthropy, it is that, from the first, it has been a corporate enterprise.”11 And 
further, it is a story of a corporate enterprise cast between two modes of governance—both 
private management of wealth and public management of social welfare. Due to the corporate 
form of American philanthropy, the corporate and legal technologies of commerce—from 
merchant banking to vertically-integrated trusts—are indelibly linked to American philanthropy. 
However, understanding American philanthropy as a corporate enterprise also signals that 
philanthropy, charity, and voluntarism—all undertaken through corporate bodies—have more in 
common with business and governing institutions than historians have realized.
12
  
                                                          
10
 Histories of philanthropy have often been told separately from histories of charity and voluntarism. There are 
strong reasons to combine these different types of giving around the concept of enterprise though, as churches, 
voluntary associations and foundations have operated as incorporated bodies in the United States. For a synthetic 
works that combines these different types of giving and development, see Peter Dobkin Hall, “A Historical 
Overview of Philanthropy, Voluntary Associations, and Nonprofit Organizations in the United States, 1600-2000,” 
in The Nonprofit Sector: A Research Handbook, eds. Walter W. Powell and Richard Steinberg, vol. 2  (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 2006).  For more on the differences between them, see Benjamin Soskis, “The Problem of 
Charity in Industrial America, 1873-1915.” PhD diss., Columbia University, 2010: 261-265. 
 
11
 Jonathan Levy has described how American states did not incorporate trust law into their regulation of 
charitable corporations in “On Altruism and the Origins of Nonprofit Philanthropy,” in Philanthropy in Democratic 
Societies: History, Institutions, Values, eds. Rob Reich, Chiara Chordelli and Lucy Bernholz (Chicago: University of 
Chicago, 2016). 
  
For the classic treatment of the development of a three-sector economy see, Burton A. Weisbrod, 
“Toward a Theory of the Voluntary Non-Profit Sector in a Three-Sector Economy,” in The Economics of Nonprofit 
Institutions, ed. Susan Rose-Ackerman (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986). 
12
 Historians have written widely on the corporation in American history; however, their accounts of its 
significance revolve around the eventual creation of the business corporation. See, for example,  Alan Trachtenberg, 
The Incorporation of America: Culture and Society in the Gilded Age (New York: Hill and Wang, 2007); Martin J. 
Sklar, The Corporate Reconstruction of American Capitalism, 1890-1916 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1988); Roland Marchand, Creating the Corporate Soul: The Rise of Public Relations and Corporate Imagery in 




In this dissertation, I analyze the history of philanthropic enterprise in the United States, 
beginning in the nineteenth century. I argue that the nation’s largest philanthropic experiments, 
from the creation of the Smithsonian Institution (1846) to the incorporation of the Rockefeller 
Foundation (1913), began as public-private partnerships that worked across business, 
benevolence and governance. While historians of American philanthropy generally date the birth 
of the modern foundation to the creation of the Russell Sage Foundation (1907), the Carnegie 
Corporation of New York (1911), and the Rockefeller Foundation (1913), I show that the rise of 
what we think of as these “private foundations” represents a major transformation in American 
philanthropy, rather than its genesis.
13
 That transformation involved the legal and social 
evolution of seeing philanthropic foundations as public trusts that operated as public-private 
partnerships to envisioning them as private foundations that operated autonomously from 
business and government. How Americans have thought about the public or private nature of 
distributing private wealth for public purposes has influenced the regulation of American 
philanthropy, as well the social value placed on the accumulation of wealth through commercial 
activity, I contend.  
Prominent historians of American philanthropy have claimed that Americans lacked the 
organizational vehicles to conduct national philanthropy in the early-twentieth century.
14
 This 
has led to an analysis of how foundations filled gaps left by American business and government 
in the provisioning of social services.
15
 However, by shifting the periodization of the history of 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Corporate 1870-1920 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990); Kenneth Lipartito, “The Utopian Corporation,” 
in Constructing Corporate America: History, Politics, Culture, eds. Kenneth Lipartito and David B. Sicilia (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2004). 
 
13
 For examples of historians emphasizing the genesis of philanthropic foundations in the early-twentieth 
century, see Helmut K. Anheier and David C. Hammack, “American Foundations: Their Roles and Contributions to 
Society,” in American Foundations: Roles and Contribution, eds. Helmut K. Anheier and David C. Hammack 
(Washington: The Brookings Institution, 2010). Also see, Alice O’Connor, Social Science for What: Philanthropy 
and the Social Question in a World Turned Rightside Up (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2007); Olivier Zunz, 
Philanthropy in American: A History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012). 
 
14
 See, for example, Peter Dobkin Hall, Inventing the Nonprofit Sector (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1992), 5; Barry D. Karl and Stanley N. Katz, “Foundations and Ruling Class Elites,” Daedalus 116, no. 1 
(1987) and “The American Private Philanthropic Foundation and the Public Sphere 1890-1930,” MINERVA XIX, 
no. 2 (1981). 
15
 The most famous articulation of private philanthropy fulfilling functions that government and business 





American philanthropic foundations to include the early nineteenth century, my research shows 
that Progressive-Era foundations did not lack organizational or corporate precedent in managing 
their wealth at all. By examining the legal records of early-twentieth century foundations, I 
demonstrate that these foundations substantively based their legal form and administrative 
operations on earlier foundations, beginning with the Smithsonian Institution (1846) and the 
Peabody Education Fund (1867). Indeed, foundations assuming a legal and social identity as 
“private corporations” that held their endowments in absolute ownership was new in the early-
twentieth century; however, the functions they sought to undertake were well established by 
previous philanthropic foundations.  
This dissertation then addresses the transformation of American philanthropy across the 
nineteenth-century—from a public-trust model that operated through public-private partnerships 
to a private-foundation model that undertook development work separately from and in 
competition with the emerging welfare state. Such a transformation was not inevitable, I will 
show. Rather, the public-trust model represents a path-not-taken in American history—a path 
that prioritized an entirely different regulatory vision for private wealth in the social and 
economic development of the nation. Amidst twenty-first-century debates about the corroding 
impact of private wealth on democratic institutions, this history of American philanthropy offers 
an account of the alternative regulatory and administrative visions that government officials, 
wealthy citizens, and social reformers have had for philanthropy—from the very beginning. 
 
This story begins in the nineteenth century, when some of America’s richest citizens, in 
conjunction with state and federal legislatures, incorporated the nation’s first major philanthropic 
institutions—and created what I refer to as “public trusts.”16 Like Franklin, the nation’s first 
major philanthropists left funds in trust to be managed by corporate bodies as national 
benefactions. Public trusts were the predecessors to what we think of as modern foundations 
today. A foundation can refer to any endowed institution. Public trusts, by contrast, were created 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
16
 For the Rockefeller Foundation’s use of the term “public trust, see, “The Genesis of the Investigation,” 1915, 
Folder 150, Box 20, Series 900, Program and Policy, Rockefeller Foundation records, Rockefeller Archive Center.” 
And Frederick T. Gates laid out the contours of the concept (while not using the term directly) in a letter to John D. 
Rockefeller Sr.: Frederick T. Gates to John D. Rockefeller Sr., June 3, 1905, Folder 57, Box 3, Frederick T. Gates 
Papers, Rockefeller Archive Center.  
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from the wealth of one individual, which in turn were managed by public officials who 
undertook explicitly public works.
17
 Through these public-private partnerships that emphasized 
the civic purpose of private wealth, the public-trust model of American philanthropy eased 
citizens into the idea of private wealth accumulating and exercising public power. The model 
also created a legal and administrative mechanism for public officials, the wealthy, and social 
reformers to undertake national development projects that worked across business, benevolence, 
and governance.  
The public trust served a vital function for a nation that had decided not to manage its 
philanthropy and charity through a centralized government agency. For a nation that lacked a 
federal income tax that would have made the federal government capable of funding 
philanthropic and national development work—such as the creation of public schools, the 
prevention of public health crises, and the undertaking of agricultural development—this was 
key. For these reasons, private wealth had heightened public value to government in this earlier 
period.  
I first encountered the term “public trust” while reviewing internal memoranda at the 
Rockefeller Foundation Archive Center. In the early-twentieth century, the Rockefellers
18
 
claimed that their foundation was a “public trust, not a private possession,” because the 
American people had a right to supervise the foundation through legislative representatives.
19
 
However, ironically, the Rockefellers and their philanthropic advisers were making this point 
when the dismantling of the public-trust model of American philanthropy was already well 
underway. In fact, from the start, the Rockefeller Foundation was more of a private foundation 
than a public trust. Rockefeller and his advisers had not included public officials on the 
foundation’s board, and the foundation existed to fulfill any purpose its board of trustees desired 
to pursue (as opposed to specifying a specific public purpose in its articles of incorporation like 
                                                          
17
 As foundations refer to any endowed institutions, that term can refer to a public trust. However, all 
foundations are not public trusts. At times, I use the term foundation to refer to a public trust for the sake of 
conciseness.  
18
 I use the term “Rockefellers” to refer to John D. Rockefeller Sr. and John D. Rockefeller Jr., along with their 
team of advisers including Frederick T. Gates, Starr J. Murphy, and Jerome Greene. All of these individuals were 
instrumental in developing the Rockefeller family’s philanthropic strategies in the early-twentieth century. 
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earlier public trusts). The Rockefellers were trying to revive the language of the public trust, at 
this late moment, because by the early twentieth-century they were under pressure from 
government officials and social reformers to articulate the public value of their newly 
incorporated foundation. By that time, foundation leaders were discussing the possibility that 
new economic legislation would “preclude the acquisition of surplus wealth” and prevent the 
giving of “large continuing gifts.” 20 Public sentiment, many foundation leaders thought, would 
lead government officials to increase taxation and give money away for public works itself.
21
 
Therefore, describing the public purpose of the Rockefeller Foundation was critical to its success 
and long-term viability, the Rockefellers believed.   
So while my first encounter with the term “public trust” was fairly anachronistic, later, I 
would find it referenced more organically. I would find the term had been used to reference the 
British Museum’s public identity in 1753,22 as well as the early operations of the Columbian 
Institute in Washington D.C. in 1827.
23
 These entities were using the term public trust to 
reference the stewardship of private capital and objects for national publics. While I could not 
find a history of the concept or even a precise definition, I did find that the term public trust has 
been used occasionally to describe private gifts to government entities in early American 
philanthropy.
24
 My thinking about the concept continued to evolve in conversations with Pamela 
Henson, the Director of the Institutional History Division of the Smithsonian Institution Archive, 
in the fall of 2016. Henson has referred to the early Smithsonian Institution as a “public trust” in 
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 While the public trust may not refer to a precise legal category, some of the 
world’s largest philanthropies, including the Smithsonian Institution, have used it to reference 
the public-private partnership model they have employed.   
In my dissertation, I use the term public trust to refer to both the distinct legal form that 
nineteenth-century philanthropic institutions took, as well as the social purpose they created for 
private wealth in the nation’s development. For the foundation-model of philanthropy to develop 
in the United States, Americans had to be able to legally and socially create a role for private 
wealth in the undertaking of the nation’s public works. Just as Franklin’s experiment with 
compound interest suggested, imagining the limitless growth of private capital in national and 
global markets was critical to wealth developing a lasting role in American governance. And, 
corporate vehicles needed to exist that would allow trustees to invest, grow, and distribute that 
private capital for the sake of national development in perpetuity. That long process of 
imagining, debuting, and implementing novel models of trusts and corporations to manage the 
nation’s wealth is the subject of this dissertation. 
How have people thought about and used private wealth as a source of power nationally 
and globally?
26
 Prior to the eighteenth century and the emergence of banking and finance, 
endowed charitable bequests consisted of revenues from land.
27
 Universities, churches, and 
public works operated with the help of endowments, but they were funded by the landed 
aristocracy. In Franklin’s lifetime that was already changing as lending money out to make more 
money transformed the very possibilities of capital accumulation. Franklin could create public 
trusts that would operate off of lent money, rather than rents. By the mid-nineteenth century, 
however, an even greater sea change was taking place as the rise of banking and finance allowed 
endowed capital to be managed in securities. With the rise of banking and finance, endowed 
foundations offered founders a new vehicle to accumulate more wealth and social influence 
beyond the horizons of their natural lives. American bankers, businessmen, and eventually 
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industrialists, had the financial expertise to endow their funds with stocks and bonds that they 
believed would grow in perpetuity. This vision of establishing endowments with hand-selected 
securities carved out a niche for the expertise of the self-made rich in philanthropy. It was the 
accumulators, with this approach, who had the know-how to grow America enterprise, 
economically and socially.  
Philanthropists took note, and so did government officials and Americans concerned with 
potentially corrupting sources of centralized power in their developing democracy. The impact of 
these financial technologies on the management of private wealth was only surpassed by how 
they transformed the size of American fortunes. If Franklin’s contemporaries had to be taught the 
virtues of compound interest in the late eighteenth century, by the mid-nineteenth century, 
America was a “paradise of millionaires.”28 Or at least that was the hope of the merchants, 
bankers, and industrialists who imagined their rapidly increasing wealth as a fixture in the 
nation’s future development.  
Andrew Carnegie developed the most famous vision for the role of wealth in national 
development. In his famous essay that would become known as “The Gospel of Wealth” (first 
derisively and then in earnest), he laid out his rationale for the accumulation of wealth in U.S. 
capitalism. Possessors of what he termed, “surplus wealth,” or the profits from industry that 
exceeded the common needs of any family or individual, would serve as stewards in American 
social and economic life. Millionaires, he suggested, should use their surplus wealth to act as 
“trustee[s] for the poor.” And in this sense, parts of the profits of corporate capitalism would 
become “the property of the many.”29 Carnegie also explained what surplus wealth was not. It 
was not a “competence,” which he defined as “moderate sums saved by many years of effort, the 
returns on which [were] required for the comfortable maintenance and education of families.” 
Rather, surplus wealth referenced the capital which built great fortunes. While a competence 
might be the respectable aim for everyone, surplus wealth was a privilege of the few. In many 
respects, all wealth produced in industrial capitalism can be seen as a surplus. In contrast, 
Carnegie’s concept of surplus wealth is highly specific; he meant to reference the capital—held 
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by only a few—that he imagined would serve as the engine of what he called the development of 
American civilization.  
Carnegie’s vision for the ideal stewardship of the nation’s “surplus wealth” was, 
however, certainly contested. Intellectuals, activists, and Progressive-Era politicians debated the 
role that private wealth should play in the shaping of public life. California Senator John D. 
Works decried what he saw as the increasing relationship between commercial and charitable 
interests. In a speech on trusts and combinations, he argued that the United States government 
should not “farm out…the right and power to educate the people of the country” to men like 
Andrew Carnegie who made their money through “extortion, oppression, and crime.”30 By doing 
so the American people would become “receivers of stolen goods,” and such a practice would 
make the United States’ major educational institutions “subservient to the interests and views” of 
men like Carnegie.
31
 Senator Works’ remarks reflect a deep anxiety about the management of 
surplus wealth in the U.S. industrial economy. In Senator Works’ words, “[a]s a matter of simple 
justice and right the money thus accumulated belongs not to the dispenser of these charities but 
to the men, women, and children whose underpaid toil accumulated the fund.”32 By the early 
twentieth century, the public trust was in danger of declining due to fears of private wealth’s 
influence over public officials.  
In large part, this is a story about the control and management of wealth—about the 
competing visions for the accumulation and regulation of private wealth. Carnegie and Works 
were not engaging in a new debate though; even by the mid-nineteenth-century, enough 
Americans had large fortunes to inspire public conversation about the desired distribution of 
surplus wealth. Americans were, from the start, concerned about designing public trusts to 
promote American democracy. In an article about public benefactions, and their desired role in 
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Benefactors should ask themselves what is that which the municipalities and the State 
governments cannot be expected to see should be done? What is that which, indeed, it 
would be politically dangerous for a republican people to confide to a government which 
must always, for the time being, represent a one-sided political party, and therefore, in its 
best estate, be changing every few years? What is that which it will ennoble individuals 
to do spontaneously, while it would endanger the morals of official persons to do it? 
What is that which is never well done by clerks of governments, but must be the pride of 
an individual or a family, in order that it should make progress with society, ever going 
before, instead of toiling after, its demands? 
 
These were provocative questions (and they remain so today). What public welfare causes were 
best provisioned by the government? What should the public purpose of trusts created from 
private surplus wealth have been? In the development of American democratic governance, how 
could the division of these responsibilities have threatened the nation’s commitment to popular 
sovereignty and to fostering political efficacy? 
As Americans addressed these complicated policy questions, just as Carnegie and Senator 
Works’ divergent views about surplus wealth suggest, their answers would change dramatically. 
Philanthropists such as Rockefeller and Carnegie came to see themselves as trustees for the 
nation, rather than mere contributors of public benefactions. In the beginning, founders of the 
Smithsonian, the Peabody Education Fund, the John F. Slater Fund, and even the Carnegie 
Institution of Washington had envisioned public officials as the trustees of the funds they 
created. However, with the rise of corporate capitalism, wealth increasingly became its own 
source of power in American society—a source that through accumulation and combination 
might outspend the government on social welfare initiatives.  
This story, then, is not simply about the role of surplus wealth in society. It is also about 
the shifting scope of the state and corporate power. For much of the nineteenth century, surplus 
wealth, itself, was seen as public. That is not to say it was held as communal property, but that 
regulators, philanthropists, and the general population continually reassessed how public officials 
and the nation’s richest citizens should engage in the stewardship of the nation’s prosperity—or 
if one or the other party was the best steward. Amidst changing politics around the ownership 
and management of what Andrew Carnegie eventually called the nation’s “surplus wealth,” 
13 
 
public trusts like Franklin’s fueled national debates about how surplus wealth should be managed 
and distributed in American economy and society.
34
 And the increasing role of private wealth in 
public life, as well as the concentration of wealth, made these questions about philanthropy and 
the fundamental purpose of surplus wealth critical questions for historians, policy experts, and 
lay people. The history of the public trust in America is also a story of the controversial visions 
of progress produced alongside the rise of corporate capitalism—particularly the animating role 





This early history of philanthropic enterprise revises the classic periodization of modern 
American philanthropy.
36
 The Smithsonian Institution set an important legal precedent for the 
creation of national benevolent institutions that were not explicitly governmental in the 
nineteenth century—leading to the creation of future foundations and national associations as 
private corporations, I argue. Historians of American philanthropy, however, have not addressed 
the Smithsonian in their work; the role that Congress played in shaping the Smithsonian has been 
eclipsed by heroic narratives about the organizational genius of industrial philanthropists, such as 
Carnegie, Rockefeller and Sage. The story of the birth of the modern foundation usually 
maintains that early-twentieth-century foundations invented a new corporate vehicle to conduct 
national philanthropy at a new scale. Government institutions failed to meet citizens’ social 
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needs and business entities lacked the will or capacity, so it was up to these philanthropists to 
make national philanthropy a reality in the Progressive Era.
37
 In contrast to this emphasis on the 
genesis of national philanthropy in the early twentieth century, my research demonstrates that 
many of the nation’s first foundations used the Smithsonian’s federal charter as a model when 
they created their own articles of incorporation.
38
 In short, the Smithsonian was the archetype for 
the major foundations we know today. What is more, that legal form laid the groundwork for the 
expansive corporate privileges we associate with modern philanthropy. Carnegie and Rockefeller 
had help—a lot of help—in creating the philanthropic foundation.39 
My work on the early history of philanthropic enterprise also contributes to scholarship 
on state development in the nineteenth century. American political development scholars have 
shown the critical role that various types of nonprofit corporations played in the undertaking of 
public works, particularly in the nineteenth century.
40
 The government worked with and through 
associations and nonprofit corporations the work shows. My research on the public-private 
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partnership model of the public trust expands on these arguments by demonstrating that the 
public trust was not simply a way that the government worked with or through nonprofit 
corporations; rather it was a site for public officials to undertake new national development 
projects. Even before more famous Gilded-Age debates about the accumulation of wealth, I 
contend, Americans were creating legal and conventional social roles for the deployment of 
private surplus wealth in the undertaking of major public works. Rather than labeling 
philanthropy as “private” or autonomous from government activity, through the development of 
the public trust, national benevolence becomes part of how American governance strategy 
developed in the nineteenth century—and it was, in fact, a way that private money began to have 
a say in the complex modes of governance of the nineteenth century.  
This dissertation also considers how the public-private partnership model of the public 
trust shifted over the course of more than a century. Understanding the legal and social 
development of American associations as what legal historian William Novak calls “a mode of 
governance” has offered new insight into a politics of association that did not analytically 
separate the public and the private and the governmental and the nongovernmental—but rather 
considered the legal creation and regulation of associations as a mode of governance itself.
41
 
Work in this field promises to demonstrate the central role that voluntary associations have 
played in American political development, while uncovering distinct nineteenth-century 
associational politics and practices.
42
 In this dissertation, I analyze how the public trust continued 
to develop as a corporate vehicle for public benefactions in the nineteenth century. In doing so, I 
contribute to work on what Novak called the “legal-political construction of civil society,” and I 
expand its attention to the pivotal role that surplus wealth played in the growth and regulation of 
civil society. Like the Smithsonian, other public trusts were created from private fortunes, but 
they were managed in part by government officials for explicitly and consciously “public” 
purposes. As a result, studying the evolution of these public trusts requires attention to the 
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wealthy individuals who gave their fortunes away and their relationships with government 
authorities who both crafted special legislation to foster that growth and stood in management 
roles after the creation of these institutions.  
By analyzing the pivotal role that surplus wealth played in the growth and regulation of 
civil society, I also contribute to work in the history of capitalism that seeks to understand how 
financial and legal practices have shaped economy and society.
 43
  However, I argue that the 
chartering and administration of nonprofit corporations were at the center, rather than the 
periphery, of debates about the corporate form in American history. While historians have paid 
far greater attention to the ways in which privileged access to capital and incorporation shaped 
the evolution of the business corporation, nonprofit corporations were the true eye of the storm 
as they united concerns about material and social development that commercial corporations 
could only gesture at bringing together.  
Further, my research has as much to do with the financial and administrative technologies 
that propelled the transformation of American philanthropy as the social significance of the real 
and imagined power of private wealth in national life. As Americans worked out the desired 
relationship between private wealth and public works, they grappled with fundamental questions 
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about the purpose of surplus wealth in American capitalism and the role that the wealthiest 
citizens should play in its distribution. By the early twentieth century, John D. Rockefeller Sr., 
Andrew Carnegie, and Olivia Slocum Sage all faced social and legal challenges as they endowed 
major foundations. By analyzing how they and their legal advisers designed their trusts, as well 
as how legislatures regulated the corporate bodies they created, I argue that increasing pressure 
from philanthropists and public officials to separate their public works from their business 
operations and from the government led to the rise of a new species of corporation more akin to 
the private foundations we know today--and something fairly unlike the old public trust model 
popular in the mid nineteenth century. The nation’s surplus wealth was no longer to be managed 
through living public trusts that would be closely affiliated with government-sanctioned public 
works. Rather, it was to become its own source of power—with its own form of governance. As 
Congress tried to distance itself from Carnegie and Rockefeller’s “tainted money,” it actually 
empowered private wealth to operate with more autonomous power. This approach produces an 
entirely different perspective on the rise of the private corporation in American history than one 
that uses the business corporation as a central analytic. 
 
When I began archival research for this dissertation, I reviewed the government, legal and 
administrative records relating to the creation of the nation’s first foundations. In the early-
twentieth century, leaders in philanthropy published a number of lists describing the nation’s first 
philanthropic foundations.
44
 Intriguingly, every major foundation included in these lists—the 
Peabody Education Fund, the John F. Slater Fund, the Carnegie Institution of Washington, the 
General Education Board, the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, the 
Russell Sage Foundation, the Anna T. Jeanes Fund, the Carnegie Corporation of New York, and 
the Rockefeller Foundation all received special charters.  
The fact that all of the nation’s public trusts received special charters makes them an 
ideal corporate vehicle to study both the regulatory and entrepreneurial visions that created the 
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public-trust model of American philanthropy. While it is correct that corporate enterprise is the 
unifying force in American philanthropy, it is crucial to also understand that public trusts were 
treated differently than other types of corporations by state and federal legislatures. While states 
developed general incorporation laws across the nineteenth century to standardize the corporate 
privileges permitted to different types of entities and to open up the incorporation process to 
more people, foundations did not fit into a general incorporation model.
45
 That means that 
Congress and the New York legislature decided that state laws governing charitable trusts, as 
well as state general incorporation laws pertaining to benevolent corporations,
46
 should not 
pertain to the nation’s biggest philanthropic foundations.  
The potential social value of private wealth—in performing vital social functions such as 
managing public health crises, organizing education, and creating cultural institutions—had led 
federal and state government officials to create and regulate national benevolent institutions 
differently than other types of voluntary associations and businesses. This favorable treatment of 
the public trust was important to its development, because many states set limits on the size of 
the endowment a benevolent institution could hold, for the amount of time it could operate, and 
the purposes that qualified as benevolent in their statutes governing laws of incorporation.
47
 
Under these conditions, lay people and government officials began to debate how wealthy 
Americans should be permitted to devote private property to public uses, but at an extremely 
heightened scale. 
 
In the chapters that follow here, I track the development of the corporate entities that influenced 
the transformation of American philanthropy. I begin by emphasizing the creation of the 
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Smithsonian Institution in 1846 with a federal charter as a key moment when federal officials 
and philanthropists negotiated whether national benevolent institutions would be government 
agencies, quasi-governmental institutions, or private foundations. Congress’ decision to grant the 
Smithsonian Institution a federal charter to operate as a public-private entity laid the groundwork 
for national benevolent institutions to develop as public trusts. My second chapter examines how 
the growth of private surplus wealth in America allowed its richest citizens to experiment with 
creating their own public trusts during Reconstruction. The merchant banker George Peabody 
adapted the Smithsonian’s public-trust model to manage his major fund for southern education. 
In order to do so, he had to work with cutting-edge financial and legal technologies that 
permitted him (and his trustees) to use capital markets to grow the funds from his private trust, 
and to use a corporate body to manage the fund’s operations. This involved the evolution of New 
York corporate statutes, along with the legislature’s willingness to grant what would become the 
Peabody Education Fund a special charter in 1867.  
While these early chapters emphasize the consolidation of the public-trust model of 
American philanthropy in the nineteenth century, my later chapters examine its gradual decline 
in the late-nineteenth to early-twentieth centuries. My third chapter explores how the rise of 
debates about the proper role of private wealth in public life exploded in the Gilded Age and 
Progressive Era with emerging debates about corporate capitalism. I examine how Carnegie, 
Sage and Rockefeller all experimented with creating public trusts in this period, and as they did 
so, I show how they altered the legal form of the public trust to gain more control over the 
operation of the funds. By the early twentieth century, philanthropists were developing an 
alternative corporate vehicle to undertake their philanthropy—the private foundation. These 
private foundations were widely regarded as a “new species of corporation,” that was met with 
both celebration and condemnation by public officials and social workers.  
Amidst the rise of the private corporation and antimonopolism, my last two chapters 
consider the Rockefeller Foundation’s failed federal charter as an instance when the public trust 
almost adapted to the conditions of corporation capitalism. However, rather than increase the 
regulation of public trusts, the federal government decided to divorce its social welfare work 
from private philanthropists. I use Congressional hearings and reports, along with popular 
coverage of the proceedings, to assess how these debates about the Rockefeller Foundation 
reflected larger prevailing anxieties about the wealthy’s use of the corporate form for charitable 
20 
 
purposes. My fifth and final chapter concludes with the Rockefeller Foundation’s attempt to fund 
industrial relations research through their foundation after the Ludlow Massacre. The 
Rockefellers owned a controlling share of the coal mine at the center of the massacre, the 
Colorado Fuel and Iron Company, so state and federal governments began investigating the 
Rockefeller’s use of their foundation to undertake corporate welfare work. Shortly afterwards, 
the United States Industrial Relations Commission actually expanded the commission’s interest 
in industrial welfare to include “The Centralization of Industrial Control and Operation of 
Philanthropic Foundations.” These events resulted in government entities separating their work 
from private foundations and in the increased regulation of private wealth in public life 
throughout the twentieth century. All along the way, I show that this transformation of American 







Making the Public Trust:  
Congress and the Bequest that Created the Smithsonian Institution
 
 
In New York late in August 1838, weak and sick from an uncomfortable voyage across the 
Atlantic too full of squalls and headwinds, Richard Rush gratefully disembarked the packet ship 
Mediator.
48
 Rush, an eminent Pennsylvania attorney who had already served as the U.S. 
Attorney General and the Secretary of the Treasury, eagerly anticipated a short rest at home, but 
he first awaited instructions from the U.S. Secretary of State.
49
 He had eleven boxes of gold 
sovereigns amounting to just over $500,000 in his possession, along with a weighty collection of 
trunks filled with the personal effects of a deceased Englishman.
50




For two years Rush had been in England prosecuting a bequest on behalf of the U.S. 
government, which he referred to as, a most unusual “public business.”52 That business began in 
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1829 when James Smithson, the illegitimate son of the Duke of Northumberland, had surprised 
his countryman and American officials by puzzlingly naming the United States in his will.
53
 
Smithson bequeathed almost all of his fortune to his English nephew, but in the event of his 
nephew’s death and in the absence of heirs, he left his fortune “to the United States of America, 
to found at Washington, under the name of Smithsonian Institution,
54
 an establishment for the 
increase and diffusion of knowledge among men.”55  
When Smithson and his nephew died without heirs, President Andrew Jackson appointed 
Rush, who was also a practiced diplomat, to prosecute the U.S.’s claim to the Smithson bequest. 
It took Rush two years, but he successfully won the suit. In August 1838, back in the United 
States with the numerous trunks, he needed only to deposit the gold to complete his task. Soon 
the Secretary of State sent instructions, and Rush arranged for the deposit of the funds in the U.S. 
Treasury. That unlikely deposit, more than the bequest ironically, launched a far greater force in 
American economy and society. Upon the deposit of Smithson’s fortune in the national treasury, 
Rush enabled a new use for private fortunes in the undertaking of national public works. This 
was a moment when a foreign bequest provided an opportunity to the US federal government, 
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and it was an opportunity the government took—embarking on a path towards a new hybrid role 
for government and private funding. Because as unlikely and unusual as Smithson’s bequest was, 
the Smithsonian as we know it was not a fait accompli when Rush deposited the funds. 
Even in the mid-eighteenth century, Smithson’s bequest for establishing the Smithsonian 
Institution was a proverbial drop in the bucket when taken together with the appropriations 
records from a single session of Congress. And around that time the annual revenue and 
expenditures of the federal government both topped thirty million dollars.
56
 In 1845, for 
example, Congress spent well over a half million dollars compensating legislators and covering 
incidental expenses alone.
57
 A half-million-dollar gift to the federal government would not have 
lasted long in the annals of national benevolence without becoming an endowed institution—
even in the first half of the 19
th
 century. The principal would have to be preserved for the gift to 
achieve the testator’s objectives.58 It was Congress’ stewardship of the bequest and its decision 
not to touch the endowment’s principal that gave the Smithsonian Institution a lasting place in 
the federal government’s appropriations and in the nation’s vision of its economic and social 




And with the federal government in possession of Smithson’s fortune, Congress was left 
to decide what type of entity the Smithsonian Institution would be—whether it would be a 
government agency or private corporation, whether it would primarily serve Washington D.C. or 
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the entire nation, and how exactly it would promote the increase and diffusion of knowledge. 
None of these fundamental questions were settled by Smithson. Unwittingly, with his open-
ended bequest to establish an institution “for the increase and diffusion of knowledge among 
men,” he had invited the federal government to design, from the ground up, a massive 
benevolent institution that would influence the organization of the U.S. nonprofit sector in 
centuries to come. The Smithsonian was the establishment of a new place for the power of 
accumulated capital in the nation—somewhere between private and public. 
 
Despite the extraordinary circumstances surrounding its creation, historians of American 
philanthropy have, for the most part, not included the Smithsonian Institution in their work.
60
 
This has been the case for two reasons. First, while the Smithsonian Institution was created from 
the private wealth of an individual, in 1858 the federal government started to make annual 
appropriations to the Smithsonian Institution, and by the 1880’s a majority of its funding came 
from the federal government.
61
 Because of this, the Smithsonian Institution has been seen as a 
creature of the federal government with greater relevance to the development of federal authority 
than to the development of philanthropic institutions.  
However, while federal officials may think of the Smithsonian as a “federal 
instrumentality” today, its first leadership did not think of it as a government institution. 62 
                                                          
60
 I have not found an example of historians grappling with the legal and social connections between the 
Smithsonian Institution and later foundations. For the lengthiest treatment of the history of the Smithsonian 
Institution as “public philanthropy,” see Peter Dobkin Hall, “The Limits of Public Philanthropy,” Documentary 
History of Philanthropy and Voluntarism in the United States, 1600-1900, Hauser Center on Nonprofit 
Organizations at the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University website, 
https://www.hks.harvard.edu/fs/phall/10.%20Franklin.pdf (accessed October 19, 2016); Hall more briefly mentioned 
the connection in “A Historical Overview of Philanthropy, Voluntary Associations, and Nonprofit Organizations in 
the United States, 1600-2000,” 41. Also see, Zunz who briefly mentioned the significance of Congressional debates 
about accepting Smithson’s bequest in Philanthropy in American, 105. 
61
 Pamela Henson, “History of Smithsonian Trust and Federal Funds,” March 2016, Institutional History 
Research Files, Smithsonian Institution Archives.  
62
 By 1977 Congress commissioned a report on the relationship between the Smithsonian and Congress that still 
shapes how we view the Smithsonian today. At that time, commissioners deemed the Smithsonian a “federal 
instrumentality.” See Phillip S. Hughes, “Report to the Audit Review Committee of the Board of Regents of the 
Smithsonian Institution,” 1977, Smithsonian Institution Archives, Record Unit 613, Box 429, Folder: 1977 Bd. of 
Regents/Audit Review Committee, 11. 
25 
 
Rather, as William Rhees the chief clerk under the Smithsonian’s first two secretaries and the 
first keeper of the Smithsonian Institution Archives, explained: “The Smithsonian [was] not a 
Government Institution, as [was] often supposed, but [was] a private foundation, originating 
entirely in the bequest of an individual.”63 As such, the Smithsonian Institution set an important 
legal precedent for the creation of national benevolent institutions that were not explicitly 
governmental—leading to the creation of future foundations and national associations.  
Further, historians of American philanthropy have not addressed the Smithsonian in their 
work because the Smithsonian’s role in forging the shape of the American nonprofit sector has 
been buried under the weight of heroic narratives about the organizational genius of industrial 
philanthropists. The story of the birth of the modern foundation usually goes something like this: 
in the early-twentieth century as American fortunes grew larger than ever, would-be 
philanthropists lacked the organizational vehicles to conduct national philanthropy at a new 
scale. Government institutions failed to meet citizens’ social needs and business entities lacked 
the will or capacity, so wealthy entrepreneurs like John D. Rockefeller and Andrew Carnegie 




In contrast to this emphasis on the genesis of national philanthropy in the early twentieth 
century,
65
 my research demonstrates that many of the nation’s first foundations used the 
Smithsonian’s federal charter as a model when they created their own articles of incorporation.66 
In short, the Smithsonian was the archetype for the major foundations we know today. What is 
more, that legal form laid the groundwork for the expansive corporate privileges we associate 
with modern philanthropy. Carnegie and Rockefeller had help—a lot of help—in creating the 
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philanthropic foundation. In fact, this legal and social connection between the Smithsonian and 
philanthropic foundations is directly evidenced in what historians often refer to as the first 
foundation, the Peabody Education Fund.
 67
  The first Secretary of the Smithsonian Institution, 
Joseph Henry, advised George Peabody on his philanthropy in Baltimore in 1866.
68
 Peabody 
would go on to create the PEF a year later.  
The Smithsonian’s influence on the design and purpose of foundations would also last 
into the twentieth century. When Andrew Carnegie and his legal advisers chartered the Carnegie 
Institution of Washington in 1904, they explicitly used the Smithsonian’s federal charter as a 
model.
 69
 Charles Walcott who served as a founding member of the CIW’s executive committee 
was an old friend of Andrew Carnegie and a long-time honorary curator at the Smithsonian who 
would go on to become its Secretary in 1907.
70
 The institutional tradition established by the 
Smithsonian extends to the Rockefellers, as well. The Rockefellers and their philanthropic 
advisers used federal charters, like that of the Smithsonian’s, to design their General Education 
Board, and they attempted to do so with the Rockefeller Foundation.  
 
Unusual Public Business: The Decision to Accept the Bequest 
Smithson’s bequest of his fortune to the United States government did not result in its immediate 
dissipation. On the contrary, the way government officials decided to preserve the fund—as a 
trust managed by public officials and private citizens through a corporate entity—reveals the 
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critical role that the government played in managing the development of philanthropy in 
America.
 
To understand the impact that the Smithsonian Institution has had on the nonprofit 
sector, first we need to know more about why Congress decided to accept Smithson’s fortune 
and the entity the US government created to manage the funds. 
The choice was deliberate and well-debated. The bequest inspired popular interest in both 
England and the United States. The English found it so strange that it was published in full in the 
London Times. It was met with similar curiosity in the United States and promptly published in 
the New-York American.
71
 And before Richard Rush even boarded a ship to England, Congress 
was already engaged in public debates about the Smithson bequest—about questions even more 
fundamental than how to employ the gift. President Andrew Jackson believed he did not have 
constitutional authority to pursue the bequest on his own, so in the first months of 1836, both 
houses of Congress were in the process of deciding, as a preliminary matter, whether or not to 
authorize a U.S. official to prosecute the nation’s claim to Smithson’s fortune in the British court 
of chancery.
 72
 Concerns about accepting the funds ranged from its foreign origin to the 
constitutionality of Congress managing and accepting the bequest.  
The concerns about constitutionality and federalism seemed primary. The bequest was 
dropped as fodder into fiery, ongoing debates regarding American federalism. Here was a 
bequest and purpose giving new ground to the central government at Washington, suddenly 
given a mandate to increase and diffuse knowledge among men. Further the debates hinged on 
public officials’ desire to have access to any pool of funds to manage national development 
causes. In the antebellum period, the federal government’s powers were famously limited. In 
1789 the Departments of War, Treasury, and State were created as the first federal agencies.
73
 
These functions were to benefit the entirety of the nation and could hardly be performed locally, 
so they occupied the rare status of requiring federal operation and funding. Aside from this, as 
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More than abstract concerns with centralized power, federal coffers did not overflow with 
funds easily devoted to public works—the nation’s surplus wealth was limited. Congress funded 
the operations of its agencies mostly with tariffs and excise taxes.
75
 There was no federal income 
tax at that time. (For a brief period, Congress would levy an income tax during the Civil War, but 
the Sixteenth Amendment, which permanently established the federal income tax, would not pass 
until 1913.) That meant that, when necessary, funding federal expenditures was an omnipresent 
concern, and the federal government establishing a Smithsonian Institution of its own—with 
national revenue—was a far-fetched proposition in this period. For example, even George 
Washington could not persuade national officials to create a national university during his 
tenure.
76
 All of these concerns about the federal management of public works had to be 
confronted as a result of the Smithson bequest, making the gift as much about government as it 
was about the philanthropic aims of James Smithson. 
And then, there were concerns about this role for government that went further than 
federalism, into a concern for how the gift bound up the government with private interests. In the 
Senate, the matter was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary where South Carolinians John 
C. Calhoun and William C. Preston made the most significant objections to the bill. First, both 
senators questioned the “dignity” of accepting the gift.77 Senator Preston argued that it would be 
better for the nation to use its own funds to establish such an institution. He feared that by 
accepting the gift, Congress was pandering to the “paltry vanity of an individual.”78 He 
continued, “If they accepted this donation, every whippersnapper vagabond that had been 
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traducing our country might think proper to have his name distinguished in the same way. It was 
not consistent with the dignity of the country to accept even the grant of a man of noble 
birth...”79 And Senator Calhoun believed “it was beneath the dignity of the United States to 
receive presents of this kind from anyone.”80 
These objections about the dignity of accepting a foreign bequest sound familiar to 
modern ears. The corrupting influence of private money in democratic politics is widely 
discussed today.
81
 And the foreign origin of Smithson’s fortune would only seem to have 
heightened the nefarious possibilities of its influence in American society. However, in the case 
of the Smithson fortune, there are surprisingly few references to its foreign pedigree in the 
Congressional record. Even Calhoun and Preston’s comments above note the corrupting 
influences of the fund as offending the nation’s dignity, rather than referencing a foreigner 
potentially interfering with U.S. governance. So shortly after the war of 1812 and the British 
burning the nation’s capital, many Congressmen probably would have had little interest in 
allowing an Englishman to dictate the creation of a national institution, but there is ample 
evidence that Congressmen did wish to accept the gift and were eager to find ways to do so. The 
quick turn of Congressional debates about the bill to the constitutionality of accepting the 
bequest demonstrates this. 
 
As these debates began to unfold and resolve, the negotiation of the boundaries between private 
and public purpose, power, and wealth were at stake. The first step was to argue whether 
federalism was even implicated, given a technical point. While Calhoun, a staunch defender of 
slavery and state sovereignty, construed the gift as one to the nation—and as such one that 
should be prevented—Delaware Senator John M. Clayton took a different view. Smithson had 
merely named the United States in his will as the trustee that would undertake the charitable 
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object of establishing a university in the District of Columbia, Clayton contended.
82
 This 
distinction mattered so greatly, because there was legal precedent for Congress to incorporate 
public works corporations and charities for the benefit of Washington D.C. in loco parentis 
patriae.
83
 If the Smithsonian Institution was to be another corporate entity to benefit the 
inhabitants of the District of Columbia, then there was at least some hope that it would not 
inspire new controversy. 
Smithson had indeed stated that the gift was to found the Smithsonian Institution “at 
Washington,” but the institution was to have a broad, universal purpose—to increase knowledge 
among men. That purpose would interest citizens in the United States and beyond, which [some] 
argued contradicted Clayton’s technical point. Therefore, Senators did need to confront how the 
federal government might legally serve as a trustee of Smithson’s bequest. While it would be 
relatively easy to assert Congress’ right to manage the funds in Washington D.C., if the gift was 
to the “United States,” as Senator John Calhoun of South Carolina asserted, then Congress’ 
ability to manage the fund was a more difficult proposition. Another group of senators 
decentered federalism as they considered the bequest though. Samuel L. Southard of New Jersey 
believed that it was too benevolent of an endeavor to pass up—and went as far as to assert the 
utter irrelevance of whether the Smithsonian would benefit the District or the nation. 
Establishing charitable institutions for the diffusion of knowledge was a “vital principle of a 
republican government.”84 Public officials should do what they could to promote that vital 
principle whenever possible as a benefit to society, he held. 
Somewhat similarly to Southard’s concerns, members of a select committee in the House 
that formed to discuss the Smithson bequest—put frankly—did not care whether the Smithsonian 
Institution served Washington D.C. or the nation. They simply noted, “The location of the 
Institution at Washington, prescribed by the testator, gives to Congress the free exercise of all the 
powers relating to this subject with which they are, by the Constitution, invested as the local 
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Legislature for the District of Columbia.”85 In other words, these House members did not 
perceive a legal problem with a D.C. institution with a national purpose. And proceedings in the 
House continued to echo senators’ loftier sentiments about the virtues of the diffusion of 
knowledge in a republican government. The House committee not only recommended the 
passage of the bill, but its members also went so far as to publish a series of laudatory reflections 
on its passage. “Of all the foundations of establishments for pious or charitable uses, which ever 
signalized the spirit of the age, or the comprehensive beneficence of the founder, none can be 
named more deserving of the approbation of mankind than this,” they wrote.86 It was the 
“greatness and simplicity of Smithson’s design” to promote knowledge among men that set the 
gift apart.  
John Quincy Adams led the charge in the House to ensure that the United States accepted 
the bequest, and that its principal would be preserved in perpetuity. For Adams it was an 
opportunity to establish a national astronomical observatory. There was no funding for such a 
project at hand, so he hoped the bequest would first be used to propagate what he called 
“lighthouses of the skies.”87 After that, Adams envisioned that the principal of the fund would be 
preserved; it could be held as a loan in the U.S. Treasury and collect six percent interest per 
annum.
88
 While they would eventually prevail, Adams’ lofty visions were ancillary concerns at 
the moment; designing the operations and legal shape of the Smithsonian were unnecessary 
actions to take before attempting to claim the bequest.  
Ultimately, despite some legislators’ objections, both houses voted to claim Smithson’s 
fortune for the United States. In some sense, more pragmatic views held sway. Congress seemed 
to have a hard time passing on an opportunity to undertake national development work. And 
while some still objected to the creeping aggrandizement in federal aims, as a matter of 
federalism, these concerns quieted in the face of a fortune marked for the increase and diffusion 
of knowledge.  
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With acceptance decided, Richard Rush quickly sailed to England in August 1836, and 
while the intended use of the fund was by no means a settled matter, he was empowered to claim 
Smithson’s fortune for the nation. After Rush’s success, with a half-million dollars in gold in the 
treasury in 1838, that is when Congress had to decide what to do with the money. Renewed 
attention to the federal government acting as the trustee of a national benevolent institution set 




A National Institution: Designing the Purpose of the Smithsonian 
The Smithsonian—whether it funded a cultural institution, a university, or scientific research—
had the potential to expand the limited functions of the federal government. But, in particular, 
officials saw a practical and symbolic benefit to developing the Smithsonian as a research 
institution—one that would necessarily advance the nation and bring it closer to Western Europe. 
Such immense symbolic value lay in two features of the institution. First, it would provide the 
nation with a research institution that could contribute to natural resource development and serve 
necessary organizational functions for government agencies. As a select committee in the House 
discussed, establishing an institution to cultivate national knowledge was a necessary dignity for 
an independent nation; to avoid a position of “meek colonial dependence,” the nation needed to 
stop relying on other countries to provide knowledge about America’s “national features and 
resources.” Rather, the nation and its leaders should come to their own conclusion about putting 
the country’s resources to “useful purposes.”90 Putting research findings to useful purposes 
required the cataloging, maintenance, and publication capabilities of an institution that could 
serve functions that a library, museum, and research institute might provide.  
Richard Rush, who had procured the funds in the first place, agreed with John Quincy 
Adams regarding the gift’s potential to advance scientific investigation (beyond astronomy), and 
he joined him in advocating for establishing an institution capable of promoting America’s 
interest in the “race among nations” for wealth, power, and science. And like Adams, Rush knew 
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the contours of that race well from his own work as a long-time public servant, but he also would 
have been well-versed in debates about education policy from his father, Doctor Benjamin Rush. 
Benjamin Rush had fought during his lifetime for the creation of a national university, eventually 
establishing Dickinson College.
91
 In Richard Rush’s estimation, by establishing the Smithsonian, 
the United States had the opportunity to engage in a “rivalry of mind” with European powers 
more than ever with the help of steam-powered ocean transport. That connection brought the 
Unites States closer to what Rush and his contemporaries called civilization.
92
 “The continent 
that Columbus found was a desert, or overspread with barbarous people and institutions,” he 
explained. Now, steam would bring “the active and enterprising men” of the old and new world 
together.
93
 In his letter, Rush also mentioned that Americans had seen the publications produced 
by “recently formed associations” in Europe that had made “science a fashion there.”94 Rush saw 
the Smithsonian as the product of a partnership between Congress, which would oversee the 




The vision that Rush and other public officials put forth regarding the development of 
civilization was founded on a belief in the expansion of white, European civilization in the 
United States. This kind of developmentalist vision for the United States was critical to its self-
image as nation capable of, as Adam Smith wrote in Wealth of Nations (1776), entering “a more 
advanced state of society,”96 capable of producing surplus wealth and engaging in “foreign 
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commerce.”97 Smith had described “the native tribes of North America” as the “lowest and 
rudest state of society,” so it is no stretch to see Rush’s comments about the continent that 
Columbus found as an articulation of the United States’ emergence as a capitalist nation capable 
of advancing socially and economically.
98
 
And second, this emphasis on the value of research was part of the spiritual cause 
attached to nation building. That spiritual cause was multi-layered, too. Rhetoric about the public 
value of the increase and diffusion of knowledge in the United States revolved around the idea 
that in a young nation without an aristocracy, the nation’s institutions and economic development 
would only be as good as its citizens permitted. Education would be central to developing a 
citizenry capable of taking on that role. This symbolic, nation-building value of knowledge-
production at a national institution was of particular importance to a country that could not and 
did not wish to reproduce European traditions of patronage.
99
 If the museums, universities and 
research institutes were often state-supported in Europe, in the United States they were funded 
locally and as enterprises, at least rhetorically, tasked with advancing the common good.
100
 
There were both institutional and intellectual frameworks that Americans leading the 
cause for national development drew upon as they debated a national institution’s importance. In 
large part, this inspiration came from abroad. Beliefs about the symbolic benefit of a national 
institution to increase and diffuse knowledge were inspired, in part, by the national museums and 
scientific institutions that European governments were creating at the time. During his service 
abroad, for example, Benjamin Franklin who played a key role in founding many of the nation’s 
“first” cultural and research institutions of various sorts, had witnessed the increasing emphasis 
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on the public value of museums.
101
 The British Museum, founded in 1753, grew when the nation 
purchased the private collection of an individual citizen.
102
 The price of admission kept many 
would-be visitors out, but it was managed by the state and operated as a public trust in its own 
right. The French had aspirations of making royal collections more useful to the public even 
before their revolution.
103
 But it was during their revolution in 1792, when the French created the 
“Museum Français” in the Louvre, that they inspired a new emphasis on the popular utility of a 
national museum. In that old royal palace, the revolutionary government would make the 
confiscated property of the church and aristocracy available to a wider public. By making 
collections that were once only available for private viewing accessible to the public—
sometimes for free—the new republic hoped to establish its right to the property and its own 
higher aims of cultivating the tastes and knowledge of its newly enfranchised citizenry.
104
  
 And beyond these examples of national museums, there were lauded European research 
institutions that were looked upon as precedent. While a museum and library would become part 
of the designs for the Smithsonian, at first “advancing knowledge” was most often taken to mean 
the creation of a university or a research institute, and European scientific societies supplied 
another ready model for American officials. During Congressional proceedings in the House, 
University of Pennsylvania professor of chemistry Walter R. Johnson remarked that “the 
foundation of an institution for practical science [was], in itself, no novel project for the 
enlightened Government of a civilized nation to entertain.”105 He listed the Royal Institution and 
the Society of Arts in England, the Andersonian Institution in Scotland, the Polytechnic School 
and School of Mines in France, and the Gewerbverein in Germany as examples of such 
institutions. In addition, entities such as the Royal Society in London, the Accademia del 
Cimento in Florence, and the Academie des Sciences in Paris each had set forth the idea that the 
proper study of science involved some kind of combination of a museum, library, printing office, 
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botanical gardens, and laboratories.
106
 James Smithson had been a member of both the Royal 
Society (1660) and the Royal Institution (1799), so he would have imagined the Smithsonian 
Institution as a kind of replica of them when he wrote his will.  
The research component of a potential institute was a key piece of a symbolically 
national institution. This was a common theme for the English, for example, who explicitly 
connected their empire with a national—indeed global—community of thinkers through the 
Royal Society. The Royal Society had been operating with a Royal charter since 1662. It set an 
early global standard for extending “the boundaries of empire” through the funding and 
cultivation of the arts and sciences. The English wished to portray themselves “as the universal 
lover and patron of every kind of truth,” according to the Royal Society’s first charter.107 Their 
members were largely Oxford-educated elites who cultivated early branches of the sciences.
108
 It 
was not just British elites, though, who were inducted into the Royal Society. Cotton Mather was 




 And precedent for a national institution did not simply come from Europe. Early in the 
nation’s history, this idea had been broached. Not only had George Washington famously called 
for the creation of a national university in his last State of the Union message; since the early 
national period, public officials had debated the utility of private associations and public 
institutions.
110
 American colonists even created some models of their own that inspired the 
design of the Smithsonian Institution. Benjamin Franklin’s civic contributions, such as the 
Library Company of Philadelphia (1742) and the American Philosophical Society (1743) both 
increased and promoted the diffusion of knowledge in their own ways, through the establishment 
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of a lending library and scholarly society respectively. And each operated with non-
governmental funding, from some combination of donations, the sale of “public shares,” as well 
as membership and service fees.
111
  
Charles Wilson Peale’s struggles in transforming his Philadelphia Museum into a 
national museum demonstrated the complicated politics of funding national cultural and research 
institutions amidst this institutional and intellectual framework. Maneuvering in Franklin’s vast 
network of associations and institutions, Peale repeatedly called for the creation of a national 
museum in the late-eighteenth century. He hoped the federal government or the Pennsylvania 
legislature might take over the funding of his Philadelphia Museum (1784). In 1790, Peale issued 
his first call for the public support of a national museum in America, which he published in 
newspapers and broadsides. The national museums of the world were all established with 
funding from private individuals, he wrote, but he wished for the promise of greater public 
funding to make the benefits of his collection for the nation. If the “Public” would support his 
“infant design,” the Philadelphia Museum might be “a great national museum, or repository of 
valuable rarities, for more generally diffusing an increase of knowledge in the works of the 
Creator…”112  
Despite Peale’s personal connection to Franklin and Thomas Jefferson and many other 
public officials, his visionary call failed, and in some sense, it failed because as one editorial 
response to his call for public support explained:
113
 
In European Countries princes can, by a portion of the public treasure, promote science 
and the useful arts: our jealousy of liberty will not permit such liberality; and indeed in 
our present exigencies it is not very practical—But to make up for this, the generosity of 
individuals is amply sufficient. Thanks for Heaven, we are not poor; many of us can, 
without the least disadvantage, spare a dollar per annum; this contribution would arise 
from saving one farthing every day.  
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This editorial reflects a resistance to European patronage models that relied on funding from 
government and aristocratic bodies. To preserve “liberty,” the writer imagined a better American 
approach that would involve the popular funding of cultural institutions. In this framework, 
individual contributions would provide for the Philadelphia Museum, rather than the central 
government or elites.
114
 This kind of popular funding and support has been emphasized as the 
essence of American voluntarism. Most especially, Alexis de Tocqueville noted Americans’ 




So while Peale would have supported the idea that his Philadelphia Museum offered a 
benefit to the public and relished the cultivation of popular appeal, government funding would 
have relieved the financial pressures he faced to provide those benefits.
116
 With the urge to make 
the collection useful to a wider public came lower admission prices,
117
 along with the need to 
cater to popular tastes to invite visitation.
118
 If the museum was to gain the kind of highbrow 
respectability, dispensing what Peale and Franklin would have called “useful knowledge,” then it 
would need the security of steady funding.
119
 Peale would go on to create his own version of a 
“popular” museum that would run off moderately-priced admission fees, but his sons ultimately 
sold off the family’s beloved collections to none other than P.T. Barnum in 1849.120 Peale’s lack 
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of access to surplus wealth limited the extent to which his museum could grow; without 
government or private patronage, Peale’s vision had failed to take flight. 
 
Many of these precedents regarding research institutions and national museums would have been 
on the minds of the public officials interested in designing the Smithsonian Institution’s 
approach to the increase and diffusion of knowledge. With the concept of a national institution 
already controversial and familiar to public officials, upon Rush’s triumphant return, Congress 
argued over the desired application of the Smithson bequest for eight years, in fact. During that 
substantial interlude, representatives, multiple Presidents, scientists, and the nation’s leading 
educators disputed how the Smithsonian should promote the increase and diffusion of 
knowledge. Most often they advocated for the creation of a national university, an astronomical 
observatory, or a “modern institute” for research.121  
But the very fact that a national institute for knowledge-production would be established 
led, of course, back to suspicions about private wealth. In 1838 President Martin Van Buren 
solicited advice regarding the fund’s application, and the letters he collected demonstrate that in 
the design, chartering, and management of early philanthropic institutions, state and federal 
policymakers were grappling with the complicated relationship between private wealth and the 
public governance.
122
 In other words, as legislators avidly discussed the desired relationship 
between private funding and public institutions, they evidenced some hesitance to introduce the 
politics of private wealth into the spiritual politics of nation building. The House Select 
Committee tasked with determining the form and function of the Smithsonian Institution 
explained the significance of knowledge in nineteenth century philanthropy in biblical terms. 
The “Creator” only gave man—amongst all animated beings—“the power and the capacity of 
acquiring knowledge,” the committee explained. Knowledge critically linked earth and heaven; it 
allowed men to improve their condition on earth and prepare for the afterlife: “Whoever 
increases his knowledge, multiplies the uses to which he is enabled to turn the gift of his Creator 
to his own benefit, and partakes in some degree of that goodness which is the highest attribute of 
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Omnipotence itself.”123 Individuals cultivating their own knowledge were moral. And in its 
broadest terms, promoting the increase and diffusion of knowledge collectively was both moral 
and a republican virtue.
124
 
Enthusiasm for scientific advancements developed alongside the field of natural history, 
industrialization, and the Second Great Awakening. As historian Ronald Walters’ work on 
antebellum reform has demonstrated, all of these shifts “led many men and women to assume 
that the world did not have to be the way it was and that individual effort mattered.”125 Whether 
one emphasizes the scientific, industrial, business, theological, social, or geographical 
underpinnings of “modernization,” this was a moment when Americans outside of the elite began 




In this environment, how would American governmental or private patronage function? If 
the elite were no longer solely responsible for benevolent acts or reform measures, then what 
would American national institutions look like? As a federally created institution from a private 
bequest, of course the Smithsonian was different from popular antebellum reform efforts. But its 
form and function would have been heavily influenced by those popular movements. More than 
any other, John Quincy Adams provided the framework for how the Smithsonian could become a 
new model of national benevolence. Adams believed that funding education, like religion, was 
the “sacred obligation” of the people themselves, so he advocated that Smithson’s bequest be 
managed by a disinterested board of national officials. Such an arrangement would avoid the 
“cancer of almost all charitable foundations—jobbing for parasites, and sops for hungry 
incapacity,” and it would allow the Smithsonian to first appropriate funds for the creation of a 
national observatory.
127
 Adams considered establishing a national observatory to be a “debt of 
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honor to the cause of science and to the world of civilized man.” He said that he believed that the 
United States had a “stain on [its] good name, in the neglect to provide the means of increasing 
and diffusing knowledge among men” about the “numberless worlds suspended over our 
heads.”128 And at this point, the casting of the Smithsonian institute as a national project, one that 
would take private wealth and carry it as part of a more popular project was largely settled. 
Despite early concerns with patronage, here, in the context of philanthropy at least, a centralized 
government would have some greater role, through the management of a private fund.  
 
Congress Incorporates the Smithsonian Institution with a Special Charter 
It was not until August 10, 1846—eight years after Rush deposited the gold sovereigns with the 
U.S. Treasury—that Congress passed an act establishing the Smithsonian Institution, and 
President James K. Polk signed it into law. In the end, the act provided for the Smithsonian to 
serve as a “geological and mineralogical cabinet; also a chemical laboratory, a library, a gallery 
of art, and the necessary lecture rooms.”129 With its broad array of activities, the Smithsonian 
was positioned to demonstrate its utility to the nation and its universal symbolic value.  
As a federal trusteeship, the Institution was to be run by a board of regents composed of 
the Vice-President, the Chief Justice, the Mayor of the City of Washington, three members of the 
Senate, three members of the House, and six other non-members of Congress, two of whom had 
to be members of the National Institute and residents of Washington D.C. and the other four had 
to be inhabitants of states—no two of them of the same state. Congress would have the right to 
alter, amend, add, or repeal any of the provisions of the act.
130
 And it further provided for the 
regents to select a place for the construction of a building for the Smithsonian on the “public 
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ground in the city of Washington lying between the Patent Office and Seventh Street.”131 Until 
that time Kristin Hass has explained, the Mall had been what the original capital-designer Pierre 
L’Enfant called an “immense T-shaped public park.” Throughout the nineteenth century, 
however, the Mall became what Hass called a “national symbolic space” containing the 
Washington Monument, gardens, and eventually the Smithsonian Institution.
132
 
But despite these characteristics, the Smithsonian Institution was not intended to be a 
government agency. As Congressmen had argued over the course of the previous decade, the 
Smithsonian Institution would be operated with the funds of a private trust, but Congress and 
private citizens would manage the growth and expenditure of those funds for the public benefit. 
The operational vision for the Smithsonian’s administration was expressed most clearly by its 
first Secretary Joseph Henry in the “Programme of Organization” that he drafted for its Board of 
Regents in 1847. He began, Smithson’s “property [was] bequeathed to the United States of 
America.” It followed then that “the bequest [was] for the benefit of mankind. The government 
of the United States [was] merely a trustee to carry out the design of the testator.” All of that 
being true, Henry argued, “The institution [was] not a national establishment, as [was] frequently 
supposed, but the establishment of an individual, and [was] to bear and perpetuate his name.”133  
Claiming that the Smithsonian was not a “national” establishment may seem puzzling; Henry 
had a point though. The Smithsonian operated with the funds of a private trust; as such, there 
were distinct legal requirements for its management and operations. 
But this purportedly private project became immediately bound up with a more public 
form, which Congress would ultimately work out. As Congressman had noted in their initial 
hearings on whether to accept the bequest and again while national leaders discussed what to do 
                                                          
131





 sess., August 10, 1846.  See  Kristin Ann Hass, Sacrificing Soldiers on the National Mall (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2013), 10-17. Hass writes that while the Mall would become a space for war 
memorials and remembering later in the twentieth century, with the founding of the Smithsonian Institution, the 
Mall became a space for the cultivation of knowledge and nation building. The 1893 World Columbian Exposition 
in Chicago further changed expectations for the Mall to become a version of the “White City” that drew popular 
attendance to the world’s fair with interest in the development of civilization and economic development.  
132
 Hass, 10-17. 
133
 The Programme was included in the first annual report of the Board of Regents. Joseph Henry, “Programme 
of Organization of the Smithsonian Institution,” 8 December, Rhees 847, 944. 
43 
 
with the bequest, there was talk of making it a corporation for the District of Columbia. Or 
officials also recommended that the Smithsonian receive what we could call a “federal charter” 
today. The distinction lay in whether Congress held the trust in loco parentis patriae for the 
citizens of Washington D.C., or if Congress was creating the Smithsonian Institution with a 
federal charter to operate as a national entity. This is a complicated distinction to make, however, 
because in the mid-nineteenth century, Congress had used special acts of incorporation to 
establish both District corporations and national entities. That means that when the Smithsonian 
was founded, it did not practically matter (even if it did rhetorically) whether it was a D.C. 
corporation or a federal corporation for the time being. 
Ultimately, Congress chose to establish a federal corporation, and at a time when even 
the federal funding of lighthouses to promote domestic and international commerce was 
controversial—the chartering of the Smithsonian Institution was a remarkable exercise of federal 
power.
134
 By 1836, Congress had chartered a total of [only] forty-six corporations.
135
 While 
almost all those entities served Washington D.C., the very first entity to receive a federal charter 
in 1791 was the first Bank of the United States. Congress would not grant another federal charter 
like it until it created the second Bank of the United States in 1816, but in the meantime, it 
established twenty-one other entities to serve Washington D.C. Those entities included, for 
example, the Washington Canal Company (1802), the Columbian Library Company in 
Georgetown (1804), the Presbyterian Congregation in Georgetown (1806), the Farmers’ Bank of 
Alexandria (1811), and the Fire Insurance Company of Alexandria (1814).
136
 
While it is accurate to say that the D.C. corporations chartered by special acts of 
Congress are distinct from the Bank of the United States, they are all part of a very small number 
of corporate bodies that Congress has created since the nation’s founding. The Bank of the 
United States was another matter altogether though. The government owned twenty percent of 
the bank’s stock and limited its existence to twenty years, making the bank what one historian 
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has termed, a “semipublic institution.”137 As historians have shown, debates about the Bank of 
the United States launched multiple “bank wars” that had more to do with centralized banking 
and knitting together a national economy than national benevolence.
138
 However, the fact that 
Congress charted a national bank set a relevant precedent for the Smithsonian Institution: when it 
served a national function, the federal government could charter a corporate entity for that 
purpose. Indeed, it was the Bank of the United States’ second charter that led to McCulloch V. 
Maryland (1819) in which the court affirmed Congress’ authority to incorporate a bank.139  
Before Congress would charter the Smithsonian Institution in 1846, it would create two 
entities that pushed the tenuous boundaries between District corporations and national 
corporations. In 1818, Congress chartered the Columbian Institute for the Promotion of Arts and 
Sciences and in 1842 the National Institute for the Promotion of Science. The Columbian 
Institute, which established a museum and botanic garden, operated “under government 
patronage.”140 While it legally created the possibility of its interpretation as a voluntary 
association operating in Washington D.C. with many of its members hailing from the District, 
the institute also welcomed members from across the nation. At its inception, the institute had 
ninety “representative men of Washington” as members, including congressmen, scientific men, 
clergymen, prominent citizens, and prominent politicians such as the Secretary of War, the 
Secretary of the Navy, the ex-President Adams, the Chief of Engineers of the Army, and other 
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While the Columbian Institute could safely be interpreted a voluntary association serving 
Washington D.C. (albeit under “government patronage”), the National Institute for the 
Promotion of Science was different. Joel Poinsett, a planter and naturalist from South Carolina 
who named the Poinsettia and eventually served as Secretary of War, led the charge to create the 
National Institute for the Promotion of Science in 1840. Poinsett had long desired the creation of 
a national museum to display the many curiosities acquired during scientific expeditions, so he 
used the creation of the National Institute as a move to shape how Congress managed the 
Smithson bequest. However, while Poinsett was successful in advocating for a national museum 
to be part of the Smithsonian, the National Institute remained a separate entity and its exhibitions 
of curiosities, arranged in the U.S. Patent Office, eventually waned in popularity.
142
 
The National Institute’s institutional form and ambitions are of particular importance to 
the development of the federal charter, though, because the institute expressly meant to have a 
“national character.” Heads of government departments served as Directors of the Institute, and 
it envisioned itself “merely a trustee for the Unite States of the property which it possesses.”143 
The fact that the National Institution understood its role as a “trustee for the United States” rather 
than operating under “government patronage,” though, sets the National Institute apart. Its 
creators were at once imagining it as having a federal imprimatur while privately operating. 
However, National Institute members had asked Congress for an “appropriation.”144 They said, 
while they believed that the institution merited a “plenteous endowment,” due to the financial 
condition of the government, they would content themselves with a more modest appropriation 
for their work which was “so truly national and so truly republican.”145 They were not 
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successful, though, and their struggle for funds demonstrates how essential the Smithsonian’s 
private endowment was to its success in this period.  
This history of the federal charter and Congress’ use of it to establish the Smithsonian is 
essential to the history of Smithson’s bequest, but also to the making of the U.S. nonprofit sector. 
Congress could easily have created the Smithsonian as a government agency or a 
quasigovernmental institution, which would have set an entirely different precedent for the 
management of large trusts to undertake public works and charity. Instead, however, they made 
it a private corporation.  
 
A Precedent is Set: The Smithsonian becomes a Public Trust 
Unlike the National Institute, the Smithsonian Institution came with an endowment of its own—
one that had been put right into the hands of the federal government. But despite the oddities of 
its charter and its expansive powers, its members insisted it was a private institution. This was 
not just semantics. Because its founders considered it a private institution, the next chapter will 
show, it made the Smithsonian’s charter relevant to the national foundations that would rise in 
the remainder of the nineteenth century. The richest American philanthropists quickly replicated 
its design when they incorporated their own foundations. 
In this way, the Smithsonian established a legal precedent for creating national 
benevolent institutions with special charters to operate as “public trusts.”  The term “public trust” 
best captures the ways that the Smithsonian and the nation’s first foundations were created from 
private trusts but were managed by public officials for distinctly public purposes. This model 
gave would-be philanthropists a way to design their foundations without raising public alarm 
about the expanding power of private wealth in society.  
The history of the public trust also illuminates how the Smithsonian Institution developed 
at the intersection of government, business, and benevolent activity. Boundaries between for-
profit and not-for-profit, as well as governmental and nongovernmental entities, were in the 
process of becoming, so Congressmen could imagine the Smithson endowment funding a library, 
research expeditions for natural resources, and a national museum. Government officials could 
populate its board, while a private citizen could serve as its Secretary. This model made public 
trusts more powerful with their proximity to government officials, but it also imbued the 
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distribution of private wealth with an explicitly public purpose. Once a wealthy individual 
decided to give away their wealth for a public purpose, that wealth took on a public character.  
While the federal government’s role in creating the Smithsonian Institution was 
exceptional, the entwining of interests and, in fact, personnel to create earlier public trusts 
broadened the significance of emerging debates about government trusteeship; in fact, state and 
federal government officials served as trustees amongst many of the nation’s largest, early 
benevolent institutions.
146
 While the Smithsonian Institution laid debates about the politics of the 
public trust at the feet of the federal government, it was not the only foundation that forced 
Americans to confront the politics of the public trust in the mid-nineteenth century. If the foreign 
origin of James Smithson’s half-million-dollar gift was unique, its size was not unparalleled.147  
Even in the early nineteenth century and in these provincial United States, some 
Americans had million-dollar fortunes. Before Congress accepted Smithson’s half-million dollar 
bequest, in fact, merchant and banker Stephen Girard had left a majority of his almost $7 million 
fortune to establish Girard College for the education of “poor white male orphans” in 
Philadelphia in 1831.
148
 Girard left his bequest “in trust” to “the Mayor, Aldermen, and Citizens 
of Philadelphia” to establish and maintain the college.149 Congress had spent years debating the 
legitimacy of the federal government serving as the trustee of Smithson’s fortune. It was no 
different with Girard’s gift and the city of Philadelphia; controversy ensued about whether the 
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city could legally serve as the trustee of Girard’s gift. In fact, it would take a U.S. Supreme Court 
Case, Vidal v. Girard’s Executors in 1844, to affirm that the city of Philadelphia’s own charter 
allowing it, as a corporation, to accept Girard’s benevolent trust.150 In another instance, John 
Jacob Astor left a $400,000 bequest to found the Astor Library in New York in 1848. He 
envisioned the library as “essentially public in its character,” and its trustees included the Mayor 
of the city of New York and the Chancellor of the state.
 151
 Both gifts were made posthumously, 
and like the Smithsonian, they operated as public trusts. They were entities created from private 
fortunes, but they were managed in part by government officials for specific public purposes. 
The fact that the federal government granted a special charter to the Smithsonian 
Institution, however, makes it an exceptional moment in the early shaping of the American 
nonprofit sector. While controversial in its own right, the bequest that created the Smithsonian 
Institution did not ignite what would become the most explosive issues relating to the role of the 
public trust in American philanthropy. It was of foreign origin, and the money was left almost 
directly to the federal government. That meant that when Congress accepted Smithson’s bequest, 
there was no public outcry about exploitative commercial activities that led to his wealth in the 
first place. Likewise, there were no discussions by state representatives about Smithson dodging 
estate taxes, and there was no suggestion that it would be more appropriate to incorporate the 
Smithsonian Institution in a state legislature rather than Congress. These concerns, however, did 
arise as American philanthropists used the Smithsonian as a model to create their own 
foundations. 
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Wealth’s Modes of Governance: 
 The Public Trust in the Mid-Nineteenth Century
 
 
Just as Congress was chartering the Smithsonian Institution in the mid-nineteenth century, Alexis 
de Tocqueville famously proclaimed that American associational life was changing the contours 
of modern democracy. In addition to museums and research institutions like the Smithsonian, 
major universities, charitable organizations, as well as voluntary and fraternal associations all 
flourished in this period.
152
 Kathleen McCarthy has described the first half of the century through 
the Civil War as the heyday of civic stewardship, a time when American reformers gave 
unprecedented amounts of both time and money to undertake public benefactions.
153
 In 
Tocqueville’s estimation, the developing nation’s affinity for pursuing common interests was 
setting a new precedent for individuals to meaningfully counter government and aristocratic 
bodies through association.
154
 Subsequently, historians have mused broadly over the role that this 
affinity for associations has played in American history, and Tocqueville’s assertions about the 
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relationship between associations and government have received particular attention. Most 
significantly, in his 1944 article “Biography of a Nation of Joiners,” Arthur Schlesinger argued 
that Americans have “minimize[d] collective organization as represented by the state while 
exercising the largest possible liberty in forming their own voluntary organizations.”155 He drew 
a direct line from the First Continental Congress to the creation of the Boy Scouts in the early-
twentieth century to illustrate a tradition of public-spirited voluntarism. As Congress’ chartering 
of the Smithsonian Institution demonstrated though, government bodies have played a critical 
role in shaping the nation’s early institutions. That state involvement flies in the face of a central 
tenet in the “nation of joiners” thesis offered by Schlesinger. In his powerful framework, until 
the New Deal and the rise of big government in the 1930s, Americans had a “weak state” that 
voluntary associations worked around rather than through.
156
  
In recent years, however, historians have contested this institutional configuration of 
associations residing outside of government.
157
 William Novak and other legal, political and 
economic historians have interrogated this thesis of limited government.
158
 Understanding the 
legal and social development of American associations as what Novak calls “a mode of 
governance” has offered new insight into a politics of association that did not analytically 
separate the public and the private and the governmental and the nongovernmental—but rather 
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Nineteenth-century legislators, judges, and commentators defended associations not as 
alternatives to a legal-constitutional state, but as constitutive components of it. 
Associations did not arise outside of and immune to coercions of public power as natural 
counterweights to the artificial sovereignty of the state. Rather they were in fact legally-
constituted and politically-recognized delegations of rule-making authority and public 
resources. 
 
This was true for all types of associations whether they were devoted to benevolence, business or 
religion, and so, Novak calls for both a comprehensive analysis of the varied associations that 
comprised nineteenth-century “American state, economy and civil society,” as well as attention 
to the distinctions that law makers made between different types of associations.
161
  
Work in this field promises to demonstrate the central role that voluntary associations 
have played in American political development, while uncovering distinct nineteenth-century 
associational politics and practices.
162
 In this chapter, I analyze how the public trust continued to 
develop as a corporate vehicle for public benefactions in the nineteenth century. In doing so, I 
contribute to work on what Novak called the “legal-political construction of civil society,” and I 
expand its attention to the pivotal role that surplus wealth played in the growth and regulation of 
civil society. Like the Smithsonian, other public trusts were created from private fortunes, but 
they were managed in part by government officials for explicitly and consciously “public” 
purposes. As a result, studying the evolution of these public trusts requires attention to the 
wealthy individuals who gave their fortunes away and their relationships with government 
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authorities who both crafted special legislation to foster that growth and stood in management 
roles after the creation of these institutions. My research shows that even before more famous 
Gilded-Age debates about the accumulation of wealth, Americans were creating legal and 
conventional social roles for the deployment of private surplus wealth in the undertaking of 
major public benefactions. I expand on this by paying attention to the pivotal role that surplus 
wealth played in the growth and regulation of civil society. As Americans worked out the desired 
relationship between private wealth and public works, they grappled with fundamental questions 
about the purpose of surplus wealth in American capitalism and the role that the wealthiest 
citizens should (or should not) play in its distribution. 
 
Endowments as Novel Modes of Governance 
The terms of the debates about surplus wealth and national development would change in the 
second-half of the nineteenth century, as American philanthropists deviated from Smithson’s 
bequest in two important ways. First, increasingly, philanthropists gave their fortunes away 
during their lifetimes, and the power and influence this gave them raised new policy questions 
about the desired role of private wealth in public life. And, second, with the rise of banking and 
finance, endowed foundations offered founders a new vehicle to accumulate more wealth and 
social influence beyond the horizons of their natural lives. American bankers, businessmen, and 
eventually industrialists, had the financial expertise to endow their funds with stocks and bonds 
that they believed would grow in perpetuity. This vision of establishing endowments with hand-
selected securities carved out a niche for the expertise of the self-made rich in philanthropy. It 
was the accumulators, with this approach, who had the know-how to grow America enterprise, 
economically and socially.  
As American associational life expanded under these conditions, it would change the 
contours of what public works would receive funding to match the vision of civilization held by 
accumulators. It would also make public trusts operating with huge endowments new centers of 
power in society, as they shaped approaches to education, medical research, and agricultural 
development, for example. This began to accentuate the controversies surrounding the creation 
of the Smithsonian Institution. As philanthropists created trusts while they lived, they produced 
entirely new legal issues relating to the management of private property across generations—and 
in their own lifetimes. 
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Andrew Carnegie would come to describe this kind of living stewardship as “the proper 
administration of wealth” in his 1889 essay that would become the “Gospel of Wealth.”163 In the 
vision that Carnegie laid out in his essay, millionaires should act as “trustee[s] for the poor.” 
Their surplus wealth, he suggested, would actually become “the property of the many.” But that 
was an exaggeration; in Carnegie’s vision the rich were still bound to administer their surplus 
wealth themselves “to produce the most beneficial results for the community” by exercising their 
“superior wisdom, experience, and ability to administer” the surplus.164 In other words, the 
property would still belong to them or it would be in the hands of a body corporate following the 
sage wisdom of the nation’s great accumulators. Although Carnegie’s vision for the proper 
administration of wealth had many similarities to the characteristics of the public trust, it is fair 
to say that the ideas about civic stewardship that motivated mid-nineteenth century 
philanthropists were quite different than Carnegie’s ideas about wealth’s duty to advance 
civilization from the top down that he offered later in the century. The practices of the public 
trust in this earlier period made government officials the logical trustees of the nation’s surplus 
wealth (not necessarily the philanthropist him or herself). And some of the philanthropists were 
not even trustees at their foundations—they left that to the public officials and private citizens 
they selected to populate their boards. 
For example, New York inventor and businessman Peter Cooper began designing the 
Cooper Union for the Advancement of Science and Art in 1853, and he spent over $600,000 to 
buy land and to erect a building for the school in the city. Cooper obtained a charter from the 
New York legislature to formally establish the Cooper Union in 1857. He served on the board of 
trustees himself, but the charter also provided for the Supreme Court to “possess and exercise a 
supervisory power over the Corporation.”165  
Further, in 1867, George Peabody created the institution that set the legal and social 
trajectory for the growth of the public trust. He endowed the Peabody Education Fund with a $1 
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 (and he would increase that amount to $2 million in 1869) “for the 
promotion and encouragement of intellectual, moral, or industrial education among the young of 
the more destitute portions of the Southern and Southwestern States of our Union.”167 Unlike 
James Smithson and Stephen Girard, Peabody did not leave his fortune directly to a government 
body. Instead, he endowed the fund during his lifetime, and he selected a board of sixteen 
trustees to manage its operations. But public officials still played a pivotal role at the PEF. 
Trustees included General Ulysses S. Grant who would shortly become the eighteenth U.S. 
president, former New York governor Hamilton Fish who would join Grant’s cabinet as 
Secretary of State, as well as governors from Massachusetts, Virginia, and South Carolina.
168
 
These trustees were not outsiders trying to influence public policy; they were policy makers 
using the PEF as a corporate vehicle to undertake public works. And that remained true until the 
PEF closed in 1914; multiple presidents and future Supreme Court justices would serve on the 
board during its existence.
169
  
From the start, too, Peabody and his trustees imagined the fund fulfilling a distinct public 
purpose—to promote education in the South—and then dissolving once that purpose was 
achieved.
170
 The Peabody Education Fund was different than what had come before it, because it 
combined cutting-edge legal, social and financial technologies of its time to reconfigure the 
operations and role for the public trust in America. Peabody was using his financial prowess to 
transform how an individual fortune could be used for public works. When he created the PEF, 
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he became one of the first philanthropists to single-handedly endow a philanthropic institution 
with securities he selected to try to ensure its long-term success. Soon after, John F. Slater, the 
Rockefellers, Carnegie, Anna T. Jeanes, and Olivia Slocum Sage would all build on these 
foundations as they created their own philanthropic practices through the early-twentieth century.
 
Understanding how endowments like this permitted the wealthiest Americans to imagine their 
fortunes growing in perpetuity—and for their foundations to last forever—is critical to 
comprehending the economic, social, and governing power that foundations amassed in this 
period.  
 
Joseph Henry, the first Secretary of the Smithsonian Institution, played a crucial role in 
promoting the endowment of institutions in the United States.
171
 With the Smithsonian’s place on 
the National Mall and its importance to national development established, Henry took up the 
work started by Benjamin Franklin and John Quincy Adams to foment support for the 
establishment of more endowed institutions in the United States.
172
 To those who would listen, 
Henry encouraged would-be philanthropists to avoid funding the creation of buildings, which he 
considered a relic of “semi-barbarism.” By endowing institutions for original scientific research, 
he argued, philanthropists would create “monuments of mind” that would “belong to high 
civilization.”173 As a prominent scientist and head of the Smithsonian, Henry moved in circles 
where he had ample opportunity to promote his vision. He encouraged James Lick, the richest 
man in California, to permanently endow a fund to assist astronomers and their assistants, and he 
advised leaders in higher education at University of California, Clemson, Johns Hopkins, and 
Princeton to promote and fund research in higher education.
174
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Henry, persuasively, imbued his passion for endowments with a spiritual vision for the 
nation’s development, recalling the earlier vision that John Quincy Adams and other legislators 
had for establishing a national institution for the diffusion of knowledge. “I am not a believer in 
‘manifest destiny,’ but on the contrary think that the condition of our country at a given future, 
must depend upon the wisdom of folly of those who exist in the preceding times,” he wrote to 
Senator Roscoe Conkling in 1867.
175
 Henry explained that he did not think that all human events 
were brought about “in accordance with an inexorable law.” Rather, humans with knowledge of 
natural laws of the material universe could “produce new combinations and results which are 




Science not alone observes phenomena and deduces laws, from them, but also enables 
man actually to control phenomena, to perform as it were miracles, such as the creation 
of engines and inventions like those of the telegraph and others the effect of which is to 
change the character of civilization itself. It is in this sense that knowledge is power. 
 
For Henry, the development of civilization required active scientific discovery. It also required 
surplus wealth, too.
177
 This understanding of social progress was on display at the world’s fairs 
that took place around the world in this period as celebrations of the rise of industrial capitalism. 
Historians of the fairs have emphasized their role in, above all, displaying machines and 
celebrating trade even while they delighted their millions of visitors with curiosities and delved 
into reformist politics with displays of sociological research.
178
 
At the opening of the Peabody Institute in Baltimore in 1866, Henry had a chance to 
introduce his philosophy to George Peabody in person who clearly shared his passion for the 
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increase of knowledge and national development.
 179
 (In fact, Peabody had supported American 
exhibitors at the Great Exhibition of 1851 in London when the U.S. government failed to do 
so.)
180
 After a full day of ceremony and reception, Henry attended a dinner given by the trustees 
in Peabody’s honor. As an unending succession of courses kept the men busy until 1:30 in the 
morning, Henry was called on to give an account of the Smithsonian.
181
 At the dinner and in the 
opening lectures that Henry would give at the institute, he boldly criticized the Institute’s 




I endeavored in my introductory remarks to impress upon the Trustees and the public the 
importance of a proper disposition of the funds. I stated that money may be considered a 
kind of accumulated power which differed from other power in its capability of being so 
managed as to yield a constant supply of energy without diminishing the original 
quantity—that like other powers it could be exhausted in a single effort and instead of 
producing a series of results important to the city of Baltimore and the country it might be 
expended in the erection of a dead mausoleum a monument of the folly rather than the 
wisdom of the directors of the munificent endowment. 
 
Henry’s explanation of the “accumulated power” Americans could harness in managing capital 
through endowments makes their novelty in this period clear. Other entities, such as universities 
and religious institutions, had been created with endowments since the colonial period. However, 
preserving the principal of an endowment in its entirety for perpetuity was something new.
183
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The conditions were right for the accumulated power of endowments to flourish in the 
late-nineteenth century. In order to preserve an endowment in perpetuity, investment 
opportunities needed to exist in capital markets. Trustees had to be capable of managing the 
investment of an endowment in securities. Also, a basic level of surplus in the economy needed 
to exist that would permit the accumulation of wealth and the preservation of an endowment for 
future generations. Well before Carnegie’s vision for surplus wealth in the advancement of 
American civilization, Henry had his own vision for the accumulated power of endowed 
institutions. This marks a vision of social enterprise that is predicated on national development—
or the idea that United States officials and business people could create a better world through 
the accumulation and distribution of wealth. Unlike Carnegie though, institutions rather than 
individuals were the center of Henry’s vision for the administration of the nation’s surplus 
wealth. 
Peabody was no hero to Henry though. Around that time, Henry wrote that he did not 
believe that men of great wealth like Peabody, Cornell and Packer had done enough to 
“consecrate minds” when they established their institutions. Diffusing knowledge that already 
existed was not the best way to advance civilization; while it was important, “it [was] not 
sufficient for a higher and more full development of humanity…”184 Likely Henry was not so 
explicit with his criticism when he met Peabody; however, his perspective had an impact. The 
Peabody Education Fund, Peabody’s next project, did not have an expensive building, and its 
aims went beyond the general diffusion of knowledge to the promotion of lasting public 
education institutions.  
Peabody and others who endowed public trusts in the remainder of the nineteenth century 
would masterfully tie their business successes to the long-term growth and welfare of the 
societies in which they did business. Benevolence for these titans was not just a bequest at the 
time of one’s death anymore; it was undertaking business to benefit society. They had the 
financial, and as the next section will show, the legal, tools to undertake their new vision.  
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George Peabody’s Mode of Governance and the Evolution of the Public Trust  
George Peabody, indeed, worked hard to cultivate a public reputation for operating his 
businesses to benefit international commerce and global civilization. Peabody travelled the same 
unlikely path from modest means to extraordinary wealth that made Gilded Age titans Andrew 
Carnegie and John D. Rockefeller so famous.
185
 Born in 1795, though, Peabody’s road to riches 
lay in becoming an international merchant banker (not an industrialist). In an 1857 biography in 
Hunt’s Merchants’ Magazine, Peabody’s commercial activities were new enough to merit 
explanation for readers.
186
 Peabody established himself “as a merchant and banker,” but “in 
conformity with American ideas,” its authors explained. By that they meant, Peabody was not a 
banker in the English sense; he did not “pay out money” like the Rothschilds and the Barings. 
Rather, he “loan[ed] money, change[d] drafts, b[ought] stocks, [and] h[e]ld deposits.”187 In other 
words, Peabody traded in dry goods, but he also financed such trade for governments and 
prosperous individuals and companies; as he did so, he issued stocks and bonds.
188
 
Born to a family struggling to support itself in Danvers, Massachusetts, Peabody was 
apprenticed in the drug and grocery business at the age of eleven. He had only two to three years 
of schooling before that, and throughout his life he told relatives and friends that the lack of an 
education had caused him some anxiety and difficulties in his career.
189
 Unsurprisingly, 
education would become the centerpiece of Peabody’s philanthropy. Before he was wealthy 
enough to give significant amounts of money away, though, he was busy using family 
                                                          
185
 The most comprehensive biography of George Peabody is Franklin Parker’s George Peabody: A Biography 
with a foreword by Merle Curti (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1971). See also, Chapple, George Peabody. 
The first chapter of Ron Chernow’s book on the House of Morgan focuses on Peabody, as well. Ron Chernow, The 
House of Morgan: An American Banking Dynasty and the Rise of Modern Finance (New York: Grove Press, 1990),  
186
 Merchant banking was hardly unique to Peabody. Merchant activity was the primary way that New Yorkers 
built their fortunes in the first-half of the nineteenth century, for example. For more on the evolving relationship 
between merchants and banking activities in this period, see Sven Beckert, The Monied Metropolis: New York City 
and the Consolidation of the American Bourgeoisie, 1850-1896 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 
especially Chapter One “Accumulating Capital,” 17-45.  
187
 “George Peabody,” Hunt’s Merchants’ Magazine and Commercial Review XXXVI (1857), 431. 
188
 Chernow, House of Morgan,  4. 
189
 Parker, George Peabody, 25.  
60 
 
connections to launch a career in the wholesale dry goods business. Eventually, he founded 
Riggs and Peabody in Baltimore as the junior partner. In that period, he frequently travelled to 
Southern states for raw cotton to export to England, and it established a connection between 
Peabody and the South that would endure in his philanthropy.
190
  
By 1822, Riggs and Peabody expanded to Philadelphia and New York, and Peabody 
became senior partner. In this period, Peabody widened his operations, as he supplied credit for 
others to ship cargo. Selling cotton in Lancashire and returning with merchandise to sell in 
America was a lucrative part of Peabody’s operations.191 By 1837 he moved to London, and as 
he expanded his banking activities, he became one of the most successful American financiers in 
London.
192
 It was there that Peabody’s star truly rose when he established George Peabody and 
Company in 1843. Famously, Peabody took on Junius Spencer Morgan as a partner later in life, 
and by doing so he gave the house of Morgan its start.
193
  
During Peabody’s life in London he inserted himself in British society through acts of 
statesmanship and business that benefitted him financially and socially. Peabody marketed 
himself as the head of an American banking house in London. He was a leading seller of 
American state bonds, and when states threatened to default on payments to British creditors 
during multiple recessions, Peabody actively encouraged state repayments and secured British 
loans allowing them to do so.
194
 He famously threw an annual Fourth of July dinner party that 
was attended by government officials and elites from both Britain and the United States. In fact, 
eventually the American government took over the dinner altogether. Throughout his career, 
Peabody displayed a shrewd understanding that statesmanship and international business success 
went hand-in-hand.  
Peabody rose in the ranks of British society through the growth of his banking activities, 
but also through his philanthropies. In their work on the “financialization of philanthropy” in 
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Victorian England, historians Josephine Maltby and Janette Rutterford have argued that with the 
growth of securities markets and the broadening of the populations acting as investors, the form, 
function and purpose of philanthropy in British society changed in this period that was so 
formative to Peabody’s philanthropies. Concepts and logics attached to finance, such as 
“investment and speculation, risk and return, [and] profit and loss” made their way into the 
design of charitable activities and the manner in which people evaluated the desired “returns” of 
charitable activity, they argue.
195
 The authors look to model dwelling companies (these were 
low-profit housing companies, which Peabody was involved in) and to a shift in charity 
organizations selecting aid recipients based on their likelihood to repay or succeed, rather than 
charitable impact. While investing had previously been seen as a “self-interested activity,” these 
activities, the authors argue, “brought together key preoccupations: the desire to be seen as a 
philanthropist and the anxiety to make profitable investments, in the social as well as the 
financial sphere.”196 While a number of historians have written about the manner in which 
market society and the rise of capitalism altered social relations, Maltby and Rutterford’s 
research demonstrates how philanthropy, statesmanship, and business were, in many instances, 
inseparable in this period.
197
   
 
Despite his devotion to accumulating capital, Peabody famously spent comparatively little on 
himself.
198
 He lived in rented rooms, and he worked constantly with time off for the occasional 
fishing trip. Although Peabody had a daughter with a partner in Brighton, he did not publicly 
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recognize either of them. He did not even include them in his will.
199
 Instead, by the 1850s 
Peabody started to build his legacy in a more public fashion—all of his major donations would 
bear his name throughout his lifetime.
200
  
Peabody’s early charitable endeavors reflected a more popular nineteenth-century 
approach to giving—he supported local institutions and made contributions to charitable 
societies. He did not need to actively seek for opportunities either. He received upwards of 1000 
“begging letters” per month.201 From consumption, failed businesses, to “cold chronic lumber 
abscesses,” men and women wrote to Peabody for help.202 He also received requests for aid to 
charities and causes through established institutions. Churches, industrial schools, beneficent 
associations, hospitals, and budding scientists all wrote to Peabody hoping he would join their 
annual list of subscribers or contribute to their endowments.
203
 
As Peabody’s personal wealth grew, so did the scope of his gifts. One friend had chided 
Peabody that he must be hording his wealth with dreams of becoming the next James 
Smithson.
204
 That was not so far off. First, in 1852 Peabody gave $20,000 to his native town of 
Danvers to create a Peabody Institute. Peabody did not sail back to Danvers to deliver the gift in 
person, but at the town’s centennial celebrations, inhabitants opened a letter from Peabody 
explaining the gift. He said that he was paying a “debt” that he owed the previous generation.205 
In Peabody’s estimation, at least rhetorically, he “owed” something to society.206 Peabody did 
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not assume responsibility for the dissemination of the funds. Instead, he instructed that Danvers 
citizens should hold a vote to formally accept the gift and then elect a board of twelve trustees 
who would create a lyceum for free lectures.
207
 Peabody would establish additional institutes, the 
largest of which was the Baltimore Institute where he met with Henry.  
Peabody also gave £150,000 (eventually he would increase that amount to £500,000) to 
establish the Peabody Donation Fund in London in 1862. The PDF operated in the milieu of 
model housing companies described by Maltby and Rutterford.
208
 At first Peabody had 
considered giving money to education, but he was persuaded by prominent British charity 
reformers to direct his money towards housing the “deserving poor.”209 England’s Charity 
Commissioners, the official body responsible for accepting and administering charities, had to 
arrange for the legal acceptance of Peabody’s gift; they were even involved in the drafting of the 
trust deed, because there was no precedent for it. Peabody, as a foreigner trying to give away 
£150,000 while he lived, raised new issues.
210
 Like Smithson’s gift in the U.S., Peabody’s trust 
was eventually accepted, and in describing his actions to trustees, Peabody again used the 
formulation of fulfilling a debt to a place and people who had helped him flourish.
211
 Shortly 
thereafter Peabody was offered a Baronetcy by Queen Victoria, which he did not accept. 
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Then in 1867, Peabody began the foundation that would make him the grand patriarch of 
American philanthropy, replicating the Smithsonian Institution’s operations as a private fund 
with a public purpose. He gave $1 million to establish the Peabody Education Fund. After the 
Civil War, Peabody perceived the perfect moment to come to the aid of his home country with 
great fanfare. While he was no abolitionist, even decrying the war as a folly that could have been 
prevented through negotiation, he seized an opportunity to emphasize reunion through a vision 
for collective national development.
213
  
Peabody began to experiment, essentially, with new technologies for the public trust—in 
large part to help address what nineteenth-century Americans referred to as “the dead hand” 
problem of a donor’s impact on future generations. This was the problem of trusts created for a 
narrow purpose that, over time, became of little use to society or even gifts that had a pernicious 
influence.
214
 As Peabody developed his philanthropies while living in London, he would have 
been privy to the debates about the dead hand and charitable foundations that were sweeping the 
nation. The dead hand was a particularly contentious issue amongst British government officials 
and scholars of political economy in this period, because of the many thousands of charitable 
foundations that existed there.
 215
 Experts on charitable distributions went so far as to question 
the justice of allowing the nation’s wealthiest citizens to posthumously dispose of their property 
to objects of their own choosing—in perpetuity. This “shackling of property,” as one Charity 
Commissioner put it, allowed founders with no superior knowledge of social needs or the public 
good to remove property from society for useless or even pernicious purposes.
216
 In the opinion 
of the commissioner, posthumously disposing of property was not a natural right, but one 
positively given by the government. Late in the century, British charity reformers and members 
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of the Charity Commission, which regulated British charities, observed that thousands of 
philanthropic trusts existed. These trusts, they feared, did not reflect an interest in charity but in 
the whims of their founders.
217
  
In the United States, there were not thousands of trusts with the same capabilities as those 
in Britain. While American surplus wealth and civil society were growing rapidly in this period, 
the questions that policy makers faced were distinct. The legal apparatus creating American civil 
society was heavily influenced by British laws, but unlike Great Britain, there was no centralized 
body that oversaw the development of American philanthropy. The British created a permanent 
Charity Commission in 1853, and their philanthropic practices had developed under Elizabeth’s 
1601 Statute of Charitable Uses.
218
 American laws regarding charity blended with the legal 
infrastructure of voluntary associations and all other types of corporate entities. States created 
laws governing the purpose and regulation of charities as corporate bodies, and that led to 
variation in the regulation and corporate privileges granted to charities.
219
  
But this was no issue to Peabody. When he created his education fund, he used a deed of 
gift to transfer $1 million to his trustees. Charles Winthrop helped Peabody to draft the letter, and 
he selected trustees, as well.
220
 Winthrop was a descendant of John Winthrop, and he trained in 
Daniel Webster’s law office. He was a key public figure of the period. The letter, as they 
designed it, ensured that the PEF would maintain possession of the trust when Peabody died; it 
also described the purpose of the fund and instructions for its administration.
221
 For example, 
after describing the purpose of the fund as southern education, Peabody wrote that he gave 
trustees “permission to use from the principal sum, within the next two years, an amount not 
exceeding forty per cent;” he named Winthrop chairman; and he indicated that the fund could be 
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closed after thirty years if trustees deemed it appropriate. Peabody also designated that if the trust 
was dissolved, it should be distributed to educational institutions in the South.
222
 
Although Peabody was not a trustee of the PEF, the specificity of this deed of gift 
provided him with a great deal of administrative power at the foundation while living and after 
his death.
 However, Peabody wrote that he left “the details and organization of the Trust” to the 
trustees.
 223
 In fact, the Peabody Education Fund’s charter referenced the letter explicitly; its 
trustees were authorized “to hold, manage, invest, collect, control, administer, and dispose of the 
money and bonds given by the said George Peabody in the letters hereinbefore set forth.”224 This 
was important, because it seemingly lifted the shadow of the “dead hand” from Peabody’s gift, 
but it also obligated trustees to consult his trust letter.  
Most often, when philanthropists created a new institution, they named a group of 
trustees to manage their gifts. Those trustees would then apply for a corporate charter from a 
state legislature or the federal government to manage the trust as a body corporate. In this way, 
philanthropists were not managing the public distribution of their wealth directly; instead, a 
board of trustees used corporate entities to manage and distribute their fortunes. By designing the 
PEF and inviting government officials to serve as trustees, Peabody adroitly eschewed the issue 
of the dead hand. In Peabody’s world, by leaving his funds in trust to a group of men who would 
create a corporate body to manage his gift was a resolution to some of these questions. 
However, although they might have allayed fears regarding the dead hand, the corporate 
bodies that grew out of this benevolence became increasingly powerful. Part of what made the 
public-trust model so influential in this period was the corporate privileges contained in their 
charters. In the mid-to-late nineteenth century, if a foundation wanted to operate in perpetuity 
with an unlimited endowment, it needed a special charter. Although states were granting 
corporate charters to nonprofit corporations at an increased rate with the rise of general 
incorporation laws, restrictions on the number of years a nonprofit corporation could exist, the 
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amount of funds it could hold, and the specifications of its purpose required with general 




After Peabody distributed his trust letter, trustees also quickly created a committee to investigate 
forming a corporate body during their first meetings. They appointed Governor Hamilton Fish 
and William M. Evarts to procure an act of incorporation, and in about two months they had a 
special charter from the New York legislature.
226
 Fish was a former governor and senator of New 
York and Evarts was a New York lawyer and statesman who would soon serve at the federal 
level, so their success is unsurprising.  
 In the charter process that PEF trustees went through in New York, you can see the way 
these developments in incorporation were being negotiated in terms of society’s expectations 
(and limits) for wealth—and the ways people began to get comfortable with the public trust. 
With the first general incorporation laws in the nation, the availability of special charters, and 
PEF trustees’ connections to public officials in the state, New York became the primary choice 
of the incorporators of foundations well into the twentieth century.
227
 When New York revised 
its Constitution in 1846 it crafted its general incorporation laws to be the most sweeping in the 
nation.
228
 Historians have explained the shift towards general incorporation in New York and 
other states as the result of popular discontent with the “special privileges” and “corruption” 
associated with special legislation.
229
 There were no debates at the convention regarding 
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concerns about the size and power of nonprofit corporations; however, New York would include 
charitable corporations amongst its general incorporation statutes.
230
 In particular, the act of 
April 12, 1848, allowed individuals to incorporate for “benevolent, charitable, scientific, or 
missionary purposes” by securing permission from a Supreme Court Justice and then filing a 
certificate with the Secretary of State. However, these corporations were limited to holding real 
estate up to $50,000 and personalty up to $75,000.
231
 Such property limitations would not have 
worked for the Peabody Education Fund, but the convention had provided for corporations to be 
created by special act “in cases where in the judgment of the Legislature, the objects of the 
corporation cannot be attained under general laws…”232 This loophole left room for the creation 
of enormous public trusts like Peabody’s. And more significantly, it set a precedent for the 
special chartering of public trusts in New York. While some entities would obtain federal 
charters, the majority would obtain special charters from New York. These entities included, for 




When attorneys advised the creators of the nation’s first foundations, though, they had a 
choice: apply to Congress or a state legislature for a special charter. At the moment that Peabody 
established his fund, in fact, the federal government was issuing a number of federal charters to 
Reconstruction-Era institutions. Had Peabody left his trust to the United States of America at his 
death like Smithson, perhaps Congress would have used the funds to supplement funding to 
federally-created government agencies and corporations, such as the Freedmen’s Bureau. Or it is 
not hard to imagine Congress giving all or part of the funds to Howard University, which 
received a federal charter in 1867 or the Colored Union Benevolent Association, which received 
a federal charter in 1865. While it would have been an expansion of either institution’s purpose 
to manage Peabody’s bequest, it is not hard to envision one or both entities establishing normal 
schools for the education of black teachers or even of creating a plan for developing education 
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for African American children in the South. None of that happened, of course. But, the federal 
government continued to issue federal charters for both District corporations and national 
institutions in this period. 
Despite the rise of federal charters granted to benevolent works, along with federal 
approbation of his gift, the PEF obtained a special charter from NY. After Peabody established 
his trust, Congress gave him a gold medal in honor of his benevolence, and President Andrew 
Johnson visited Peabody at the Willard Hotel after the first meeting of the trustees to thank him 
in person. Allegedly Johnson welcomed the gift and hoped it would reunite the country.
234
 These 
actions of federal approbation suggest that Peabody might have been able to get a federal charter, 
but would he have wanted one? Peabody’s belief in reunion and the politics of federalism during 
Reconstruction would have made the federal charter undesirable to him. The PEF’s New York 
charter distinguished it from abolitionism and federally-funded Reconstruction-era reform and 
development agencies. With a state charter, the PEF chose to form alliances with southern state 
and county officials at the local level, and it could avoid questions about economic and racial 
justice. In fact, abolitionist William Lloyd Garrison chastised Peabody for his choice. He 
publicly ridiculed Peabody for esteeming the heroism of the Southern people, evidenced by his 
willingness to work with and through southern elites and institutions.
235
  One critic of Peabody’s 
philanthropies even published an anonymous letter in newspapers accusing Peabody of profiting 
off the Civil War. He never made contributions to the Sanitary Commission, and he gave money 
to the poor of London while he failed to support the Union army, the writer alleged.
236
 In the 
end, these accusations had little impact on Peabody’s gift and its perception by public officials, 
but by eschewing federal regulation in this case, Peabody had indeed made a choice to 
distinguish his benevolent work in the south as offering reunion rather than reform. However, 
officials did not immediately find that suspect—Peabody was operating in more universalist 
terms, much like Smithson, in his repeated claims to desire the advancement of the nation. 
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To undertake that vision, Peabody and Winthrop included almost an equal balance of 
board members from southern and northern states. Around the March 1867 meeting of the 
trustees, Winthrop who had been named Chairman, asked southern trustees for their opinion on 
how the fund should be spent.
237
 Some advocated for the funds to be spent for feeding and 
clothing southerners, while others advocated that the funds benefit the children of the formerly 
wealthy in the South. These suggestions did not satisfy Winthrop, so he reached out to Barnas 
Sears for his opinion. Sears had worked to establish public education in Massachusetts as part of 
the Massachusetts State Board of Education, and he firmly believed that developing a system of 
public education required popular, local support. Legislation should follow public sentiment 
rather than the reverse, he argued. So rather than advocating that the PEF establish schools for 
the poor in the south, he recommended that the fund assist southern leaders and organizations in 
their crusade for publicly supported education institutions in the south.
238
 The board approved of 
his vision, and Sears would serve as the fund’s field agent from 1867-1880. 
 
The Limits of the Public Trust in Pursuing the Public Good 
After creating the PEF, Peabody received a gold medal from Congress. The medal showed his 
profile with a statuette of Benevolence crowning him with a laurel wreath, as well as palmetto 
trees with black and white children playing under their shade.
239
 In Peabody’s letter creating the 
trust, he had characteristically described his gift as a “duty and a privilege.” In addition to 
specifying that the fund should be used for education in “destitute portions of the Southern 
states,” though, Peabody indicated that the funds should be “distributed among the entire 
population, without other distinction than their needs and the opportunities of usefulness to 
them.”240 When Congress gave Peabody the gold medal thanking him for his “great and peculiar 
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beneficence,” they noted his intention that the funds should be “distributed among the entire 
population without any distinction…”241 
However, the Peabody Education Fund would fail to make black education a priority in 
its work. Worse than that, it would hurt the cause of black education in three important ways. 
First, as W.E.B. Du Bois described in Black Reconstruction in America, the Peabody Education 
Fund lobbied for the elimination of a clause prohibiting separate schools in the original draft of 
the 1875 Civil Rights Bill.
242
 In addition, Barnas Sears attempted to bully Louisiana officials into 
eliminating the state’s prohibition of racial separation in education.243 Finally, the fund had an 
abysmal record in contributing to African American education. Under Sears’ leadership, trustees 
distributed about $1.2 million, and of that sum, about 6.5 percent or $75,750 went to schools 




Of course, the body of people that the term public encompasses can be highly expansive and 
extremely exclusive. As we have seen, the vision of civilization that the Smithsonian Institution 
and the Peabody Education Fund worked to develop was certainly targeted towards advancing 
white European civilization. And, in line with that developmental vision, the racial politics of 
many northern philanthropists interested in black southern education in this period saw black 
education as a means of advancing the interests of the nation at the expense of material and 
social justice for formerly enslaved African Americans. In other words, northern reformers 
articulated a southern “negro problem” as a question that threatened the development of 
civilization. In a speech made in front of the Alabama legislature in 1899 praising their funding 
of public education, the then agent of the PEF Jabez Lamar Monroe Curry, emphasized that 
Americans were “bound, hand and foot, to the lowest stratum of society;” and that lowest 
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stratum, according to Curry, African Americans without property, were threatening to drag down 
the “white race” and its “free institutions.” The most benevolent act—to benefit the entire nation, 
then, was strengthening free public education for black southerners.
245
 
While public officials served on the boards of public trusts and worked with public trusts 
to implement public education, that fact hardly guaranteed that they would pursue just social 
causes or even that the public officials selected would hold antiracist, reformist politics. This is 
not to say that the entirety of the PEF’s work had pernicious consequences. Du Bois also stated 
that the PEF helped to establish the public school system in the South.
246
 Over time, the PEF did 
redouble its efforts to establish public education in the South by working with local schools at 
the county level to foment support for tax-payer supported education; it established the Peabody 
Normal College to produce more teachers for southern schools; and it advanced efforts to 
provide curriculum for the preparation of teachers.
247
 To undertake those works the PEF would 
pay the salaries of supervisors, staff, and support associations that were often formally elected 
and managed by state boards of education.
248
 Given their board structure, too, the PEF had 
access to public officials and community leaders in the South who could aid in their campaign to 
foment support for tax-supported education.
249
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The Peabody Education Fund was the first of a number of foundations dedicated to 
education that formed in the late-nineteenth century. All of the other similar funds received 
special charters and used the PEF as a model. The John F. Slater Fund incorporated in 1882 with 
a $1 million endowment to uplift “the lately emancipated population of the Southern states…by 
conferring on them the blessings of Christian education.”250 The Rockefellers endowed the 
General Education board with $10 million in 1903 to promote education in the United States 
“without distinction of race, sex, or creed.”251  And Anna T. Jeanes left $1 million to Booker T. 
Washington and Hollis Burke Frissell to endow the Negro Rural School Fund (also known as the 
Anna T. Jeanes Foundation) in 1907.
252
 However, attributing the Peabody Education Fund, or 
any of the northern funds for southern education, with the successful development of black 
education after 1867 would be facetious.
253
 Historians of education have written about these 
funds’ influence on education in detail;254 rightly, many historians have emphasized the limited 
impact that they had on Southern education in comparison to grassroots charitable and 
educational endeavors funded by African American associations in the South.
255
 Additionally, 
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the missionary societies and the Freedman’s Bureau played vital roles in the development of 




The Peabody Education Fund would close by 1916, and leave a majority of its trust to fund the 
Teachers College at Vanderbilt.
257
 By the early twentieth century, Wickliffe Rose the general 
agent of the Peabody Education Fund no longer believed that private benevolence offered the 
best path in developing public education. Schools should be “paid for by the people” through 
taxation and “administered as a public business,” he argued.258 Citizens had enough individual 
surplus wealth to pay taxes, and so the “public business” of education was to be carried out by 
southern states themselves. By supporting small, private schools across the south, northern 
benefactors were actually hurting the development of an effective education system in the south, 
he believed. However, because Peabody had planned for the closing of the fund in his trust letter, 
trustees had a method and rationale for its closing at their fingertips. In the end, Peabody’s trust 
letter had created a remarkably flexible design that allowed trustees to put the funds to better use 
in the early twentieth century than they might have been had the PEF continued its operations. In 
one important respect at least, Peabody’s vision for combatting the dead hand had worked. 
Just as this triumph for state capacity crested, though, an even wealthier group of 
philanthropists demonstrated their ability and their intention to outspend state and federal 
governments on social welfare initiatives. As the next chapter will show, Andrew Carnegie 
famously built public libraries, John D. Rockefeller funded medical research to stanch the spread 
of communicable diseases that haunted American communities, and Olivia Slocum Sage would 
fund social science research into some of the nation’s greatest problems. The balance of private 
and public funding of public works was constantly shifting, and never in the same direction. But 
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as we will see, those later founders were not quite as aggressive in limiting the dead hand. They 
were more interested in building powerful institutions. 
 
The Private Foundation as Public Trust  
Despite the qualities that make the PEF a public trust, the Peabody Education Fund has been 
consistently described by American historians as its opposite: as the first in a long line of 
privately endowed philanthropic foundations in America.
259 Peabody’s decision to use his 
fortune to endow the PEF during his lifetime has imbued it with the honor (and the weight) of 
having inspired future wealthy Americans, such as Rockefeller and Carnegie, to follow his 
example and to actively shape the philanthropic foundations they created during their own 
lifetimes. The Peabody Education Fund has been cast as the beginning of private philanthropy. 
However, just as it is a mistake to conceive of the Smithsonian as a creature of the federal 
government, it is equally unwise to imagine that the PEF was a wholly private institution.
260
 It is 
best understood as a public trust.  
By analyzing the PEF as a public trust like the Smithsonian Institution, this chapter has 
shown how the contours of American philanthropy and the creation of the nonprofit sector shift 
in American history when we see the duality of the public and the private. Rather than labeling 
philanthropy as “private” or autonomous from government activity, through the Peabody 
Education Fund and the development of the public trust, national benevolence becomes part of 
how American governance strategy developed in the nineteenth century—and it was, in fact, a 
way that private money began to have a say in the complex modes of governance of the 
nineteenth century. The public trust makes clear how wealthy philanthropists could participate in 
the governing process and build networks with public officials through their philanthropy and 
                                                          
259
 Hammack and  Anheier, A Versatile American Institution, especially chapter one “Foundations in the United 
States;” Zunz, Philanthropy in America, 10. 
260
 Barry Karl and Stanley N. Katz David provide a longer history of the trusts and other types of institutions 
that preceded the nation’s first foundations in “The American Private Philanthropic Foundation and the Public 
Sphere.  Hammack and Anheier critically examine this emphasis on foundations in the history of American 
philanthropy, including the Peabody Education Fund’s role as a symbol of “private power” in A Versatile American 
Institution, 1.  
76 
 
growing capital. The prestige and influence a philanthropist would gain through pursuing 
philanthropy while living was (and remains) unparalleled.  
All of this complex negotiation of the boundaries of private and public money, private 
and public purpose, and the nation-building capacity (and ownership) of surplus wealth is clear 
in George Peabody’s philanthropy. He used a corporate body to expand the power of his wealth 
beyond his lifetime, and as he did so, he and his advisers adapted the public trust model to 
American foundations. To do this, he and his advisers developed new legal and financial 
technologies that offered a collective vision for the public purpose of private wealth in American 
society. Equally important to that vision, though, was the New York legislature who granted the 
fund its charter. The legal and financial history of the public trust reveals that Americans were 
making decisions about how to coordinate private and public spending.  
This would not last, though; the negotiated outcome that created the public trust model 
would falter. In the Progressive Era, the growth of American fortunes and the rise of 
antimonopoly politics would change the balance of power that allowed the public trust model to 
operate. As wealth had more power in society, citizens grew increasingly suspicious of 
philanthropic activity. And with corporate power featuring heavily in public debates about 
monopoly capitalism, the corporate bodies that made public trusts function were regarded as 
suspect. Under these new conditions, the relationship between governance and benevolence 
would transform. The next chapter will address what happened to the public trust model in the 






A New Species of Corporation: 
The Public Trust’s Evolution in the Gilded Age
 
 
Gilded-Age commercial development produced more American surplus wealth than ever before 
with much of it heavily concentrated amongst the nation’s richest citizens.261 By 1910, the top 
ten percent of American wealth holders owned about eighty percent of the nation’s total 
wealth.
262
 Further, the expansion of railroads and corporate consolidation beginning in the 1880s 
that ended with the great merger movement at the turn of the century famously transformed 
industrial capitalism and knitted together an increasingly national marketplace.
263
 As these 
seismic shifts fueled technological development, immigration and urbanization, they also 
produced popular questioning of the desired role of large corporations in American 
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 While some saw surplus wealth accumulated by large corporate bodies as the 
driving force behind the advancement of civilization, to others it was the road to a new American 




 The concentration and skewed distribution of resources famously put surplus wealth at 
the center of many Progressive-Era debates about the state of American political economy and 
laissez-faire capitalism. Business people, government officials, political economists and social 
reformers all debated and negotiated the role that surplus wealth should play in economic and 
social development, as well as the role that state and federal governments should play in its 
management and distribution.
266
 These policy debates regarding surplus wealth and the corporate 
form would take place popularly and at the highest levels of government.   
For the wealthy, the promises of the public trust and the grand potential of their wealth 
would be a bright point of the times. In 1889, Andrew Carnegie wrote that the problem of the age 
was “the proper administration of wealth, so that the ties of brotherhood [might] still bind 
together the rich and poor in harmonious relationship.”267 For Carnegie, the increasing 
distinction of wealth and poverty itself was a sign of the development of civilization—a 
necessary condition that fueled social and economic progress.
268
 According to John D. 
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Rockefeller Sr. and his closest advisers, the corporation was the medium “right at hand” for the 
wealthy to undertake careful gifts. In fact, using the corporate form for philanthropic grants was 
essential to prevent “giving unwisely” and to make “careful investigations,” they argued.269 
But after multiple recessions, seemingly originating with the rich, and social movements 
led by small producers and wage-laborers, tying the rich and the poor in brotherhood did not 
seem all that likely. In any case, this question of tying rich and poor together was not destined to 
be solely answered through the better administration of surplus wealth by the rich themselves. 
The volatility of the business cycle, as well as labor strikes and Populist movements were putting 
new pressure on wealth to validate its increased role in American democracy.
270
 At the federal 
level, in 1890 and at the height of the Gilded Age, Congress passed the Sherman Antitrust Act, 
which promised the federal prosecution of the unlawful restriction of trade and was directed at 
the holders of the nation’s surplus wealth. Legal disputes about the meaning and desired 
application of the Sherman Antitrust Act dominated the courts through the early twentieth 
century. And as the judiciary debated the desired role of trusts in American capitalism, books 
and novels popularized the legal disputes. In fact, historians of Populism in the Gilded Age have 
emphasized the level with which alternative visions of progress and political economy saturated 
Americans from all classes and regions.
271
 Henry Demarest Lloyd described the threatening 
“bigness” of monopoly corporations that controlled the average American’s access to the 
necessities of life in Wealth against Commonwealth.
272
 Henry George’s widely-read Progress 
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and Poverty explored how “social difficulties” were “engendered by progress itself.”273 And 
Edward Bellamy’s popular novel Looking Backward: 2000-1887 shared a vision of the ultimate 
destination of monopoly capitalism as a socialist utopia where one corporate syndicate operated 
in the interest of “common profit” rather than personal enrichment.274 
 Under these conditions, Americans wanted to know more about how many millionaires 
the country had produced and what those millionaires were doing with their wealth. Further, 
additional policy debates about the protective tariff and the federal income tax made information 
about the number of great fortunes in the nation, as well as how they were made, matters of even 
greater curiosity.
275
 Political economists and social reformers published numerous books and 
articles on great American fortunes and the distribution of wealth through the early twentieth 
century.
276
 Two newspapers even attempted to provide complete lists of the millionaires in the 
country. The New York Tribune’s financial editor reported that there were 4,047 millionaires in 




 Martin Sklar called the debates Americans were having about monopolies, trusts, 
combinations and competition, essentially, preoccupations with the “corporate question.” For 
policy makers, Sklar explained, these debates were less about zero-sum choices between 
monopoly and competition, as well as laissez faire and regulation; rather they were rooted in 
determining the respective regulatory roles that large corporations and the government should 
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play in managing the market.
278
 Of course, government subsidy and regulation of corporate 
bodies were controversial long before the late nineteenth century. Charters to banks and public 
works, for example, produced national debates about government subsidy and regulation much 
earlier.
279
 And the creation of both the Smithsonian and the Peabody Education Fund have 
demonstrated the central role that special charters played in the controversial development of 
national philanthropy through the legal creation of the public trust. But the Gilded Age debates 
made corporations the eye of the storm. 
Large corporations were so controversial, because in addition to swallowing up or 
squeezing out small producers, they were known to acquire unfair advantages. Historians have 
used railroads as the prime example of this trend; first celebrated as the epitome of progress, they 
were eventually widely regarded as the epitome of corruption.
280
 Richard White’s work on the 
history of transcontinental railroads emphasizes the manner in which these commercial 
developments were entwined with government subsidy. Like public trusts that required 
government support to flourish, transcontinental railroad corporations produced private wealth 
because their creators leveraged “large public subsidies and particular legal privileges.”281 
Federal and state governments created the conditions for railroad entrepreneurs to flourish in the 
name of the “public good,” but the particular kind of good they produced regularly resulted in 




Given the public trust’s existence as a special, wealth-driven mode of governance in the 
nineteenth century, it is of little surprise that it would change in this cultural environment, when 
great fortunes and the corporate form were so suspect. And it is precisely at this moment that 
historians have located the birth of the modern philanthropic foundation, with its grant-making 
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approach to advancing civilization.
283
 A small number of the richest of the rich included in the 
lists of millionaires followed Peabody’s example, creating living trusts; these rich also began to 
create more and more corporations that would have many of the characteristics of the earlier 
public trusts. But the millionaires began to deviate from some of the traditional practices of 
public trusts too. For example, experts began to replace government officials on boards of 
trustees and foundations began to operate with broader purposes—not just one particular 
purpose. And government state and federal legislators tasked with granting these trusts special 
charters to form corporate bodies increasingly flinched at the idea that they were not only 
validating the business practices of the nation’s most controversial monopolies, but also that they 
were sanctioning the governing role that foundations played in society. As earlier debates about 
the public trust already revealed, such conferrals of power in the chartering process to pursue 
public works not only allowed philanthropists to perpetuate their names, they allowed the 
superrich who created living trusts to influence social and economic policy; these were special 
modes of governance. But as the corporate form and the government’s role in the chartering 
process took on heightened significance, the public trust model that had facilitated the creation of 
enormous foundations was forced to adapt. 
In this chapter, I explore this development away from the traditional public trust to 
something recognizably new--and how the nation’s largest holders of surplus wealth negotiated 
this development at the height of Gilded-Age debates about the corporate form, the accumulation 
of wealth, and its distribution. In particular, I focus on the efforts of John D. Rockefeller Sr., 
Andrew Carnegie, and Olivia Slocum Sage, who all faced social and legal challenges as they 
endowed major funds in this period. By analyzing how they and their legal advisers designed 
their trusts, as well as how legislatures regulated the corporate bodies they created, I argue that 
increasing pressure from philanthropists and public officials to separate their public works from 
their business operations and from the government led to the rise of a new species of corporation 
more akin to the private foundations we know today--and something fairly unlike the old public 
trust model popular in the mid nineteenth century. I also show that nonprofit corporations were at 
                                                          
283
 See, for example, Hall, Inventing the Nonprofit Sector and “A Historical Overview of Philanthropy, 
Voluntary Associations, and Nonprofit Organizations in the United States, 1600-2000;” Karl and Katz, 




the center of debates about the corporate form in this period. Historians have paid far greater 
attention to the ways in which privileged access to capital and incorporation shaped the evolution 
of the business corporation, but nonprofit corporations were the true eye of the storm as they 
united concerns about material and social development that commercial corporations could only 
gesture at bringing together.  
 
Philanthropists Proclaim a New Species of Corporation (The Future, Partially Realized) 
In the early-twentieth century, the nation’s largest benefactors offered an answer to the corporate 
question in their own way, by giving surplus wealth a supposed permanent, mollifying role in 
society. Trustees at the Russell Sage Foundation, the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement 
of Teaching, and the Rockefeller Foundation each published announcements in newspapers and 
professional journals describing the creation of philanthropic foundations—a “new species of 
corporation” in the words of Cornell President and Carnegie Trustee Jacob Gould Schurman.284 
Their foundations could exist in perpetuity, hold unlimited endowments, maintain self-
perpetuating boards, and their charters were “elastic” so they could change the focus of their 
grants at any time.
285
 With these unprecedented corporate privileges, the nation’s rapidly 
increasing surplus wealth would be held in absolute ownership by new, permanent artificial 
individuals.
286
 And while the purpose of the business corporation was to return profits to 
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shareholders, this new vision for the nonprofit corporation articulated the purpose of its unique 
existence as extending the benefits of corporations to social management and the development of 
civilization.  
This was something new entirely, promising something different than the public trusts of 
the past century that had envisioned working closely with and through public officials. The 
nation’s surplus wealth was no longer to be managed through living public trusts that would be 
closely affiliated with government-sanctioned public works. Rather, it was to become its own 
source of power—with its own form of governance—a sort-of spin off, private mode of 
governance. 
The greatest of this new species can be found in an article entitled “Five Great Gifts,” 
published in 1907, by Daniel C. Gilman, former President of Johns Hopkins University and the 
then President of the Carnegie Institute of Washington, in Outlook. He argued that recent 
benevolent gifts from George Peabody, John Slater, John D. Rockefeller, Andrew Carnegie, and 
Olivia Slocum Sage, when taken together, revealed “a new force in civilization.” And that force, 
Gilman argued, was likely “to have still further development.”287 Gilman chose to write this in 
one of the nation’s most widely read news magazines “to arrest attention” to the “influence of 
good examples,” he wrote.288 Already men and women had followed in these benefactors’ 
footsteps, he noted, and he hoped more gifts would promote national development in the future. 
Then in 1911, Leonard Ayres, head of the Russell Sage Foundation’s Education Department 
joined Gilman’s cause, and he declared that a new corporate form had been created. In his words, 
Ayres described what we now call philanthropic foundations as “national benefactions that 
[were] in a class by themselves.”289 This “class” was distinguished by four criteria, he explained: 
they had endowments greater than one million dollars; they were explicitly nonsectarian; they 
should be national or global in focus; and their charters should be elastic enough to permit the 
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organizations to adapt their missions with changing future conditions.
 290 
In making his case, 
Ayers produced a list of “seven great foundations” that allegedly had these qualities, including 
his own employer, the Sage Foundation, and analogous organizations, such as the Peabody 
Education Fund, the General Education Board, and the Carnegie Institution of Washington. 
 




Charter Type Mission Endowment 
(Millions) 
Peabody Education Fund 1867 New York Education $2 
Slater Fund 1882 New York Education $1 
Carnegie Institution of Washington 1902 D.C. to Federal Research $22 
General Education Board 1903 Federal Education $53 
Carnegie Foundation for the 
Advancement of Teaching 
1906 Federal Teacher 
Pensions 
$15 
Russell Sage Foundation 1907 New York General $10 
Anna T. Jeanes Foundation 1908 New York Education $1 
 
As leaders in philanthropy proclaimed the newness of the foundation model in these triumphant 
terms, one could easily have missed the policy innovations and debates about philanthropic 
foundations that their legal establishment ignited—the corporate privileges that Ayres identified 
as unique to foundations were highly contentious, in fact.  
Many of the charters of the foundations included in his list did not, however, hold all of 
the corporate privileges he included in his definition of a foundation. For example, all of the 
foundations in his list, except the Russell Sage Foundation, specified public purposes in their 
charters that were decidedly not “general.” The longer history of the public trust shows that 
changes in the legal and social vision for foundations were not rooted in necessity, as many 
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 The superrich had been using special charters for decades to create 
large foundations. They were after something else—other than a corporate vehicle—with these 
new corporate privileges. 
In fact, the longer history of these “new species” starts with the public trust and the 
experimentation that took place around the corporate form. Throughout this period, 
philanthropists and their advisers experimented with different types of corporations and 
privileges to undertake their public works in the early twentieth century. And those experiments 
would alter the practices and shape of the public trust. The nation’s largest funds continued to 
receive special charters through the early twentieth century, so the administrative and legislative 
records regarding those experiments offer insights into how state and federal representatives 
imagined the role of public trusts in monopoly capitalism.  
However, by experimenting and making their case for yet more privileges, they were 
dramatically altering the earlier legal and social role inhabited by the public trust. By 1911, 
though, foundation leaders were discussing the possibility that new economic legislation would 
“preclude the acquisition of surplus wealth” and prevent the giving of “large continuing gifts.” 293 
Philanthropists and their advisers were predicting that the state might prevent the accumulation 
of large fortunes, or at least, they would prevent their distribution through foundations. Public 
sentiment, foundation leaders thought, would lead government officials to increase taxation and 
give money away for public works itself.
294
 While these fears certainly guided the superrich and 
their advisers as they designed their foundations, there was no clear path to the new species of 
corporation as their articles proclaimed. This is why understanding what leaders in philanthropy 
meant by new species of corporation and philanthropic foundation in this period is critical to 
advancing our history of the public trust at this moment. In the following sections, I focus on the 
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incorporation process of major early-twentieth century foundations. I focus on Carnegie, 
Rockefeller and Sage, because they combined elements of the public trust with the emerging 
private-foundation model. 
 
Heaven Born: John D. Rockefeller’s Corporate Bodies Required Special Privileges 
Before creating his eponymous foundation in 1913, John D. Rockefeller created multiple 
nonprofit corporations in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries that heavily influenced 
the rise of private foundations as a “new species of corporation.”295 In 1890, Rockefeller gave 
one of his first notable gifts to the University of Chicago, and then in the early-twentieth century 
he and team of advisers developed numerous endowed institutions, including the Rockefeller 
Institute for Medical Research (1901), the General Education Board (1903), and the Rockefeller 
Sanitary Commission for the Eradication of Hookworm Disease (1909). Along the way, they 
used various types of corporations to undertake their work. At times, they described their 
foundations as “public trusts” rather than “private possessions,” but for the most part, their vision 
of philanthropy centered on adapting the form of the private business corporation to manage their 
philanthropy.
 296
 As one of Rockefeller’s advisers explained, his approach in philanthropy was 
the same as his approach to investing money in business: “[i]n a business enterprise he desires to 
get dividends upon his capital. In a philanthropic enterprise he desires to get dividends payable 
not in money but in the welfare of humanity.”297 Those dividends while payable to humanity 
were not necessarily the property of all of humanity. And that is a key distinction that would 
become more contentious over time. Nevertheless, the Rockefellers did not begin by imagining 
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their work in philanthropy as a new species of corporation; they began with older, tested 
corporate vehicles. 
For example, in 1901 when Rockefeller incorporated his institute for medical research 
dedicated to “the prevention and treatment of disease,” he and his advisers did not obtain a 
special charter from the New York legislature like George Peabody had.
298
 Rather, Rockefeller 
incorporated the institute as a New York membership corporation, and he stacked the board with 
medical doctors.
299
 That decision caused administrative problems in the future though. To begin, 
Rockefeller had provided the institute with $200,000 to purchase real estate in New York and 
another $1 million, but by 1907 he wanted to endow the medical institute with a larger sum. His 
advisers could not figure out how to facilitate that under New York’s membership corporation 
laws though, which limited the property a membership corporation could hold to $3 million. 
Additionally, trustees of a membership corporation would also need to act as directors. This was 
another problem with the membership corporation, because with an endowment, Rockefeller and 
his advisers envisioned a separate board of trustees who would manage the endowment, and a 
board of directors comprised of medical doctors who could direct the institution’s research and 
programs.
300
 Rockefeller and his advisers eventually decided that to achieve their vision for the 
institute, they would need a special charter. They would need some means of achieving the 
deployment of their wealth. 
So in 1908, Rockefeller’s attorney, who worked on both his business and philanthropic 
matters, Starr J. Murphy began meeting with the governor of New York Charles E. Hughes (a 
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family friend) and Senator Alfred Page to advocate for the special charter.
301
 Murphy had 
graduated from Columbia Law School and practiced law in Montclair, New Jersey before joining 
the Rockefellers’ personal staff in 1904.302 The institute had already developed a serum that 
cured epidemic meningitis, Murphy explained, and to keep developing into the future, its trustees 
required a special act of the New York legislature to ensure its operations could continue in the 
future.
303
 The legislature had granted a special charter to the Russell Sage Foundation the 
previous year, Murphy reminded the governor.
304
 That spring, the bill to issue the institute a 
special charter passed without a hitch. 
 
Rockefeller founded his next major institution in 1902. It was really his first major grant-making 
foundation that approached the type of the foundation eventually described as a “new species of 
corporation.” This time, he and his advisers obtained a federal charter to endow the General 
Education Board
305
 with $10 million to promote education in the United States “without 
distinction of race, sex, or creed.”306 The Rockefellers had been persuaded by the Peabody 
Education Fund and the Slater Fund that education was a field they wished to enter with their 
philanthropy. In 1899, Rockefeller and his son engaged New York lawyer Geo Welwood Murray 
to provide an overview of the legal documents they would need to establish an “educational fund 
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or trust.”307 Such a move, with the GEB and the Rockefeller Institute for Medical Research, 
suggests that far from a special charter being a foregone conclusion in creating foundations in 
this period, that the superrich were still uncertain and searching for the best manner to 
incorporate their philanthropies. Further, it suggests that while the public-trust model of 
American philanthropy had spread by the early twentieth century, it was not so instantiated as to 
have overdetermined the legal creation of foundations in the early twentieth century.  
The surviving correspondence between the Rockefellers and their legal advisers reveals 
the considerations that they were entertaining as they incorporated their foundations at the turn of 
the century. Surprisingly, even after the creation of so many public trusts, in his memos, Murray 
went back to the basics. He described the Rockefellers’ options to create the fund as a trust or as 
a corporation. They could use a deed to appoint trustees of their choosing and define the purpose 
of a trust, but New York statutes prohibited the creation of a trust that would persist for “more 
than two lives.”308 That wouldn’t do. But, courts had consistently held that the law of perpetuities 
did not apply to property held by charitable corporations. With that precedent, Murray believed, 
they were “practically shut up to the corporate method.”309 He then went on to discuss the 
advantages of a special charter over general incorporation. Most general acts provided for some 
kind of “visitation or control by the state,” so George Peabody and John F. Slater had chosen to 
incorporate their funds with special charters from New York, he noted. In detail Murray 
explained that the legislature had included Peabody and Slater’s letters of gift in their articles of 
incorporation “thus making [their] letters the exact definition of the powers and duties of the 
corporation.” He then went on to explain the concept of general incorporation and special 
incorporation.
310
 Murray alerted them to the fact that if they wanted a special charter, they might 
consider engaging public officials to serve as trustees. At the Peabody and Slater funds all of the 
trustees were “notable and numerous,” nationally-recognized public figures. He “gravely 
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doubt[ed] if [they] could secure the passage of a similar special act unless [they] were willing to 
name a board of trustees as broadly representative.” 311 
By 1902, the Rockefellers were ready to incorporate the GEB, but they still were not sure 
where they should do so. This time, they enlisted the assistance of founding GEB trustee William 
H. Baldwin Jr. who had completed his legal training at Harvard and went on to become a 
president of the Long Island Railroad and a trustee of the Tuskegee Institute. With his help, they 
considered obtaining a charter from Washington D.C. (by then, Washington D.C. had its own 
general incorporation laws), Virginia, New Jersey, New York, and a federal charter from 
Congress. They weighed the benefits of general and special charters as well.
312
 Each jurisdiction 
had different advantages and disadvantages. A general charter from D.C. might limit them to 
property of an annual income not to exceed $25,000; additionally, its statutory exemption from 
taxation technically only seemed to apply to buildings within the district that were used for 
education or charity. They could hope for lax enforcement or attempt to secure the passage of a 
federal law exempting property like their endowment. With the CIW and other D.C. societies, 
they thought they might be able to lobby Congress to pass a general law for the exemption of 
charitable corporations in D.C. That all might cause some delay, though, and it might be just as 
easy to get a special charter from Congress, they thought.
313
 Virginia might only extend its tax 
exemption to property used within the limits of Virginia making it an unlikely choice. New 
Jersey placed a limit on the property a charitable corporation could hold of $500,000, and they 
would be liable to taxation on the property that they did not use in the state. New York seemed 
more favorable due to its permissive general incorporation laws that had previously attracted the 
Peabody Education Fund.  
 However, despite all of New York’s advantages, incorporating in the nation’s capital had 
its own allure. In particular, Frederick T. Gates saw a federal charter as particularly valuable.
314
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The GEB’s purpose was to be so expansive to be unimpeachable, and the institution could serve 
all of the nation’s states. That kind of broad benefaction would give the GEB a “public 
esteem.”315 Gates suggested that Rockefeller philanthropies that were chartered in states were 
left vulnerable to “hostile legislation control or repeal.”316 Or, Gates explained, that the charters 
could be “temptations” to the states. A “state might wish to limit the benefactions to its own 
boundaries, or to direct the benefactions to state hospitals, charities, normal schools or what not.” 
That had been the case in Europe, Gates explained. Even in England, he argued, the nation 
claimed the right to confiscate property or convert it “with slight formalities or none.”317 A 
charter from Congress could offer the Rockefellers more security—it was less likely that the 
federal government would interest itself in the foundation’s operations, Gates thought.  
Buttressing Gates favorable opinion of the federal charter was the fact that by the early 
twentieth century, a federal charter seemed like a reasonable tool to facilitate philanthropy that 
would operate “nationally.” As Ayres list of early foundations demonstrates, almost half of the 
nation’s first foundations had federal charters, but some thirty-four educational and charitable 
organizations received federal charters from 1889-1907, including the Rockefeller-funded 
General Education Board (1903), the Carnegie Institution of Washington (1904), and the 
Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching (1906).
318
 As we have seen, while the 
federal charter has a much larger history, the wealthy attempting to use the federal charter for 
their national foundations was a new use of the charter in the early twentieth century.
319
 The 
Smithsonian Institution that had obtained a federal charter was created from a bequest and not a 
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living trust. At the time, though, uses of the federal charter had expanded; it was being used to 
incorporate voluntary and charitable associations that operated nationally, such as the American 
Historical Association, the Red Cross, and eventually the Boy Scouts.
320
 
Given Gates arguments about the benefits of the federal charter, the Rockefellers 
obtained a federal charter in 1903. A few other choices the Rockefellers made while creating the 
GEB impacted the development of foundations in this period, too. Like previous public trusts, 
the GEB selected its trustees by a “representative principle.” In the beginning the approach was 
necessary, Gates explained. They needed the prestige of distinguished names, and their purpose 
was further legitimated by its “territorial representativeness.” But with this approach, Gates 
wrote, trustees “came not for the good they might do but for what they could get.” After twenty-
five years of operation, Gates would eventually advocate for the end of their representative 
selection. They no longer needed the prestige or the services of these individuals.
321
 Finally, 
Gates advised Rockefeller that he should consider endowing the GEB with cash rather than 
stocks. It would have left “no room in the minds of the meanest for the suspicion of your 
absolute good faith in the whole transaction,” Gates suggested.322 It would also allow 
Rockefeller to avoid the disclosure of any of his securities.
323
 If Rockefeller preferred to give 
securities, though, Gates compiled a list of securities that he recommended Rockefeller chose 
from; ominously, they included railroad companies and funds from the U.S. Steel Corporation.
324
 
As the next chapter will show, the Rockefellers would soon run headlong into 
antimonopoly politics of the Progressive Era as they attempted to create even larger 
philanthropic trusts. The role that private wealth should play in promoting the public good 
became increasingly contentious in the early twentieth century. The tainted money scandal in the 
spring 1905, illustrates the new, widespread skepticism about Rockefeller’s vision of civilization 
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and surplus wealth that they were beginning to face. After Rockefeller’s closest philanthropic 
advisers, Frederick Gates and Starr Murphy, worked out a $100,000 donation for international 
missions with the American Board affiliated with the Congregational Church, Boston 
Congregationalist ministers openly denounced the gift and demanded that the American Board 
return it to the Rockefellers.
325
 The objectors noted the “morally iniquitous and socially 
destructive” nature of Standard Oil, and they insisted that the Congregational Church should set 
an example in refusing the gift.
326
 These debates continued for years, and they were popular 
reading in the national press. Washington Gladden, a leader in the Congregational Church, who 
had been writing publicly against Standard Oil since the late 1880s published widely on his 
opposition to the Rockefeller gift, and this debate echoed earlier critiques of Standard Oil and 
John D. Rockefeller Sr. that had been occurring for at least twenty years.
327
   
 
Carnegie’s “Gospel of Wealth”: the Government Rethinks the Public Trust 
The philanthropist who had been out-spending Rockefeller in the late-nineteenth century was 
Andrew Carnegie. In addition to creating the Carnegie Corporation of New York to “promote the 
advancement and diffusion of knowledge and understanding” with a special charter from New 
York in 1911, he endowed many other philanthropic institutions that walked a fine line between 
operating as public trusts and private foundations. For example, in 1881, Carnegie began making 
gifts to establish libraries. He created libraries at his companies (often after labor disputes), and 
eventually he worked with cities and municipalities to establish public libraries if they would 
take over their maintenance and operations.
328
 He first approached Pittsburgh in 1881, but the 
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Pittsburgh City Councils did not accept the gift, because officials didn’t believe they had the 
authority to use public monies for a library.
329
 By 1887, however, Pennsylvania passed a law 
allowing for the levying of taxes for such purposes and asked Carnegie to renew his offer; by 
1889 they had funding for multiple libraries. By the end of his life, Carnegie had spent about $41 
million establishing more than 2,500 libraries around the world.
330
 A few other major gifts 
include his 1891 gift to establish Carnegie Hall, his donation in 1895 to create the Carnegie 
Museums of Pittsburgh, he created the Carnegie Dunfermline Trust in 1903 to benefit the 
residents of his birthplace in Scotland; he created the Carnegie Foundation in 1903 to erect and 
maintain a courthouse at the Hague; he incorporated the Carnegie Foundation for the 
Advancement of Teaching in 1905 with $10 million. This list is not comprehensive, but it 
displays the international character of Carnegie’s gifts, as well as his willingness to leave funds 
to city governments into the twentieth century. Although in “Wealth,” Carnegie distinguished 
between leaving funds for a public purpose in trust and administering one’s surplus while living, 
he combined those categories with ease in his own philanthropy. By example, at least, Carnegie 
was strengthening the public-trust model in many ways.  
By the early twentieth century, Carnegie tried to create a larger foundation, and at first 
his vision included key characteristics of the public trust. But when Carnegie attempted to obtain 
a federal charter to create the Carnegie Institution of Washington, government officials and 
social workers had a more cautious response to his gifts. In the words of Carnegie biographer 
David Nasaw, Carnegie offered President Theodore Roosevelt $10 million to establish the CIW 
in November 1902 as a “national trust.”331 However, as newspapers widely proclaimed, 
Roosevelt politely declined such an arrangement. While he wished for good relations with 
Andrew Carnegie, at that moment, the government could not accept securities from U.S. Steel to 
establish the CIW. Carnegie shifted gears, and decided to incorporate the CIW as a public trust 
like the Smithsonian Institution. He and his advisers proclaimed the gift a bit differently. In 
December 1901, Carnegie announced his intention to endow a research institution with $10 
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million. Newspaper articles speculated that his fortune amounted to something like $200 million, 
and he had already given away $40 million to libraries and universities.
332
 His latest gift, though, 
was to be different—Carnegie was asking the government to serve as the trustee of this latest 
gift, an article in the American proclaimed. “Mr. Carnegie’s plan does not propose a national 
university in the sense that an appropriation will be asked or needed,” the author explained. “The 
government [was] simply to be the trustee of the magnificent endowment, just as it 
administer[ed] the fund bequeathed by Smithson.”333  
Despite Carnegie’s shift in framing, Congress was still reluctant to grant him a federal 
charter though. It took the CIW years to obtain its federal charter, in fact. Like Frederick T. 
Gates predicted to Rockefeller, Congress was loath to charter a public trust with $10 million in 
U.S. Steel bonds. As a reporter at the Sun wrote, “the question ha[d] been raised whether it 
would be politic to accept [the Steel Company securities] in view of the agitation against 
combinations.”334 Another article “Gift Not Yet Accepted” asserted that President Roosevelt was 
pressuring Carnegie to offer cash rather than U.S. Steel securities.
335
 
Carnegie received some good advice from Charles Walcott, who was a CIW trustee and 
would become Secretary of the Smithsonian in1907; he suggested that Carnegie incorporate his 
foundation with a District charter and wait a couple years to approach Congress for a more 
permissive charter. By this time, Washington D.C. had its own laws of incorporation like many 
of the states (that were separate from federal incorporation laws), and the CIW easily obtained a 
District charter. In fact, it was Walcott who drew up the District charter for Carnegie.
336
 Trustees 
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included the President of the United States, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the 
House, the Secretary of the Smithsonian Institution, and the President of the National Academy 
of Sciences as ex officio trustees, and they held their first meeting to organize the trustees at the 
office of the Secretary of State.
337
 However, in their very first meeting, CIW trustees discussed 
renewing their efforts to obtain a federal charter.
338
 Their efforts were fueled by speculation that 
the District laws they incorporated under restricted the amount of income the fund could 
receive.
339
 CIW trustee, Supreme Court Justice Edward D. White wrote Walcott in 1902 
explaining that, even as a trustee, he could not express a legal opinion about the limitations of 
their Washington D.C. charter; however, he could say that if the trustees saw fit to diversify their 
endowment, which was sill entirely invested in bonds of the Steel Trust, they would be in a 
better position to obtain more favorable legislation from Congress to develop their operations. 
They could accomplish “great work,” but for that to happen, the CIW had to “overcome the 
reluctance of public men to given even an implied sanction to so great a combination as the Steel 
Trust.”340 
By 1904, Carnegie and his advisers applied for a federal charter. Elihu Root and John 
Cadwalader prepared the CIW’s new charter.341 The Speaker of the House had personally told 
Root that he would favor the bill and assist in its passage. However, he also insisted that the CIW 
should strike out its government officers and any mention of submitting reports to Congress. The 
CIW should “stand on its own legs and not appear to be a creature of the Government,” the 
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 Root and Carnegie did not object to this request, so they proceeded. The 
CIW did receive a federal charter successfully, but by the time it did, its character as a public 
trust was irrevocably altered. The CIW was decidedly not, in fact, it was prohibited from being, a 
“creature of the government.” As Congress tried to distance itself from Carnegie’s “tainted 
money,” it actually empowered private wealth to operate with more autonomous power. 
Eventually, this would have major consequences on the evolution of the public trust and the 
development of the American nonprofit sector.  
 
The Russell Sage Foundation: a New Foundation and a New Vision for the Public Trust 
When Oliva Slocum Sage created the Russell Sage Foundation in 1907, she and her advisers 
would push the public trust even further towards operating as a “private corporation” rather than 
a public trust. Most often referenced as the first general-purpose foundation in the United 
States,
343
 the RSF promised to use its $10 million endowment to improve the “social and living 
conditions in the United States of America.”344 The New York legislature granted her foundation 
a special charter without any amendments or delays.
345
 The lack of pushback, in part, was 
because RSF trustees applied to the New York legislature (rather than US Congress) for a special 
charter, as well as the fact that they did not include public officials amongst their trustees. 
Instead, Sage and her philanthropic adviser Robert W. de Forest, stacked the board with 
professionals in social work and charity. That decision, more than any other, offered the RSF a 
new path to making its own way as a public trust. But it was not a public trust that operated with 
public officials on its board; rather it harnessed the close relationships that leaders in social work 
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were acquiring with public officials as they undertook social reforms to benefit the working poor 
in the midst of industrialization and urbanization. 
De Forest himself, in fact, had been the president of the Charity Organization Society of 
New York for almost twenty years, he was appointed by Governor Roosevelt to serve on the 
New York Tenement House Commission, he had been president of the National Conference of 
Charities and Correction in 1903, and he was a trustee at numerous New York charities, as well 
as the Metropolitan Museum of Art. Other board members shared De Forest’s specialization. 
Cleveland H. Dodge, Daniel C. Gilman, John M. Glenn, Helen Gould, Gertrude M. Rice and 
Louisa Schuyler were all named as original trustees. The public nature of their interest in 
benevolent work was undeniable. Dodge was chairman of the Executive Committee of the Red 
Cross in New York and an officer of the YMCA, as well as a trustee of the American Museum of 
Natural History. Gilman was president of Johns Hopkins University, was the president of the 
Baltimore Charity Organization Society, the first president of the CIW, and a GEB trustee. Glenn 
was prominent in the national conferences for charities; he headed up the Baltimore Department 
of Public Charities. Rice was the president of the State Charities Aid Association of New York 
for years, and she was appointed to New York’s Board of Education. Schuyler was the founder 
and an officer of the New York State Charities Aid Association, as well-known for her work on 
the Sanitary Commission during the Civil War.
346
  
Regardless of the social prestige of the social-work leaders on the board, though, Robert 
de Forest was surprised by the lack of pushback on the “vagueness of purpose” in their 
charter.
347
 De Forest had been savvy though. He intentionally arranged positive press while they 
applied for a special charter from the New York legislature. In his interviews and in the 
information he provided publicly, he emphasized Sage’s “wise” approach to giving away her 
fortune.
348
 De Forest could reach out to his friends, like Edward Devine the publisher of 
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Charities, to aid his cause in this public relations campaign.
349
 Beyond that, though, de Forest 
hoped to keep their intentions as quiet as possible until they had their charter. He was not entirely 
sure that there would not be pushback on its “undefined” nature. However, if the special charter 
failed, they had planned to obtain a charter under New York’s membership corporation laws and 
then apply for a special charter at a later date, like the CIW did.
350
 Unlike the CIW though, 
Olivia Slocum Sage was named as the President of the RSF’s board of trustees (although she did 
not attend meetings). Sage did not have to worry about putting a great deal of distance between 
herself and her foundation. The general narrative around her contribution was that she was 
flouting her husband’s miserly tendencies by giving his fortune away. That made her a heroine.  
 
De Forest began advising Sage on the creation of her foundation after it became publicly known 
that she had inherited her husband’s money after his death in 1906. Russell Sage, the famously 
miserly New York financier once found guilty of usury, left his wife $65 million dollars in his 
will. This resulted in what de Forest called her “philanthropic problem,” when she received over 
20,000 written request for aid in about six months.
351
 De Forest went through the letters for Sage, 
but he also began to advise her on how to give away her new wealth. Sage would go on to give 
away $35 million to charitable, religious, and educational institutions while living and she 
bequeathed over $36 million at the time of death.
352
 De Forest was close with many of the most 
famous leaders in social work at the time, including Edward Devine, Jeffrey Brackett, and John 
M. Glenn. And they all relished the idea that de Forest would be able to work with Sage to 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
“Margaret Olivia Sage,” Folder 1, Box 1, Series 1: Mr. Russell Sage, Subgroup 1, Russell Sage Foundation records, 
Rockefeller Archive Center.  
349
 Robert de Forest to Edward Devine, March 12, 1907, Folder 11, Box 1, Series 1: Mr. Russell Sage, 
Subgroup 1, Russell Sage Foundation records, Rockefeller Archive Center. 
350
 Robert de Forest to Henry de Forest, Mar. 9, 1907, Folder 11, Box 1, Series 1: Mr. Russell Sage, Subgroup 
1, Russell Sage Foundation records, Rockefeller Archive Center.  
351
 Robert de Forest to Oliva Slocum Sage, February 7, 1907, Folder 11, Box 1, Series 1: Mr. Russell Sage, 
Subgroup 1, Russell Sage Foundation records, Rockefeller Archive Center. 
352
John M. Glenn, Lilian Brandt, and F. Emerson Andrews, Russell Sage Foundation, 1907-1946, vol. 1 (New 
York: Russell Sage Foundation), 3.  
101 
 
channel her newfound personal wealth into what they considered the most important social 
causes of the twentieth century.
353
 
De Forest sent Sage a memorandum detailing the makings of a foundation. Much of de 
Forest’s language from the memo made it into final draft of the RSF’s charter.354 For example, 
de Forest wrote that the foundation could focus on the “improvement of social and living 
conditions.” It should have a broad mission and avoid address social problems that might be 
dealt with by others; rather, it should focus on addressing the “larger and more difficult 
problems” facing society. One of the most remarkable elements that he added was an early 
gesture towards what foundations today call “program related investments.” 355  In De Forest’s 
words, some portion of the fund’s capital should be invested in “betterment which themselves 
produce income, such as tenement houses or boarding houses for women.” In the end, Sage 
decided to authorize trustees to invest at most one-quarter of the principal of the fund in 
businesses devoted to social improvement, which would likely produce an annual income of no 
less than three per cent for the fund.
356
 While the RSF is often associated with social work and 
Rockefeller and Carnegie are granted the mantle of what we call “philanthrocapitalism” today, 
the RSF was actually a far more remarkable leader in combining business and philanthropy.
357
 In 
fact, the relationship between legislatures and philanthropy did not sit well with de Forest. He 
wrote a friend also in social work,
358
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I am seriously disturbed about what seems to me to be a socialistic or paternalistic 
attitude on the part of many of our professional philanthropists. There is a disposition to 
ignore individual initiative and individual freedom as the fundamental basis of social 
progress. There is a pathetic expectancy of results from legislation, and the politicians, 
some of them, seem to think philanthropy a good play to the gallery. There is a real 
danger to our cause from a union of mushy philanthropy and self-seeking politicians. 
 
De Forest, it seems, saw keeping philanthropy private and separate from legislation as an 
opportunity to emphasize liberalism in American philanthropy and social welfare work. The 
politics of his vision would grow throughout the twentieth century. 
Despite this perspective, however, it also true that as de Forest worked with sage to 
develop the RSF, and they modeled it on the GEB and the CIW, both of which de Forest noted, 
enjoyed a great deal of public approval for their work in education and scientific research, 
respectively.
359
 This is an important point, because despite the legislative troubles that founders 
might have had in chartering their institutions, they still enjoyed a great deal of public approval. 
Sage shared their interest in improving the lives of the working classes, de Forest noted, but he 
suggested that the RSF eliminate the dead hand from its operations by making its charter 
sufficiently elastic so the fund could undertake any method of work at any time. The possible 
extension of public funding of education, the hospital systems, playgrounds, tenements, libraries 
and museums made such an approach necessary and right.
360
 This, in many ways, was de 
Forest’s contribution. He encouraged elasticity, or a general purpose that could change over time. 
As we saw with the PEF, though, that elasticity would not necessarily produce a foundation more 
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responsive to public needs; sometimes donor guidelines could in fact ensure that a foundation 
would serve the public good in a beneficial way. 
After the announcement of the Sage Foundation there were more telltale signs of radical 
changes to come in American philanthropy. A Post article praised the munificence of Sage’s gift 
but immediately pointed out its small size in relation to the “gigantic problem” that its purpose 
indicated. It could be “suggestive and inspirational,” but little else on a national scale. While you 
could lessen the symptoms of “ignorant poverty,” no charitable endeavor could wholly eliminate 
the “vicious tendencies” of modern society.361 In other words, it would take government 
investment in public welfare, or private philanthropy was going to have to get much bigger. With 
fortunes growing, it seemed like either approach was possible. 
 
The Growing Commercialization of Charity and the Decline of the Public Trust  
During the first decade of the twentieth century, journalists weighed in on the relative efficacies 
and value of different philanthropic policies. In 1903, one author proclaimed the virtues of the 
Standard Oil Company for establishing a pension fund as the definition of “sensational 
philanthropy.” As the author touted this philanthropy as achieving some meaningful 
redistribution of wealth, it ridiculed Andrew Carnegie’s more “orthodox” method of providing 
libraries and funding cultural institutions. To achieve philanthropy that would be philanthropic 
and charity that would be charitable, the author argued, one could not provide for aging 
employees with food for thought, it could not clothe them with Shakespeare’s plays, house them 
with Herbert Spencer, or give them a “sense of independence” with the latest novels. Joining 




Then in 1907, an anonymous author published “The New View: The Danger of 
Endowments” in the Survey, a leading journal in the burgeoning field of social work expanded 
critiques of foundations. The author, he or she explained, was writing in response to a “radical 
group of magazine writers” who argued that benefactions were actually malefactions, “like 
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kerosene on a burning house.”363 While the Survey magazine and its predecessor Charities and 
the Commons, which were affiliated with the Charity Organization Societies, had devoted much 
praise to the incorporation of the General Education Board and the Russell Sage Foundation, the 
author noted that the rise of endowments had “their own dangers” without “extraordinary 
vigilance and breadth of sympathy.”364 At the end of the piece, the author imparted a warning 
that would resurface over the course of the next decade: 
The brutal power of concentrated wealth is ever present in these endowments. If used 
judiciously, wisely, with breadth of sympathy, with sufficient safeguards against abuse 
and incidental injury, they may be in all ways beneficent. If used carelessly, with class 
prejudice, or personal favoritism, or in disregard of the social effects of making or 
withholding grants, then neither the good intentions of the donors nor the possible 





This perspective, that endowments could be benefactions or malefactions, depending on their 
management, brought increasing attention to the founders and board members who were 
managing the nation’s surplus wealth. It also re-raised the question: what kind of safeguards 
should exist to protect citizens from the potentially pernicious interests of its richest citizens 
seeking to endow their philanthropic works? 
In the mind of one public official, what he saw as the increasing relationship between 
commercial and charitable interests could do nothing good for the nation’s social welfare. On 
May 5, 1913 during a speech on trusts and combinations, California Senator John D. Works 
lamented, “[e]ven the charities of the present day have become commercialized…They are 
carried on as a business.”366 As he stood before the U.S. Senate and the president, he exhorted 
them to address the inadequacies of the Sherman Antitrust Laws that sought to maintain 
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competition and reduce collusion among for-profit corporations, and he warned against the 
effects such practices might have amongst nonprofit corporations invested in influencing social 
welfare and corporate policy.  
Senator Works’ fears about the commercialization of charity brought attention to the 
increasing number of charitable foundations forming in the early twentieth century. Beyond the 
Rockefellers, Carnegie, and Sage, other rich citizens were following their lead to establish 
philanthropic foundations, too.
367
 The number was still modest (probably closer to twenty or 
thirty rather than Ayres’ seven great foundations); but just as monopolies and trusts amongst for-
profit corporations inspired policy debates at this moment, nonprofit corporations, which 
proposed to use the corporate form for social good, inspired intense popular and regulatory 
responses.
368
 The efficiencies of the corporate form, along with what seemed like limitless 
endowments, shifted the national conversation regarding charitable policy. In the end, it was 
these charitable institutions’ likeness to massive corporations that incited the greatest dissent and 
support for their existence.  
Intellectuals, activists, and Progressive-Era politicians, like Senator Works, debated the 
role that private wealth should play in the shaping of public life. In Senator Works’ speech he 
argued that the United States government should not “farm out…the right and power to educate 
the people of the country” to men like John D. Rockefeller who made their money through 
“extortion, oppression, and crime.”369 By doing so the American people would become 
“receivers of stolen goods,” and such a practice would make the United States’ major 
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Senator Works’ remarks reflect a deep anxiety about the management of surplus wealth 
in the U.S. industrial economy. His comments bring attention to the shifting relationship between 
the government, business, and charitable institutions in the early twentieth century. If, as Works 
suggested, the private wealth held by men like John D. Rockefeller was stolen or even 
accumulated at the expense of the working and middle classes, what rights could the state and 
private citizens have to manage that wealth? In Senator Works’ words, “[a]s a matter of simple 
justice and right the money thus accumulated belongs not to the dispenser of these charities but 
to the men, women, and children whose underpaid toil accumulated the fund.”371 Senator Works 
contended that charitable foundations were “doing more, perhaps, than almost any other 
influence to make this nation a country of mendicants and beggars.”372 He proceeded: “[o]ne of 
the millionaires of the day conceived that an easy and convenient way of ridding himself of some 
of his useless and burdensome millions and at the same time exalting himself would be the 
giving away of public library buildings.”373 Undoubtedly referencing Andrew Carnegie’s efforts 
to establish thousands of public libraries around the world, Senator Works decried, “[t]hese 
municipalities have made themselves the objects of charity, and more of them are begging for 
like favors. Any self-respecting community should be ashamed to accept charity of this kind 
under any circumstances.”374  
The public trust was in danger of declining due to fears of private wealth’s influence over 
public officials. However, the ascent of the private foundation model threatened to make wealth 
its own source of power—with even less oversight. In the next chapter I explore what happened 
to the public trust with antimonopolism on the rise. Would it retain its public character, or would 
it become more like the private corporations rising in its midst?
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Antimonopolism and a New Politics of Surplus Wealth: 
Breaking the Public Trust in the Progressive Era
 
 
In the first decades of the twentieth century, Rockefeller’s personal wealth soared, increasing 
from $200 million in 1901 to $900 million in 1913.
375
 Investing even a modest portion of that 
capital in a public trust had the potential to establish a much larger role for surplus wealth in 
American society. A foundation with hundreds of millions of dollars would not just be a mode of 
governance that operated with public officials for public purposes. As one independent-oil 
producer warned, such a foundation would have created “a corporation superior to the national 
government itself.”376 
After the controversies surrounding the Carnegie Institution of Washington’s federal 
charter, including its U.S. Steel securities and Congress’ insistence that it was not a creature of 
the government, the likelihood of a future public trust receiving a federal charter was unlikely. 
However, despite that, in 1910, the Rockefellers submitted a bill to Congress to incorporate the 
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Rockefeller Foundation with what one critic called an “extraordinary” federal charter. 377 In the 
first version of the charter submitted to Congress, the foundation’s stated object was:378  
[T]o promote the well-being and to advance the civilization of the people of the United 
States…and of foreign lands in the acquisition and dissemination of knowledge; in the 
prevention and relief of suffering; and in the promotion of any and all of the elements of 
human progress. 
 
Compared to the far-narrower purposes of earlier public trusts, the Rockefeller’s “general-
purpose” broke from the norms of establishing national benefactions to undertake specific public 
works. While Robert de Forest had emphasized the elasticity of the Russell Sage Foundation’s 
charter internally, he had been careful not to emphasize that particular element of the 
foundation’s charter publicly. He celebrated it in private correspondence, and even noted that he 
was surprised that the New York legislature had not pushed back on the “vagueness of purpose” 
in their charter.
379
   
However, the Rockefellers were not shy about the expansive purpose of their foundation; 
Frederick Gates announced the Rockefeller Foundation’s broad purpose to any journalist who 
would listen.
380
 The Rockefeller Foundation also deviated from precedent in other ways, as well. 
To undertake its broad mission, it might have established or aided other institutions in order to 
carry out its broad purpose. In short order, that element of the charter raised questions about the 
Rockefeller Foundation’s potential impact on other charitable institutions. In addition, the 
foundation was to exist in perpetuity, to amass an unlimited endowment, and to be run by a self-
perpetuating board of trustees—those trustees alone would be responsible for defining what the 
foundation meant by “human progress.” And, at least at first, there was no hint of public officials 
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serving as trustees, or for that matter, even experts in the field of social work.
381
 With all of these 
unprecedented characteristics, the Rockefeller Foundation was indeed, a new species of 
corporation. Its potential size combined with its expansive purpose made it truly exceptional.  
 
As members of the House of Representatives and the Senate held hearings to debate the bill to 
incorporate the Rockefeller Foundation with a federal charter, multiple U.S. presidents were 
involved in debates about the charter, and it unleashed a national argument about the merits of 
laissez faire capitalism and the appropriate role for surplus wealth in advancing civilization.
382
 
However, it was really the Rockefellers’ business activities that made already contentious issues 
surrounding the public trust truly explosive. While Congressional representatives debated the bill 
to incorporate the Rockefeller Foundation, the Supreme Court ruled on the iconic Standard Oil 
Antitrust case. In 1909 the U.S. Department of Justice had sued Standard Oil under federal anti-
trust law in Congress, and by 1910 the Federal Circuit Court ruled in the government’s favor and 
ordered the dissolution of Standard Oil. Five days after the introduction of the bill to incorporate 
the Rockefeller Foundation in the U.S. Senate on March 11, 1910, Standard Oil appealed to the 
Supreme Court. By May 1911, the Supreme Court upheld the lower court’s ruling to break up the 
Standard Oil trust. Without a doubt, in creating the Rockefeller Foundation, Rockefeller and 
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Gates hoped to shift conversations about the significance of his personal wealth and the Standard 
Oil trust by emphasizing the public utility of both. This approach was less a conspiracy and more 
common sense for Rockefeller and Gates who viewed the modern corporation and all of its legal 
privileges as indicative of the advancing of civilization.
383
 In the minds of many, however, the 
infamous Standard Oil octopus was aggressively expanding its tentacles. Not only did the 
Rockefellers wish to monopolize the oil industry; they also wished to control how the nation 
defined human progress and to dictate the form that social welfare initiatives would take. Public 
or private, that kind of moneyed, expansive power was controversial. 
It was especially provocative, because the Standard Oil Trust was infamous by this time 
for driving small producers into the ground to enrich Standard Oil shareholders. Perhaps more 
than any other person Rockefeller had benefited from the rise of corporate capitalism. The 
nation’s first and one of its largest trusts, his Standard Oil Company set industry practices and 
controversially controlled prices as it drew oil from company-owned wells, transported that oil 
through company pipelines, housed the oil in company tanks, and then packaged and distributed 
the product in a similarly self-enriching fashion.
 384
 The impact that capital-fueled coordination 
had on Rockefeller’s competitors and small and medium-sized producers stoked decades of 
debates about how state and federal governments should regulate corporations with the power to 
control markets and access to essential goods and services.
385
   
Historians of the Progressive Era have framed these controversies over concentrated 
economic power as the “trust question” or the “monopoly question.”386 These questions related 
to how businesses should lawfully operate and compete in the American economy, but they also 
addressed the impact that those practices had on social relations. When the U.S. Supreme Court 
ruled on the infamous Standard Oil antitrust case, justices not only determined whether or not 
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Standard Oil executives had broken the law while conspiring to restrain trade and commerce in 
the oil industry, Justice White’s opinion introduced a longer history of the concept of monopoly 
and the possibility of monopolies promoting the public good. One of the questions under 
consideration was whether or not the Standard Oil monopoly ultimately benefited consumers by 
providing cheap oil, or if its executives sought to “unlawfully acquire wealth by oppressing the 
public and destroying the just rights of others.”387 The problem was, both of these things could 
have been true at the same time—aligning private profit and the public good would take active 
oversight. So, as Naomi Lamoreaux has argued, despite disputes about how and why monopolies 
formed, calls for more government regulation grew in this period.
388
 
As the history of the public trust has demonstrated, American millionaires had another 
vision for how to align profit and the public good—and it had nothing to do with breaking up 
commercial monopolies. For them, it involved the creation of the world’s largest philanthropic 
trusts. A number of historians of American philanthropy have mentioned the Rockefeller 
Foundation’s attempt to gain a federal charter in the context of the Rockefeller’s broader 
philanthropies.
389
 They have accurately linked debates about the federal charter to the politics of 
the monopoly question and the culture of antimonopolism in the Progressive Era. But that 
connection has been used to dismiss debates about the Rockefeller Foundation’s federal charter 
as having more to do with antimonopoly fervor than the foundation itself.
390
 Others have argued 
that the Rockefeller Foundation’s charter was no different than previous charters and lacking in 
any “startling innovations.”391 These assertions, however, are not supported by contemporary 
reactions to the bill identifying it as a new corporate form. As one leader in the field of social 
work put it at the time, such an example of “record-breaking philanthropy,” with its unmatched 
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endowment, enhanced “public interest” in the “reconsideration of fundamental questions of 
policy” relating to perpetual endowment.392 In the end, the Rockefeller Foundation’s federal 
charter expanded the scope of critiques of foundations generally, by making them relevant to 
larger policy issues about foundations and other philanthropic and charitable institutions. 
Two fundamental policy questions guided legislators and public observers as they 
considered the Rockefeller Foundation’s charter. First, they asked: what corporate privileges 
should philanthropic foundations be afforded by government? In other words, should their 
corporate charters give them the privilege to exist in perpetuity, to hold unlimited endowments, 
and to select their own board members? Second, they asked, what role should the federal 
government play in regulating national and international philanthropic foundations? If Congress 
granted the Rockefeller Foundation a federal charter, it would be setting a precedent for the 
federal government to guide the increasing involvement of nonprofit corporations in the 
American economy. Although the federal government was increasingly issuing federal charters 
to charitable organizations of various sorts, state governments chartered most nonprofit 
corporations, so this was an important regulatory decision.  
In this chapter, I argue that the Rockefeller Foundation’s attempt to gain a federal charter 
led to the dismantling of the public trust while it signaled the birth of a new species of 
corporation. Not only did the Rockefeller Foundation’s charter lay the groundwork for the 
chartering norms of future foundations, it inspired increased calls for philanthropy that would be 
“responsive” to popular conceptions of human progress—not just the will of one group of 
trustees. When the Rockefellers created a “corporate body” to manage their wealth, it 
transformed national conversations about the justice of the accumulation of wealth and the 
virtues and vices of its accumulators. The corporate form of the Rockefeller Foundation became 
the focal point of discussions about how surplus wealth should be managed in the American 
economy, rather than the justice of how John D. Rockefeller Sr. had acquired his wealth. In other 
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words, discussions about his fortune turned from whether or not it was “tainted” to the pernicious 
influence the funds might have on society when dispensed through a more powerful corporate 
body. As one of his closest advisers put it, when Rockefeller Sr. imagined creating the 
Rockefeller Foundation, he wished to create a “philanthropic enterprise” to get dividends 
payable not in money but in the welfare of humanity.”393 This application of corporate strategy to 
transform corporate profit blurred the lines of charity and business. By the end of the debates 
about the Rockefellers’ federal charter, it was possible to rationalize the existence of foundations 
through their efforts to create an “organized, systematized benevolence.”394  
 
The Rockefellers’ Advisers Develop an “Elastic” Charter for “Human Progress” 
As Rockefeller’s money piled up, Gates urged him to undertake the “final and complete” 
disposition of his wealth through a “great trust.”395 Rockefeller had a “moral responsibility,” 
Gates urged him, to devote his great wealth to human progress in perpetuity. As they dreamed up 
the contours of what would become the Rockefeller Foundation, though, they oscillated between 
envisioning the fund as “public” and as a Rockefeller family trust. Because the trust would hold 
hundreds of millions of dollars, it would necessarily be of a “public character,” Gates explained; 
due to its size its administration would be “a matter of public concern and inquiry and public 
criticism as any of the functions of the government are now.” 396 On the one hand, with his 
comments about the publicness of Rockefeller’s enormous trust, Gates certainly was encouraging 
Rockefeller to see his foundation as a public trust. However, Gates also believed that the 
foundation should be as “elastic” as possible so that the Rockefellers and their trustees could 
change the grants undertaken by the foundation at any time.
397
 Over time, this chapter will show, 
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it became clear that what that really meant was that the Rockefellers should have as much control 
over the distribution of their wealth through the trust as possible. These ideas of public character 
and private control were not necessarily at odds, but they did make the concept of the public trust 
something quite different to behold. Gates and Rockefeller Sr. were not thinking of their 
foundation as vehicle for distributing the nation’s surplus wealth, like George Peabody. The 
wealth they would be distributing was the Rockefellers, and they wished to manage it in 
perpetuity however they pleased. 
 
The origins of the Rockefeller Foundation predate the height of the Standard Oil debacle, and 
they suggest that even as they designed their foundation there was no obvious choice for the 
management of their nascent vision for their latest fund. Late in 1906, Rockefeller Sr. spoke to 
his son about turning over “considerable sums of money” to a large “trust” that would be devoted 
to “philanthropy, education, science and religion.”398 Rockefeller had demonstrated a 
commitment to charity as a lifelong Baptist, but this foundation was to be so different from his 
previous philanthropic initiatives that the Rockefellers and their advisers were unsure about how 
to incorporate and manage the project.
399
 At first John D. Rockefeller Jr. advocated for the 
creation of three separate trusts: one devoted to the “promotion of Christian Civilization” 
globally, another with the same purpose to operate in the United States, and a third trust to hold 
funds for their previously chartered organizations, including the University of Chicago, The 
General Education Board, and the Rockefeller Institute for Medical Research.
400
 Such an 
organization, which divided the philanthropic institutions by purpose, would align with the 
Rockefellers’ previous philanthropic practices; however, the plan did not suit their desire to 
simplify their administrative burden. In the early twentieth century, the Rockefellers were 
looking to consolidate their philanthropy. The question was: what type of nonprofit corporation 
would best enable them to achieve that?  
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By this time, as we have seen, Rockefeller Sr. had already created multiple nonprofit 
corporations that required legal, financial, and operational oversight, as well as program 
management. Rockefeller’s personal advisers, Starr Murphy and Frederick Gates, offered an 
alternative vision. Gates emphasized that in order to execute a more expansive vision of 
philanthropy, the foundation’s charter would have to be above all “elastic.”401 Foundation 
trustees would invest in institutions and individuals based on the changing needs of each 
generation in perpetuity. Their “elastic” charter would have offered them the ability to keep the 
purpose of the foundation, its geographic focus, the length of its grant projects, and the size of its 
endowment entirely at its trustees’ discretion, which would change over time.  
Heightening the importance of their new trust’s elasticity, they decided to apply for a 
federal charter. As noted, this was brave after the Carnegie Institution of Washington had 
struggled mightily to obtain its federal charter a few years earlier. In fact, historians have 
wondered at the Rockefeller’s decision to pursue a federal charter.402 Historians Barry Karl and 
Stanley Katz have explained, “Rockefeller, at least, sought some kind of federal support for his 
philanthropic activities through his request for a [federal] charter.” However, they also 
concluded, “It is by no means easy to see what he actually thought he was doing, what changes 
in the attitude and direction of federal policy toward social welfare he thought he was 
advancing.” However, by considering the history of the General Education Board and its federal 
charter, we can see that Frederick Gates provided an answer to this question. The Rockefellers 
and their advisers saw the federal charter as a safeguard against states meddling with their 
articles of incorporation—a federal charter was more “secure” from such interference, they 
thought. Further the prestige a federal charter offered was valuable to the Rockefellers, and Gates 
welcomed a public fight over the justice of what he saw as Rockefeller’s good works. Also, 
while the Rockefeller Foundation’s failed federal charter has garnered more attention than the 
successes that preceded it, as we have seen, the Rockefellers’ pursuit of a federal charter was not 
unusual or exceptional, even if it was unwise. 
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It was Starr J. Murphy who suggested combining their philanthropies under one 
organization.
403
 When preparing to draft a charter for the Rockefeller Foundation, he advocated 
for applying directly to Congress for a federal charter similar to the one they held for the General 
Education Board, but “broad enough to enable [them] to hold and administer funds for any 
charitable, educational, religious or scientific purpose, not for pecuniary profit.” 404 Such an 
approach would solve all of their “problems,” he argued, and in a moment of inspiration, Murphy 
noted: “It would be a great holding company.”405 However, the concept of a holding company, a 
corporation that exercised power and influence by owning stock in other corporations, and its 
affiliation with Standard Oil, made this plan both bold and magnificently out of touch with 
corporate reform efforts of the period.
406
 
The foundation would operate like a holding company, because Rockefeller Sr. could 
give any amounts of money to the foundation, and the foundation could give money directly to 
causes or it could fund the work of other institutions. And it would solve their “problems,” 
because Rockefeller could give any sum of money to the corporation at any time, he could 
specify “how the money was to be used” in the deed of gift, he could insert a condition in the 
charter indicating that all appropriations would be subject to his or his son’s approval, and 
finally, it could operate in perpetuity.
407
 This meant that unlike the General Education Board, its 
grant projects would not be limited to the field of Southern education and agriculture. As Starr 
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Murphy proposed this novel legal vision for the Rockefeller Foundation, he inspired debates 
about what kind of corporate privileges a foundation should have—particularly about what kind 
of undue power a philanthropic “holding company” might amass, particularly one with a federal 
charter. Murphy, however, attempted to steer the Rockefellers away from a federal charter, 
which would invite political opposition.
 408
 He advocated for an application to the New York 
legislature for a special charter.
409
  
Frederick Gates agreed with Murphy at first; Gates doubted whether Congress would 
give them a perpetual charter at all. He wrote, “I doubt extremely if such a charter as we want 
can be put through Congress and secure the signature of the President...I would accordingly 
organize in New Jersey and transfer to a Congressional charter if and when we get it.”410 
However, while he agreed that the Rockefeller Foundation’s direct association with John D. 
Rockefeller might make its passage in Congress difficult; he did not believe that such difficulties 
should be decisive. The possibility of political opposition and attendant publicity seemingly 
amused Gates: “Will the question of tainted money come up! Will Mr. Rockefeller’s enemies 
(for no doubt he has enemies in Congress) make a bitter fight against his right to give away his 
own money as he may deem best!”411 Gates continued, “I would not hesitate to throw this charter 
right into the arena and let the wild beasts fight over it …I cannot but think that his enemies will 
do themselves and their cause an serious injury if they carry their opposition to the point of 
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refusing him the opportunity to serve mankind…” Here, one can start to glean Gates’ motivation 
for supporting the federal charter. He welcomed a fight over the charter for the positive attention 
it might bring Rockefeller Sr. He added, “the very best service” that Rockefeller’s enemies could 
do him would be to protest his philanthropy.  
Mr. Rockefeller has given away vast sums of money…That is a feature of his character 
and life which is never mentioned by his enemies, and in all the attacks on him as a 
business man and on the Standard Oil Company, and in all the confiscatory laws and 
judgments, not a syllable is ever found to the effect that these funds are being used for the 
benefit of humanity. May it not be just as well now to throw this matter right into 




Rockefeller’s advisers had come to imagine a federal charter as establishing a direct relationship 
between Rockefeller’s successes in business and his efforts to serve the nation—in the 
accumulation and redistribution of his wealth. While reformers repeatedly criticized Rockefeller 
Sr.’s character and his business practices, Gates wanted the public to witness his attempt—
whether it was successful or not—to develop a national foundation.413 
The Rockefellers and their advisers then spent years working with members of Congress 
to draft a bill.
414
 In 1909 John D. Rockefeller Jr. corresponded with his father-in-law Senator 
Nelson Aldrich, who had represented Rhode Island since 1881 and was known as “a devoted 
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servant of the trusts,”415 about finally introducing the bill to incorporate the Rockefeller 
Foundation in Congress.
416
 Aldrich had successfully guided the bill to incorporate the 
Rockefeller’s General Education Board through Congress in 1904. Instead of introducing the bill 
himself, however, Aldrich worked behind the scenes to connect Rockefeller’s attorney Starr 
Murphy with Senator Jacob Gallinger.
417
  
Gallinger chaired the Committee of the District of Columbia, which would be the first 
Congressional body to debate the bill and its contents. He was a Republican from New 
Hampshire and served in the Senate from 1891 to 1918. He was known as a conservative and 
endorsed the re-nomination and re-election of President Taft in 1912.
418
 Starr Murphy met with 
the senator and had a “pleasant chat” about the bill. Gallinger assured Murphy that he would 
introduce the bill and if necessary when it was eventually referred back to the committee, he 
would invite Murphy to appear before the Committee.
419
 Gallinger kept his promise and when 
the Committee on the District of Columbia scheduled a hearing on the incorporation of the 
Rockefeller Foundation for March 11, 1910, he invited Starr Murphy to appear. With the 
advantage of his previous communications with Senator Gallinger, Murphy arrived at the Senate 
hearings prepared. The Committee let him speak virtually uninterrupted for almost an hour. 
Through his testimony, the Rockefeller’s self-congratulating vision of their social 
entrepreneurship, as well as, the contours of the opposition to the foundation become crystal 
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clear. Unlike Robert de Forest, the Rockefellers were committed to shining a light on what they 
saw as their philanthropic innovations. 
Murphy emphasized the Rockefeller Foundation’s likeness to previously chartered 
foundations, and then quickly pivoted to address one of the more contentious aspects of the 
Rockefeller Foundation’s charter.420 The language in the Rockefeller Foundation’s charter had 
been spoken of as “indefinite,” and, indeed that was intentional. The scope of the foundation was 
to lack definite limits. In fact, it was to be “so elastic that it may respond to the demands of 
humanity as the years go by…”421 Murphy continued:  
The charities of the fourteenth century are not the charities of the twentieth century…and 
it is eminently desirable, it seems to me, that the tendency of philanthropy in the future 
should be that the dead hand should be removed from charitable bequests and that the 
power to determine to what specific objects they should be applied should be left in the 
hands of living men, who can judge of the necessities and of the needs in the light of the 
knowledge which they have as contemporaries, and not that they shall find their hands 




This being the case, Murphy argued, further specificity was not possible, as further definition 
would be imposing limitations on the type of work the foundation might undertake. 
Murphy next attempted to convince his audience that the grant-making model to be 
employed by the Rockefeller Foundation would create strong institutional networks amongst 
charities, while it would not grant the Rockefellers and their associates any kind of undue 
influence in shaping social welfare policy. In Murphy’s words: “It ha[d] always been the practice 
of the donor to work through existing agencies, so far as that is possible; never to supplant, but 
always to supplement.”423 For that reason, the bill provided for the foundation to “cooperate with 
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existing agencies,” or even to provide “floating endowments.”424 As Murphy explained, if an 
enterprise was worthy of “perpetual support,” the Rockefeller Foundation could “turn over a 
portion of our funds to it in the way of endowment.”425 However, if the enterprise became 
obsolete, the Rockefeller Foundation could withdraw the endowment and put the funds to 
another use. Again, Murphy had hit on one of the most alarming elements of the Rockefeller’s 
charter—their ability to shape charitable networks. While Murphy’s testimony certainly outlined 
the potential efficiencies of a limitless charter, he unwittingly highlighted its potential to over 
determine the nation’s charitable policies and practices. This potential expansion of corporate 
power inspired years of debates about the bill.  
 
The Dangers of a “Limitless” Charter 
After the introduction of the bill, the Rockefellers received a number of letters in support of their 
efforts.
426
 Generally, these letters emphasized Rockefeller’s position as a rich man living through 
a time of economic transition in which large fortunes were inevitable. They focused on 
Rockefeller’s personal position in order to establish the righteousness of his corporate power. 
However, to others, Rockefeller’s exceptional abilities and his exemplary character were not 
relevant to deciding the corporate privileges, which should be permitted the Rockefeller 
Foundation. However, for others, the corporate privileges contained in the foundation’s charter 
were precisely the issue. 
The Watchman, a Baptist journal, published an article on the proposed Rockefeller 
Foundation, which they proclaimed was “unparalleled in the history of the world.” With its 
desired corporate privileges the foundation would have “unprecedented powers.” Usefully, this 
would have prevented the possibility of any further “tainted money” disputes, because the 
Rockefellers would garner so much influence in their charitable networks that would no one 
would complain about the source of their wealth. Even more astutely, the authors noted that as 
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Rockefeller sought to manage his wealth in an “incorporated body while retaining the name 
[Rockefeller],” the family would be eliminated from the Foundation while it opaquely controlled 
the foundation’s assets through a veil of trusteeship.427 When Rockefeller’s wealth “became the 
property of a corporation, [it] became impersonal,” they explained, and then it would not directly 
be “claimed by anyone.” The article concluded, by this act Mr. Rockefeller was removing 
himself from the equation,” and he would become simply a part of the board.428 As the funds 
became “impersonal,” their relationship to the Rockefellers became less direct. Although he 
would be a trustee, Rockefeller could always assert that the foundation was run and managed by 
a greater board of trustees. This expansion of Rockefeller’s corporate power without perceivable 
limits threatened the values of reformers invested in limiting the power of large corporations.  
George W. Da Cunha, an architect of Upper Montclair, NY, further developed this 
critique in an open letter (published in the NYT) to the senior senator from each state decrying 
the “dangerous precedent” that would be set by incorporating the Rockefeller Foundation with an 
“extraordinary charter.”429  Da Cunha called the charter “special,” a piece of “class legislation” 
that would be in line with “the granting of charters by crowned heads with extraordinary 
powers.” Through the foundation, the funds would be hard to trace back to the Rockefellers 
when placed in an “incorporated body.” Da Cunha was concerned that by establishing the 
foundation, the Rockefeller’s would have made a portion of their fortune immune from 
inheritance and income taxation. This was the moment when the nation was ratifying the 
Sixteenth Amendment establishing the federal income tax, so Da Cunha’s thoughts on the 
foundation in relation to taxation reflect the possible impact that the foundation might have on 
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the Rockefellers’ tax contributions, rather than how taxation actually worked in that period.430 
Da Cunha noted, “there will be no heirs only successors in the corporate body; there being no 
heirs as each generation of Rockefeller’s pass away, there can [be] no inheritance tax collected” 
from successors. As the federal income tax and personal and corporate tax deductions did not 
exist yet, the idea that the Rockefeller Foundation was taking money out of the national economy 
and it would be controlled by Rockefeller and his associates seemed unjust. There was a greater 
benefit to the Rockefellers in establishing their foundation than to the nation, which would lose 
the value of the potential inheritance taxes that Rockefellers’ progeny would pay on his securities 
at the time of his passing. Such a loss would not necessarily be limited to the Rockefellers. He 
warned, “there can be no excuse hereafter for not granting similar charters to any and all the 
wealthy families of the land. They in turn, (interests being similar), could combine and form one 
of the greatest aggregations of money in the world and one that could dominate and overcome all 
opposition.” However, in fact, “No guarantee can be had that the successors to the original 
incorporation will continue to use the money for the purposes for which the charter shall be 
granted.”431 Da Cunha’s quite practical critique of the corporate privileges in the charter 
amounted to a much darker vision of how the Rockefeller Foundation and other foundations 
might overpower national and foreign governments.  
Edward Devine, an economist and early leader in the field of social work who had 
happily aided his friend Robert de Forest’s creation of the Russell Sage Foundation a few years 
earlier, powerfully developed similar critiques of the Rockefeller Foundation’s charter. However, 
in Devine’s case, his response to the Rockefeller Foundation’s charter influenced the trajectory 
of the bill due to his eminent position in the growing field of social work. Known as the “dean of 
social welfare,” Devine ranked highly in the New York Charity Organization Society, he was a 
professor of social economics at Columbia, and he published widely. Devine edited the Survey 
magazine, which had a readership of about twenty thousand people who mostly included 
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“lawyers, scientists, economists and doctors.”432 Frequent contributors included Jane Addams, 
John R. Commons, Jacob Riis and Florence Kelley.  
While most of the content he published about philanthropy in The Survey affirmed a 
belief in the possibility of foundations positively shaping national fields, such as education, the 
debates about chartering the Rockefeller Foundation led him to criticize the antidemocratic 
nature of the board structure at foundations. After the bill was introduced in the Senate, Devine 
responded with an article in The Survey that emphasized the unprecedented nature of the 
Rockefeller Foundation and called for increased Congressional oversight.  
It was Devine who said that the exceptional nature of the Rockefeller foundation’s 
charter should enhance “public interest” in the “reconsideration of fundamental questions of 
policy” relating to perpetual endowment.433 With his critical commentary Devine expanded the 
scope of critiques of the foundation by making them relevant to larger policy issues about 
foundations and other philanthropic and charitable institutions. Never a foe of foundations, 
generally though, Devine asserted, “[i]n conception and purpose the Rockefeller Foundation 
compares favorably with the wisest and most generous of all previous donations for the 
promotion of human welfare.”434 However, there should be “limitations to which this and all 
other endowments are subject arising from our imperfect human nature and fallible judgment.”435 
He explained that the quality of the benefactions would rely entirely on the trustees’ “wisdom,” 
and “freedom from class prejudice.”436 Thus, with the wrong trustees the Rockefeller Foundation 
could lead to support for institutions and agencies that worked against human progress.
437
 It was 
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not long ago, Devine argued, that the Inquisition and slavery were deemed essential elements of 
human progress.  
Devine also addressed the Rockefeller Foundation’s exemption from taxation. While 
Rockefeller Sr. and his fellow incorporators declined to specify the exact amount of money he 
planned to give to the foundation, the press speculated wildly about the potential size of the 
foundation’s endowment. If the foundation’s property and funds were to be exempt from 
taxation, Devine explained, taxpayers would be “furnishing annually in perpetuity one-third of 
the resources of the Foundation.”438 Devine argued, “[t]he question fairly arises whether the 
withdrawal forever of so large a sum or sums from taxation does not in effect constitute the 
nation a partner in the benevolent enterprise, and whether this and other grounds of public 
interest do not deserve emphatic recognition in the charter.”439 Put another way, with 
unprecedented corporate privileges, the foundation was neither public nor private. It was a 
“partner” in benevolence. As such, the government should take care in specifying its unique 
relationship to the foundation. 
However, how that private-public partnership would operate to promote “public interest” 
was highly controversial. The bill to incorporate the Rockefeller Foundation provided for it to 
send financial reports annually to the secretary of the interior in addition to being subject to 
alteration at the pleasure of congress. Devine advocated for additional provisions for government 
oversight in the form of three major amendments to the charter. First, he advocated for the 
government to have some role in the selection of trustees. Second, the annual income of the 
foundation should be expended and the indefinite increase of the foundation’s endowment 
forbidden. And third, within a period of something like one hundred years, the endowment 
should be expended in its entirety—both principal and interest.440 For Devine, these proposed 
amendments would make the institutional structures of the foundation more democratic. The 
federal government would play an active role in managing the foundation, and its board and 
grants would be more likely to be representative of the public’s best interest. These amendments 
would soon dominate future discussions of the bill. 
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 In fact, during his speech before Congress, Starr Murphy had taken pains to emphasize 
the federal government’s managerial role in shaping the Rockefeller foundation and the larger 
charitable sector. The “Government always has control of charitable corporations,” he argued. 
There was precedent for Congress to decide that a charitable corporation had acted in a manner 
“inimical” to the “public welfare” and to seize its endowment. He cited the case of the Mormon 
Church in 1890, which as a corporation organized under the laws of the Territory of Utah, was 
subject to the laws of Congress like other corporations with a federal charter.
441
 Congress had 
determined that polygamy was an “essential doctrine of the Mormon Church,” so the corporation 
was “inimical to the public welfare.” As a result, it repealed the church’s charter and re-
appropriated its property worth millions of dollars under the “cy-press doctrine.” The doctrine 
dictated that charitable funds that prove to be unnecessary or illegal could be re-appropriated for 
“purposes that are “most in accord with the original purpose.” In the case of the Mormon 
Church, Congress appropriated the church’s funds for the public school system of the Territory 
of Utah.
442
 After this lengthy explanation, Murphy noted, Rockefeller “is perfectly content to 
leave this great foundation in the hands of Congress.” It would ensure that the funds were used 
for the “public welfare.” Congress would also have the power in the future “to exert its 
authority” and apply the fund to its intended uses.443 In Murphy’s words, the philanthropy was 
“intended to be national in its scope.” Under the government’s “protection,” it could always 
intervene and “administer it for public uses.” Their direction would be critical, because Congress 
represented “not the people of a single State, but the people of this whole nation.”444 After 
Murphy’s testimony, the terms of the debate about the Rockefeller Foundation shifted, as 
journalists and public officials started to ask: would the Rockefeller Foundation be a “menace to 
the state”?445  
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The idea of the Rockefeller Foundation operating “through the state” was 
controversial.
446
 One writer for The Independent argued that Starr Murphy’s repeated assurances 
that Congress would exercise ultimate authority over the foundation were inadequate. Comparing 
the Rockefeller Foundation to existing nonprofit institutions, such as Harvard, was simply not 
analogous. Educational institutions focused on one objective—the Rockefeller Foundation was 
attempting something more as it sought the freedom to fund any benevolent cause it saw fit. 
“True, the charter calls for an annual report,” the author remarked, “but it is certain that this 
report would be accepted,” because it was after all a “non-commercial corporation.”447 Further, 
the writer believed, it was of no comfort that Congress could repeal the foundation’s charter, 
because corporate wealth frequently exercised “corrupt influence upon legislative bodies.”448 
In the face of these criticisms, the Rockefellers would have been encouraged by The New 
York Times’ response to the Devine amendments. The paper repeatedly took Devine to task for 
challenging the bill to incorporate the Rockefeller Foundation. In the Survey Devine shot back 
that he had not advocated for the failure of the bill—simply its amendment. Devine emphasized: 
“There is a wide margin between positively beneficent activities and such obnoxious and 
unlawful actions as would justify intervention by Congress and the courts.” By this Devine 
meant that while Starr Murphy assured the public that Congress would have the ability to amend 
the foundation’s charter, there would most likely be a high threshold for that type of intervention.  
From Devine’s perspective, why not create better regulatory policy that would make the 
foundation as useful as possible. His amendments, he suggested, would work to that end:
 449
  
[T]here is a better alternative—to create an institution which shall be vigorous and useful 
from the start, strong in its alliance with public sentiment, containing within itself the 
sources of constant rejuvenation, justifying its policies before enlightened public opinion, 
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making it clear to all men that service and not special privilege or power is its end, and 
relying upon its purpose to accomplish within measurable time such benefits to mankind 
that future generations will be able from their own resources to make other and even 
greater gifts. 
 
The public reactions to the bill highlight that it was indeed the corporate privileges in the 
foundation’s charter and its potential relationship to the federal government that interested both 
its proponents and opponents. The difficulty was that no one could be certain how the 
foundation’s unprecedented charter would operate in practice. 
In the end, the Senate committee recommended the bill for passage, but less than two 
weeks later the Rockefellers withdrew the bill. It was becoming clear that the bill would most 
likely not pass in the larger Senate. Senator Gallinger wrote Murphy that he believed the bill 
would be defeated due to the objections of several Senators.
450
 Republican Senator from Idaho 
Weldon Brinton Heyburn who served from 1903 to 1912 and was known for promoting western 
industries and contributing to the passage of the Pure Food and Drug Bill,
451
 as well as 
Wisconsin Republican Robert La Follette, who served 1906 to 1925 and famously supported 
progressivism and opposed the trusts,
452
 particularly objected to the bill. Heyburn’s objections 
centered on the foundation’s potential exemption from taxation, while La Follette allegedly 
believed that the object of the foundation—to benefit humanity—was far too vague. An article 
quoted Heyburn as saying, “The Rockefeller Foundation would perpetuate the Standard Oil 
Company because…it would leave the investments in the hands of the company and give it 
additional advantages over other corporations.” This financial relationship between the 
Rockefeller Foundation and Standard Oil, while abstract, promised to inspire popular protest. 
In fact, Senator Heyburn promised to “make the speech of his life” against the charter if 
the bill came up in the Senate. Heyburn believed that any “great fortune ought to be placed, so 
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far as the State is concerned, that it can be taxed after the death of the owner as well as during the 
life.” Heyburn continued: 453 
I think the charity of each age and generation belongs to that age and generation. States 
are supported by the wealth within them. An attempt to take his whole fortune out of 
taxation by the Sate by Mr. Rockefeller ought to be combated. It is the fundamental law 
that when a man dies some part of his property belongs to the state. Under the proposition 
Mr. Rockefeller is trying to put through the Senate a vast sum would be taken forever 
from the running of government. There is no suggestion in the proposed charter as to the 
character of the charities Mr. Rockefeller proposes to establish. It has never been the 
policy of the government to exempt estates from taxation. If the estates of rich men, 
under this proposed precedent, could be exempted from taxation, there would be nothing 
left to the government but the estates of the poor to tax. 
 
These objections made the timely passage of the bill impossible under the constraints of the 
Senate calendar, so the Rockefellers and Senator Gallinger decided to remove the bill from the 
calendar for the time being. They also pointed to larger questions about how philanthropic 
foundations might alter the nation’s political economy. If the state was to play a role in funding 
social welfare programs, then it would need tax revenue to do so. If the wealthy arranged to 
shield their wealth from taxes by undertaking charitable initiatives, then it would shift social 
welfare programming to privately funded institutions.  
 
Drafting a More Democratic Charter: Remaking the Public Trust 
Throughout the summer of 1910, the Rockefeller Foundation’s creators considered the 
opposition to their bill. John D. Rockefeller Jr. read literature on endowments. He sent his 
readings to Frederick Gates who responded by expressing his surprise that “[o]ur principle that 
each generation should take care of its own charities seems to be getting unexpected judication.” 
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He suggested limiting the amount of funds held by the Rockefeller Foundation.
454
 In response, 
Rockefeller Jr. indicated that providing for the dissipation of principle might be an even more 
effective means of satisfying objectors. In this period of reflection, the Rockefellers and their 
team of advisers exhibited a willingness to invite public oversight of their public works that has 
surprised many historians.  
As Rockefeller considered the amendments, Charles Eliot, President of Harvard, sent 
Starr Murphy a letter expressing his interest in the opinions put forth by “thoughtful patriots” 
who would like to see more public officials overseeing the Rockefeller Foundation.
455
 Most 
especially, Eliot indicated his interest in the issue of oversight. He asked: what sort of “Board of 
Overseers” should the foundation have? Eliot thought it would be best to populate the board with 
“national officials,” such as the Secretary of Agriculture or the President of the American 
Philosophical Society. This, he explained, was how the Board of Overseers worked at Harvard, 
and it protected the university from objections to a perpetual, self-selecting board of trustees, and 
it inspired “public confidence.”  If he had any questions, Elliot pointed Murphy to the book he 
had written on “University Administration.”456  
As they prepared to resubmit the bill in Congress, Murphy corresponded with Senators 
Aldrich and Gallinger to see what potential the bill might have to pass going forward.
457
 They 
                                                          
454
 Frederick Gates to John D. Rockefeller Jr., August 6, 1910, Folder 244, Box 24, Series O, Rockefeller 
Boards, Office of the Messrs. Rockefeller records (OMR), Rockefeller Archive Center. 
455
 Not all of the feedback the Rockefellers received was negative. On March 29, 1910 Robert de Forest of The 
Survey wrote John D. Rockefeller Jr. expressing his support for the bill to incorporate the foundation. He noted 
Devine’s objections, but said he wanted to make it clear that he didn’t share them. Robert de Forest to John D. 
Rockefeller Jr., March 29, 1910, Folder 244, Box 24, Series O, Rockefeller Boards, Office of the Messrs. 
Rockefeller records (OMR), Rockefeller Archive Center. 
456
 Charles Elliot to Starr Murphy, March 22, 1910, Folder 244, Box 24, Series O, Rockefeller Boards, Office of 
the Messrs. Rockefeller records (OMR), Rockefeller Archive Center. 
457
 Congress was unsure of its own authority to grant the Rockefeller Foundation a federal charter. On June 20, 
1911 the Board of Commissioners of the District of Columbia (signed by the President, Cuno Hugo Rudolph) sent 
Jacob Gallinger a letter about the bill to incorporate the Rockefeller Foundation. In the letter Rudolph indicates that 
Gallinger referred the bill to the commissioners “for examination and report touching the merits of the bill and the 
propriety of its passage.” Rudolph says: “In the opinion of the Commissioners the proposed legislation is for the sole 
consideration of Congress.” They further suggested: “that some proper section giving the United States more power 
of visitation over the acts of the corporation, with authority to correct any abuses of charter power, might not be 
inappropriate; and the Board feels that in justice to the District of Columbia the Commissioners should be given 




decided to insert all of Edward Devine’s amendments in the new bill. Now the revised version 
provided for the inclusion of government officials to have some role in the selection of trustees; 
for the annual income of the foundation to be expended and the indefinite increase of the 
foundation’s endowment to be forbidden; and for the dissolution of the foundation after a period 
of one hundred years—both principal and interest.458 
Edward Devine and new Survey President Robert de Forest took great pains to support 
the revised version of the bill. They praised the incorporation of the amendments, and they 
clarified that investing in philanthropy evidenced “confidence in the intelligence and in the 
capacity of the democracy.” Further, foundations promoted “desirable public activity” amongst 
other large endowments.
459
 The Survey’s influence on the bill had been great, so when de Forest 
and Devine wrote an article in support of the amended charter, Starr Murphy sent half a dozen 
copies to Senator Gallinger so that he could emphasize the periodical’s support of the bill when 
talking to Senator Heyburn and other detractors.
460
 When Edward Devine sat next to John D. 
Rockefeller Jr. at the dinner of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, he 
affirmed his support of the foundation and offered his services. He would be in D.C. working on 
child labor legislation, and he would be willing to help. He went so far to discuss the bill with 
Congressmen and report his reception back to the Rockefellers.
461
 
However, Heyburn still wished to object. Under those circumstances, Senator Gallinger 
explained to Murphy, the bill could not be passed.
462
 By late spring 1911, there was a general 
consensus amongst the incorporators not to reintroduce the bill until the Standard Oil decision 
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had been handed down.
463
 However, after the Supreme Court announced its Standard Oil ruling 
in May, John D. Rockefeller Jr. urged his father to permit the reintroduction of the bill to 
incorporate the Foundation in Congress. Rockefeller Jr. suggested that if they didn’t reintroduce 
the bill, it might look as if they had only introduced it before the Standard Oil ruling to affect the 
Supreme Court’s decision.464  
After the ruling, at Rockefeller Jr.’s request, Frederick T. Gates contacted Rockefeller Sr. 
for permission to reintroduce the bill. From their correspondence, it seems likely that Rockefeller 
Sr.’s interest in the federal charter had weakened throughout the debates. Gates took pains to 
assure Rockefeller Sr. that even if Congress granted them a federal charter, they had not 
committed to any “definite gift.” However, the public was expecting such a gift, and Gates urged 
Rockefeller to see the ideal nature of an elastic charter and large foundation. Further, he noted, 
he had just seen President Taft at a dinner at Bryn Mawr and when a third party brought up the 
subject of the foundation, Taft seemed “entirely favorable.”465 
The bill to incorporate the Rockefeller Foundation was subsequently reintroduced in the 
Senate with the amendments in June 1911. However, the bill faced another dramatic setback 
when it became public knowledge that Attorney General Wickersham condemned the 
Rockefeller Foundation’s federal charter as unwise.466 Allegedly, Wickersham and his colleagues 
believed that the trustees of the Rockefeller Foundation might choose to devote their funds to a 
“politico-economic movement” that was against “larges masses of the people.” Such a 
circumstance could conceivably intensify class conflict rather than promote human progress.  
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In response, Devine and de Forest tried to remind the public of their support of the bill. A 
like-minded article in the Chicago Record implored readers, particularly sociologists and social 
workers, to see past these critiques and promote the Rockefeller Foundation’s interest in 
advancing “humanity, research and progress.” There were real problems in the world: “misery, 
ignorance, disease lack of opportunity, wasted faculty,” the authors noted, and “organized, 
systematized benevolence” was not one of them.467 Despite these efforts, the bill still did not 
pass the Senate.    
 The Rockefellers did not give up yet though. In 1912 Jerome Greene took over Starr 
Murphy’s lobbying efforts. From 1910 to 1914 Greene worked as the General Manager of the 
Rockefeller Institute for Medical Research and later as a philanthropic adviser to John D. 
Rockefeller. Greene brought new life to the cause. He used his personal and professional 
connections to meet with Congressman, public officials, and journalists. He tried to control press 
coverage of the bill upon its reintroduction. In his words, he did not “pressure” the press, but he 
did “secure assurances from Collier’s Weekly, Harper’s Weekly, Outlook, and the Hearst 
Newspapers, that they will, on receiving notice from me that the bill is to be taken up, either 
refrain from any agitation against it, or print a paragraph of commendation.” He did not want to 
“dictate the story,” rather he wanted to ensure that the press would only engage in “casual 
reference” to the bill. If Greene could assure Congressmen that periodicals did not intend “to 
make a fuss about the bill,” he thought it would help their cause.468 
 The Rockefellers introduced the bill in the House in March 1912. Greene worked with “a 
good friend” on the subcommittee of the Judiciary to get the bill passed.469 He was successful 
and it passed both the full Committee and the House on January 20, 1913, albeit with some 
delays. Greene reported that at the last minute, a group of Congressmen tried to remove the 
exemption from taxation from the bill, but the amendment did not have unanimous support, and 
so it did not go through. A roll call resulted in a 155 to 60 vote in favor of the bill.  
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The Rockefellers were finally close to obtaining their federal charter. As the Senate 
prepared to take up the bill, Greene intensified his lobbying efforts. However, to his great 
dismay, he realized the chances were against the passage of the bill. Without complete consensus 
the bill would need to be brought up on the general calendar, which was unlikely to happen in a 
timely manner. Still, he met with Senators and the President to encourage the passage of the bill. 
John D. Rockefeller had previously expressed his desire to “put Congress squarely on the record 
in this matter,” and Greene intended to make that happen.470  
As expected, a number of Senators objected.
471
 On February 17, the bill made it out of 
committee—ten to four. As a result Greene stayed in D.C. for the rest of the month agonizing 
over whether the bill would make it onto the calendar. He was hopeful, so he spoke to President 
Taft to see if he would support the bill once it passed Congress. President Taft told him: “Well, I 
think I can arrange to let you do what you want with your own money.”472 
To help their cause, Greene highlighted that passage of the bill would “make Washington 
an important center for many movements which aim at bettering conditions of life for the race.” 
And the foundation would be “subject to control by Congress at every point.” Greene said that 
Rockefeller wanted “his biggest gift to the people to take on a national character,” and “he also 
believes that control by the people of the whole country is safer and better than control in the 
interests of any one section.” And, finally, Greene emphasized: “He does not have to obtain a 
federal charter for his Foundation. Under the laws of almost any State, a foundation could be 
incorporated…which would be much less restricted than is that established by the proposed 
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bill.”473 By 1913 the Rockefellers and their philanthropic advisers realized the importance of 
emphasizing the federal government’s role in managing the Rockefeller’s proposed foundation.  
This marks a radical shift from their initial emphasis on the flexibility and autonomy they 
wished for the foundation. Greene said that while Rockefeller did not wish to hamper his gift 
with restrictions, “the purposes he has first in view are in line with those expenditures which 
have been proved to be the most productive…” He explained that in investing in medical 
research, the eradication of public health concerns, farm demonstration work, and rural 
education, it had always been the Rockefellers’ “policy hitherto to work only in co-operation 
with State and local authorities and to stimulate the spirit of local responsibility and self-help.”474 
This strategy of emphasizing philanthropy related to less controversial endeavors such as public 
health and agricultural development became important to establishing the credibility and 
necessity of the Rockefellers’ charitable activities. 
 
Expanding the Elastic Charter to include the “Common Interest” 
Their early emphasis on elasticity helped the Rockefeller Foundation trustees argue for the 
necessity of a federal charter, but in the end, it proved to be a significant reason their bid for a 
federal charter failed. Even when the Rockefellers adopted every last one of Devine’s 
amendments in their bill to incorporate their foundation, Congress failed to pass the bill to 
incorporate the Rockefeller Foundation.  




Either a state charter or a deed of trust would enable us to accomplish all the present 
purposes of the Rockefeller Foundation without any of the restrictions by which the 
public interests of the country as a whole are safeguarded by the present bill. To defeat 
                                                          
473
 Jerome Greene, “Release for Sunday Papers, Jan. 19, Folder 245, Box 24, Series O, Rockefeller Boards, 
Office of the Messrs. Rockefeller records (OMR), Rockefeller Archive Center. 
474
 Jerome Greene to Hon. Clarence D. Clark., Feb. 13, 1913. S. 2675 (SEN 62A-E1); 62nd Congress; Records 
of the U.S. Senate, Record Group 46; National Archives, Washington, DC. 
475
 Jerome Greene to Hon. Clarence D. Clark., Feb. 13, 1913. S. 2675 (SEN 62A-E1); 62nd Congress; Records 
of the U.S. Senate, Record Group 46; National Archives, Washington, DC. 
136 
 
this bill is consequently to deprive Congress permanently of a control which could be 
exercised against conceivable abuses. 
 
Indeed, the Rockefellers made good on this quasi-threat. Shortly thereafter, they applied for a 
special charter in New York, and they removed every single one of Devine’s amendments that 
gave the government more oversight over the foundation. The endowment would not be limited 
or expended in a certain period, government officials would not play a role in appointing 
trustees, and the annual income of the foundation would not have to be spent each year. 
About a month later, Jerome Greene wrote a memo announcing the unanimous passing of 
the Act to incorporate the Rockefeller Foundation in both houses of the New York legislature 
and by the Governor. With the Rockefellers’ New York connections the bill had passed 
smoothly.
476
 Greene explained that the amendments added to the federal charter were removed 
because while they were “willingly agreed to…they were not regarded as necessary.”477 The 
trustees thought it desirable to wait and see how they should alter the charter to serve “the public 
interest” after some years of operation.  
With their New York charter, the Rockefeller Foundation would enjoy “all the powers 
and all the privileges that a federal charter would have conveyed,” Green sneered. The only 
practical difference being that “Congress has relinquished the opportunity of controlling the 
Foundation in the interest of the whole country.” However, Greene tempered his message a bit 
by adding that a lack of a federal charter would not prevent the intended operation of the 
foundation—nationally and internationally.478  
Privately, though, as the Rockefeller Foundation dropped the amendments from the 
charter, a lingering question plagued Jerome Greene. He wondered: how might the Rockefeller 
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Foundation work out “a satisfactory scheme for the future control of the Foundation in the public 
interest”? In other words, how could the current board take appropriate steps to ensure that future 
trustees—in fifty to five hundred years—would maintain a foundation that was “responsive to 
the will and intelligence of the people through future generations?”479 In letters to fellow 
foundation executives, Greene explained that addressing this question satisfactorily would stave 
off federal or state legislation that would limit or dictate the foundation’s activities and might 
prevent the “compulsory distribution of our endowment.” Greene anticipated increased 
government regulation of foundations, and he wished to initiate reform measures before they 
were externally imposed. 
However, proving the foundation’s commitment to the “common interest,” would not be 
merely an issue of amending the foundation’s charter. As Frederick Gates had told Greene in 
previous conversations, the foundation could not “permanently endure as a paternalistic 
institution far ahead of the people in wisdom and foresight.”480 The foundation would need to be 
perceived as valuable by the public if it hoped to operate in perpetuity. To achieve this, Greene 
believed that the foundation should demonstrate its “democratic” policies through the creation of 
a “Public Council.”481  
The Public Council might include “leaders of thought and action” from all fifty states and 
foreign countries. Members of the council would attend an annual meeting where directors from 
the foundation would provide reports on the foundation’s main branches of work, and the Public 
Council would then debate the foundation’s work and provide feedback. The meeting would be 
an opportunity for publicity and public scrutiny as much as an opportunity to direct the program 
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and policy of the foundation.
482
 In these designs, Greene was outdoing even Edward Devine’s 
vision for a more democratic foundation. It was a radical departure from the Rockefellers’ earlier 
commitment to elasticity. 
However when Greene wrote John D. Rockefeller Jr. about creating the “Public 
Council,” he did not share Greene’s enthusiasm. Rockefeller Jr. thought the policy proposal 
“interesting and admirable” and it might one day be desirable; however, he wrote, “I should 
rather keep the foundation as free and as flexible as possible during the early years of its 
existence while its founder and his representatives are on hand to guide and mold it.”483 Here, 
one starts to see how John D. Rockefeller Jr. and other trustees understood the meaning of an 
elastic charter. The importance had a larger significance beyond efficiency and responsiveness; it 
afforded the Rockefellers and the foundation’s trustees’ absolute control over the direction of the 
foundation.  
When Jerome Greene argued that the foundation’s desire for a federal charter reflected 
confidence in the “stability of our national life,” he revealed a larger vision for private wealth to 
play a pivotal role in the nation’s development and progress.484 The accumulation and the 
redistribution of wealth were central to this vision, and the foundation would take on a hybrid 
public-private role with a federal charter. For Edward Devine creating a more democratic 
foundation meant promoting increased oversight of foundations in order to ensure that they 
operated with “service” in mind rather than “special privilege.”485 Foundations could be kept in 
line with “public sentiment” 486 through the oversight of selection of trustees, the monitoring of 
annual expenditures, and by limiting the length of the foundation’s existence.487 Jerome Greene, 
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on the other hand, took these suggestions even further by advocating for the creation of a Public 
Council that would ensure that the foundation worked in the “public interest.” 488 Admittedly, the 
purpose of the Public Council was to ensure that state and federal governments would not dictate 
how the Rockefeller Foundation managed its endowment. To achieve that aim, Greene expanded 
the public and private categories in relation to the foundation beyond the Rockefellers and 
government entities. His “public” included grassroots, representative feedback from national and 
international interests. In his words, he was interested in developing a more “responsive” 
philanthropy. 
 There was a real possibility that the Rockefeller Foundation might have developed as an 
updated, twentieth-century version of the public trust (with federal oversight). Devine’s vision 
for a “useful” foundation that would operate with government input on the selection of trustees; 
the mandatory annual expenditure of the foundation’s income; and the spending down of its 
principal within one-hundred years, indeed, would have made the RF accountable to the 
American public in unprecedented ways. However, both Congress and the Rockefellers went 
another direction entirely. As was the case with the Carnegie Institute of Washington, Congress 
did not want to make the Rockefeller’s philanthropy a creature of the government. And despite 
real efforts to fight that perspective, the Rockefellers eventually embraced the creation of their 
foundation as a private foundation rather than a public trust. As John D. Rockefeller Jr. pointed 
out, they would have more control over the foundation that way. 
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The Rise of the Private Foundation: 
New Corporate Responsibilities for the Twentieth Century
 
 
Just over a year after the Rockefellers overcame the controversy surrounding their failed federal 
charter, their foundation ignited another national brawl. This time, the fight was over the 
Rockefellers’ use of their new foundation to patch up their botched handling of the Colorado 
Coal Strike that resulted in the Ludlow Massacre in April 1914. Rather than investigating what 
went wrong at their mining operation or instituting reforms, the Rockefellers funded industrial 
relations research through their foundation. To many, it seemed like the Rockefellers were using 
their foundation to cover-up their industrial despotism. As government officials, labor leaders, 
social workers, and philanthropists debated the legitimacy of the Rockefeller Foundation’s 
industrial relations investigation, they were working out the limits and role of the private 
foundation in twentieth-century America.  
 The Stakes were high, because the Colorado Coal Strike was the deadliest in the nation’s 
history, and the Rockefellers had staunchly refused to meet with laborers and union 
representatives at their Colorado Fuel and Iron Company, the mining operation at the center of 
the Ludlow Massacre.
489
 Tensions began in September 1913 when 9,000 CFI workers initiated a 
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strike demanding union recognition in. After a brutal winter of deprivations and rising hostility, 
on April 20, 1914, militiamen—many of who were newly sworn-in CFI employees—descended 
on the Ludlow tent colony where strikers were living with their families after being evicted from 
CFI company towns. While no one knows who fired the first shot, the chaos in the tent colony as 
residents dodged bullets infamously resulted in the death of thirteen women and children who 
died trapped under a burning tent. And the fighting did not end there; after the Ludlow Massacre, 
outraged miners waged a “Ten Days War” as they took up arms and attempted to take over other 
Colorado company towns. The strike continued until December 1914, and its death toll mounted 
to seventy-five to one hundred people, making it the deadliest strike in U.S. history.
490
 
After Ludlow, to many, it seemed the nation’s richest family had blood on its hands. In 
addition to Frank Hayes, the Vice President of the United Mine Workers of America, President 
Woodrow Wilson, Secretary of Labor William Wilson, as well as multiple state and federal 
committees’ had made efforts to alleviate or end the strike before the massacre. The 
Rockefellers, however, had maintained a hardline in opposition to organized labor. Rockefeller 
Jr. and CFI management had refused to visit Ludlow or meet with miners to discuss unionization 
or to address their grievances.
491
 As CFI’s vice president wrote Rockefeller Jr. as the strike 
unfolded, he promised to resist unionization until his “bones were bleached as white as chalk in 
these Rocky Mountains.”492 Hayes and the UMW asserted that it was precisely the Colorado coal 
companies’ failure to meet with miners that caused the strike in the first place.493  
In the aftermath, multiple state and federal commissions formed to manage and 
investigate the Colorado Coal strike. As Rockefeller Jr. testified at these hearings and 
investigations, he insisted that, as a director and board member of CFI, he was aware of the 
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situation in Colorado, but he did not know anything about workers’ grievances—that was the 
purview of company officers. Rockefeller Jr. argued that his ignorance was justified, as he relied 
on company officers and managers to make on-the-ground decisions.
494
 However, for a man who 
had publicly committed himself to promote “human progress” as President of the Rockefeller 
Foundation, such an answer was not sufficient. In the midst of the Ludlow Massacre, this 
approach made the Rockefellers seem, frankly, disinterested in the welfare of CFI workers. 
Exactly what Rockefeller Jr. knew about workers’ grievances and CFI management practices and 
what responsibility he had to intervene in the interest of his employees and industrial peace 
became key questions in hearings and in the national press. 
Under pressure to show some demonstrable interest in improving labor relations, in June 
1914 just two months after the Ludlow Massacre, the Rockefellers started to draft plans for a 
comprehensive study “of the relations of capital and labor with a view to the promotion of 
industrial peace.” By October 1914 they publicly announced their intention to create an 
“industrial relations investigation.”495 The Rockefellers hired W. L. Mackenzie King, Canada’s 
former Minister of Labor and future Prime Minister to undertake the study. Before he was even 
officially hired, though, King started to consult with the Rockefellers regarding how to handle 
CFI labor relations.
496
 Notably, all of these efforts were funded through the Rockefeller 
Foundation and not by CFI. This funding decision helped the Rockefellers shift the burden of 
drafting better CFI corporate welfare policies to their foundation. The family could invest in 
reform while avoiding admitting any past wrong doing at their coal company. They could claim 
an interest in promoting better industrial relations—even clean up the chaos at CFI—while 
maintaining ignorance of what happened during the strike.  
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This management decision made the foundation a major focal point of the United States 
Industrial Relations Commission. Congress approved the USIRC in August 1912 to research “the 
general condition of labor in the principal industries of the United States” and to report on “the 
underlying causes of dissatisfaction in the industrial situation.”497 The USIRC had spent its first 
year holding public hearings across the country and conducting research on topics such as 
collective bargaining, unemployment, and scientific management.
498
 These hearings and 
investigations directly addressed the increase in industrial violence in the first decade of the 
twentieth century that had made class, the relations between capital and labor, and the 
distribution of wealth critical topics in American public discourse. However, after the Ludlow 
Massacre, as the USIRC held hearings in Denver, Colorado about the Colorado Coal Strike, 
USIRC Chairman Frank Walsh decided to expand the commission’s interest in industrial welfare 
to include “The Centralization of Industrial Control and Operation of Philanthropic 
Foundations.”499  
Much has been written about the USIRC in terms of labor policy and the coming of 
industrial democracy,
500
 but its investigation of philanthropy raised broader questions about what 
one witness called before the USIRC called “corporate responsibility” that deserve further 
analysis by historians.
501
 With unprecedented power, these hearings demonstrate, many 
Americans believed that aggregated capital required new regulatory structures to make it 
accountable to society. And those regulatory structures made the old public trust model 
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untenable—no longer would the federal government give a national imprimatur to a trust funded 
by securities from the nation’s most notoriously profit-mongering corporations. Instead, 
accountability was discussed as obtainable through analyses of industrial trade unionism and the 
wage contract, through scientific management, and through debates about whether government 
or private entities should distribute the “excess profits” of capitalism at all.502  
 
With their hard-won “elastic” charter and a board stacked with Rockefeller friends and family 
members,
503
 the foundation’s charter only magnified the fact that Rockefeller Jr. and his 
foundation had fought for the responsibility of naming the greatest social welfare issues of the 
day and a responsibility to alleviate them in the interest of what they saw as the public good. To 
make their social and economic policy research more palatable, foundation leadership reframed 
their efforts as part of the foundation’s interest in public welfare. Foundation trustees emphasized 
the nature of the foundation as what they called a “public trust,” and industrial relations as a 
public welfare issue. The foundation was a “public trust, not a private possession,” they argued, 
because the people had a right to supervise the foundation through legislative representatives. 
Further they noted, the creation of the USIRC itself demonstrated that investigating industrial 
relations was in fact a “field of public service,” and it was a field that the foundation wished to 
enter.
504
 However, that language, which had fostered the development of other public trusts in 
the nineteenth century, would not work for the Rockefellers in the early twentieth century. Even 
as the Rockefellers tried to reframe their private foundation as a public trust, it just heightened 
the power that they had over American economy and society. This chapter analyzes the 
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Rockefeller Foundation and the USIRC’s creation of industrial relations research initiatives to 
understand the terms of debates about corporate responsibility in the early twentieth century that 
reshaped the contours of the tenuous balance between the public trust and the private foundation. 
These debates would fuel the further separation of government and private investment in public 
works, I will argue, and that resulted in the rise of a private-foundation model of American 
philanthropy rather than the growth of the public trust. 
 
Competing (Public and Private) Calls to Balance Industrial Relations 
In the early twentieth century fervor to “balance” industrial relations swept through the nation. 
As workers lost their lives or loved ones and industry was forced to reduce operations in the face 
of protest, elements of labor and capital interested in reform embraced the refrain of establishing 
a more balanced relationship between their respective interests. Of course the concept meant 
vastly different things to distinct groups, but whether one was crushing union-organizing efforts 
or fighting for an eight-hour workday, the concept of balance could be useful.
505
  
Both the government and the Rockefeller Foundation’s industrial relations investigations 
framed labor and capital as fixed interest groups fighting universal social cleavages created by 
modern industry. They both identified a responsibility to address industrial imbalances as the 
most pressing problem of the era. As Rockefeller Foundation leadership announced in a carefully 
prepared press release, their research sought to address “anomalies” of “modern industrial 
conditions” that produced “destructive capacities of opposing and contending forces.”506 Such 
framing allowed both bodies to suggest that while labor and capital were fixed interest groups, 
their relations could be managed through better labor practices or policies. One key question to 
be addressed was how government, business, and labor would play a role in shaping those 
changes. 
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In fact, both investigative bodies framed their research on these contending forces as 
national and global in scope, and they publicly announced a desire to influence the creation of 
government regulation of industrial relations. The USIRC aimed to inspire “wise and broad 
legislation” in Congress,507 and the Rockefeller Foundation asserted a desire to work with 
governments the world over.
508
 Both groups planned to gain popular support of their “findings” 
through what they called “publicity” and later through published reports. Despite their 
similarities, however, these investigations unfolded in markedly different fashions and they 
terminated in a battle over the relative efficacies of industrial justice and industrial welfare, as 
well as an ideological battle over the desired role of private wealth in public life.  
 
Two labor crises shaped the course of the USIRC. First, the bombing of the Los Angeles Times 
Building in 1910 and the subsequent prosecution of the McNamara brothers inspired its creation. 
Secondly, the Ludlow Massacre in 1914 shaped the final stages of the commission. Both of these 
tragedies made wages, working conditions, and the relationship between ownership and 
management national problems. Questions about fair wages and whether workers were 
adequately benefiting from the profits of industrial capitalism, expanded from private questions 
between employers and employees to questions of national security and social welfare. 
These questions of balance and welfare came into relief when on October 1, 1910 an 
explosion in the Los Angeles Times building, which housed Harrison Gray Otis’ staunchly anti-
union paper, killed twenty people and injured far more. This bombing followed a series of strikes 
and explosions as the International Association of Bridge and Structural Iron Workers tried to 
organize California ironworkers. When the union treasurer John McNamara and his brother 
controversially pled guilty, it led to harried debates about the use of violence in strikes and 
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The Survey magazine sought to shape public conversations after the bombing. Its pages 
facilitated discussion about how balanced relations between capital and labor might be 
researched and achieved.
 Historian Allen Davis has suggested that “the outcome of the 
McNamara case…came almost as a personal tragedy” to social workers like those at the Survey, 
whose social justice work involved “re-establish[ing] communications between the workingmen 
and the employers and to bring at least a minimum of health, safety and decency into the 
mushrooming urban center of America.”510 In the case of the Survey, many of its editors had 
contributed to work on industrial relations; they included Edward Devine the “dean of social 
welfare” so influential in debates about the chartering of the Rockefeller Foundation, John Fitch 
who worked in New York’s Department of Labor and was a professor at the New York School 




In an effort to convince policy makers and the public that finding a balance in the labor 
and capital relationship was possible and to turn the public’s attention away from the sensational 
elements of the McNamara case, the Survey formed a Committee to promote the formation of an 
Industrial Relations Commission. They held a symposium with twenty-nine constituents and 
published their conclusions in the Survey. While they published the varying beliefs of 
symposium attendees, Paul Kellogg’s remarks captured the general spirit of their conversations. 
The McNamara case demonstrated that national officials of organized labor “had resorted to 
dynamiting as a deliberate policy,” but there could be two responses to this policy, he argued. 
Some Americans were at a loss for what to do when “good-tempered boys like these McNamara 
boys” believed their only “recourse…for improving the conditions of the wage-earner [was] to 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
the LA Times building bombing, see: Adams, Age of Industrial Violence; Stromquist, Reinventing the People;  
McCartin, Labor’s Great War; Allen Davis, “The Campaign for the Industrial Relations Commission, 1911-1913” 
Mid-America: A Historical Review 45.4 (1963).  
510
 Davis, “The Campaign for the Industrial Relations Commission, 212. 
511
 In 1909 Edward Devine corresponded with Robert W. de Forest about the possibility of the Sage Foundation 
creating an investigation of industrial relations in New York that would coordinate its efforts with the employment 
bureau. Edward Devine to Robert W. de Forest, February 15, 1909, Folder 143, Box 17, Series 3-Early Office Files, 
SG1, Russell Sage Foundation records, Rockefeller Archive Center. 
148 
 
use dynamite against property and life,” while others argued for purging organized labor of 
“lawless methods and individuals.”512  
As an answer to these opposing beliefs, Kellogg argued for “industrial adjustment” or “a 
release from an unnatural tension and alignment in American life,” that would establish “fresh 
and more hopeful industrial relationships…”513 In the logic of the Survey writers like Kellogg, 
the unbalanced relationship existed because, as they wrote to President Taft, “Our statutes in the 
main were originally enacted for the different conditions existing before these industrial 
changes.” Those conditions had changed, Kellogg argued, in the favor of capital.”514 Framing his 
call for labor policy reform around the changing conditions of American capitalism gave Kellogg 
an opportunity to articulate a need for governmental intervention. Further it powerfully echoed 
calls for reform in response to a shift from personally owned and managed businesses to 
corporate entities that amassed profit and power previously unknown. Those corporate bodies 
divided ownership, management, and labor in new ways. 
However, in the early twentieth century, questions about ownership and management 
lacked clear answers. As corporate power grew, so did management structures. The increasing 
division between ownership and management created a vacuum in which labor violations could 
languish between the responsibility of shareholders and company officers.
515
 While corporate 
executives insisted on the efficiencies of creating organizational hierarchy, union advocates 
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contended that the creation of large corporations demonstrated the necessity of similarly-sized 
labor organizations. The Ludlow Massacre cracked this debate wide open. Even if corporate 
executives didn’t argue for industrial unionism, they found new ways to advocate “industrial 
democracy,” profit-sharing, or for the benefits of scientific management. While many of those 
solutions came with accompanying problems, they did offer new ways to talk about the 
relationship between employers and employees that helped other executives avoid the problems 
facing the Rockefellers. 
516
 It also demonstrated that beyond business and philanthropy, other 
nonprofit, membership, and voluntary associations had the potential to grow powerful in the 
United States. 
The Survey editors’ efforts were convincing; on the morning of March 22, 1912, at 
President Taft’s urging, the Committee on Labor of the House of Representatives held a hearing 
on a Bill to create a commission on industrial relations. The time had come, Edward Devine who 
was leading the hearings argued, for the federal government to define its ideal role in industrial 
disputes and to facilitate better relations between employer and employees. The role of the 
USIRC was not to only address labor relations amongst employees and employers in major U.S. 
industries; instead, the Survey editors wanted to persuade Congress that the federal government 
should be involved in shaping U.S. industrial relations. As Devine put it, he and his associates 
did “not believe that, when the militia is called, that exhausts what the government can do.”517  
Congress officially created the USIRC on August 23, 1912. It was to be composed of 
nine people who would be appointed by the President. No less than three of the representatives 
were to be employers of labor and no fewer than three representatives were to be representatives 
of organized labor. The Commission was authorized to hold public hearings and to compel the 
attendance of witnesses and their testimony, and then it was tasked with reporting its findings to 
Congress periodically. For its first year of operation, the USIRC was granted $100,000—far less 
than other commissions of its kind had received from Congress.
518
  
                                                          
516
 See, for example, Guggenheim Testimony on “just profit sharing” 7570; Perkins Testimony on profit sharing 
7600; Ford Testimony on the insufficiency of wages 7629; See Lewis Testimony on industrial feudalism 7509. 
517
 Industrial Commission, Hearing on H.R 21094, Before Comm. on Labor, 62
nd
 Cong., (1912), 6. 
518
 First Annual Report of the Commission on Industrial Relations (Washington D.C.: Barnard and Miller Print, 
1914). At the hearing members of the Committee on Labor asked Devine how much money would need to be 




President Wilson appointed commissioners in January 1913. John B. Lennon and James 
O’Connell of the AFL, along with Austin B. Garretson of the Railroad Brotherhoods were to 
represent labor. Merchant and department store owner Harris Weinstock, Kentucky mill owner 
S. Thruston Ballard, and railroad executive Frederick A. Delano would represent business.
519
 
And Wilson tapped social work leaders to populate the remaining seats of the Commission to 
appease the Survey leadership who were responsible for its creation. He offered a place to 
Edward Devine, but he declined, and instead, he appointed John R. Commons, the well-known 
Wisconsin economist and professor. Wilson further responded to social workers’ demands to 
place a woman on the commission and appointed Florence J. Harriman, a member of the New 
York elite who founded the Colony Club, worked for the National Civic Federation, and had 
campaigned for Wilson’s election.520 
 
While calls for the USIRC represented a belief in government intervention as central to 
balancing industrial relations, business had its own strategies and agendas. Even before the 
foundation was officially chartered, Jerome Greene had been meeting with “representatives of 
some of the largest financial interests” to discuss labor relations. They strategized about what 
could be done about “the general unrest” plaguing the nation at the conferences. At first, they 
attempted to plan a “well-organized agency of investigation and publicity” related to industrial 
relations; however, the group’s efforts came to nothing. They could not reach consensus about 
what the public needed to know about industrial disputes and when and how to share 
information.  
One group of business leaders advocated for the creation of a publicity bureau that would 
conduct “disinterested investigations” after instances of labor unrest and provide “the facts” to 
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the “middle and lower classes.”521 This group believed that unrest existed due to “misinformation 
and misrepresentation” that was “ill-conceived, though possibly honest.” A dissenting group, 
however, which included members of the Rockefeller Foundation, advocated for the creation of a 
larger bureau of investigation to conduct much broader, “scientific investigations of the causes of 
existing evils.” This would include the investigation of topics like railroad rates, tariffs and the 
high cost of living. This group believed that they needed new convincing data about the 
legitimacy of their interests in labor disputes. Framing their interests in the language of social 
welfare could help their cause, they believed. These conferences were not an isolated occurrence; 
instead, they demonstrate a recurring overlap between corporate interests and corporate welfare 
efforts to prevent governmental control or regulation.
522
 Although consensus was not reached 
and no action was taken, with their new foundation, the Rockefellers could develop their vision 
of a broad investigation of industrial relations, and they did just that in their first years of 
operation.  
 
The Rockefeller Foundation’s Industrial Relations Investigation 
The Rockefeller Foundation was, in fact, not the first foundation to undertake economic and 
social investigations of industrial relations. The Carnegie Institution of Washington organized 
their Department of Economics and Sociology in 1904,
523
 and it contributed to the writing of a 
history of American industrial society, for example. And the Russell Sage Foundation was well 
known for its attention to research on working-class poverty and industrial relations, as well as 
its undertaking of related programming.
524
 However, the Rockefellers were walking into 
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uncertain philanthropic terrain by attaching their industrial relations investigation to the Ludlow 
Massacre at their mining operation. By doing so, they seemed to be confirming their detractors’ 
fears that the foundation would promote the Rockefellers’ business interests.525 Trustees realized 
how sensitive the public would be to the Rockefellers managing and funding research that aimed 
to shape labor relations, but they proceeded with the belief, they claimed, that the subject of 
economics called for “careful, dispassionate, scientific investigation.” 526 That was not enough to 
stave off government and popular interest in their activities though. 
 Things were personal for Rockefeller Jr. The weight of CFI decisions made by its 
ownership fell squarely on his shoulders. His father had mostly retired, so Rockefeller Jr. worked 
to manage the family investment. And CFI had not been a profitable investment. According to 
Rockefeller biographer Ron Chernow, despite Rockefeller Jr.’s own retirement from business 
affairs, he felt it his “duty” to prove to his father that he could turn CFI around.527 That was no 
easy task for him though. Everyone knew that Rockefeller Jr. was devoting his life to 
philanthropy, so his ownership of CFI made a mockery of his espoused intentions. In letters to 
Rockefeller Jr., UMA Vice President Frank Hayes and Upton Sinclair expressed disbelief that he 
could realize the true nature of the worsening Colorado coal strike. They refused to “believe that 
any young, modern American” who had been “taught in a civilized school” and worshiped “in a 
civilized church,” could actually be aware of what was taking place at CFI.528 Sinclair urged 
Rockefeller Jr. to clear himself of the stains of the Ludlow Massacre by acknowledging that 
business advisers had misled him and charting a new path for “humanity and justice for the 
future.” 
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 When Rockefeller Jr. failed to respond to Sinclair’s letters, he continued sending them.529 
He also made his advice public, and he organized protests in front of the Rockefeller’s offices at 
26 Broadway in New York City. As he walked silently in front of the building with a band of 
mourning-crepe around his arm, Sinclair was jailed. Upon his release he staged protests in the 
Rockefellers’ peaceful properties at Tarrytown. Poised above the old aqueducts leading south to 
the City, Sinclair railed against the Rockefellers for hiding out behind barbed wire and armed 
guards at home while chaos descended on their property in Colorado. 
 When all of this—including allusions to Rockefeller Jr.’s compromised personal safety—
failed to sway Rockefeller Jr., Sinclair started writing King Coal. He made a rich man’s son the 
hero of the story. However, unlike Rockefeller Jr., his hero Hal Warren risked his life to get to 
know the “situation” at Colorado. As he “toiled in the bowels of the mine,” the miners who at 
first seemed like “stunted creatures of the dark” that civilization had left behind transformed into 
pitiable creatures who Warren eventually came to see as individuals capable of political action in 
the face of the deprivations of mine life and the tyranny of company authority.
530
 In King Coal 
Hal Warren’s first-hand knowledge of the situation in Southern Colorado was critical to his 
political transformation. After an explosion in the mine where Warren worked, company 
management sealed the mine to squelch burning fires and save coal deposits rather than saving 
miners trapped after the blast. As Warren attempted to convince his friend—the son of the owner 
of the mine—to intervene and save the lives of miners, he urged him to visit the mine and see 
what was happening for himself. However, repeatedly, his friend insisted that management must 
know best and Warren undoubtedly was mistaken. It’s only the fact that Warren had seen 
management mistreat workers first-hand that enabled him to believe what was true in Sinclair’s 
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story: that company management chose to preserve coal deposits rather than save hundreds of 
workers’ lives.   
 
As the Colorado Coal Strike unfolded, Rockefeller Jr. was not behaving like Hal Warren though. 
He was not unmoved by the labor crises around him. He had hired W. L. Mackenzie King to 
undertake “a critical survey of the entire field of industrial relations” in order to figure out how 
to respond to the crisis; however, he failed to visit Ludlow or to affirm his own responsibility for 
what happened at Ludlow. King was there to do what Rockefeller Jr. could not—figure out how 
the Rockefellers could clean up the chaos at CFI, along with their image. He was practiced in 
“scientific investigation,” according to the Rockefellers, and he combined the “sympathy of a 
social worker and the practical experience of a man of affairs.”531 At Rockefeller Jr.’s request, 
King visited him and Rockefeller Foundation trustees in New York in early June 1914. In their 
early talks, Ludlow and the Colorado coal strike were first and foremost in their discussions. 
Before King even agreed to take part in a larger research initiative, he suggested the creation of 
“conciliatory boards for adjusting industrial differences” at CFI.532 By mid-month after a 
conference in Tarrytown, King agreed to work on the larger study.
533
  
King’s appointment, Rockefeller Foundation trustees hoped, would allow them to both 
alleviate labor unrest in Colorado and stake a claim to the larger field of industrial relations 
research. They paid King an annual salary of $12,000 and mostly let him design the study 
himself.
534
 Throughout the work, King and Rockefeller Jr. grew close. Both famously prudish 
and moralizing, they became confidants. This intimacy forged a necessary alliance for 
Rockefeller Jr. outside of his usual inner circle at 26 Broadway, according to Chernow. 
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Rockefeller Jr. was smart enough to see that he badly “needed guidance,” and King became his 
source.
535
 As King and Rockefeller Jr. grew closer, he suggested that the Rockefeller 
philanthropies could be ruined if Rockefeller Jr. did not address the crises surrounding Ludlow. 
King encouraged “greater public openness” in the Rockefellers’ business interests, and when this 
proved fruitful, even Rockefeller Sr. came to appreciate his vision.
536
  
King described his investigation of industrial relations as nothing less than “a study of the 
fundamentals of modern civilization itself” that would address “the Problem of human 
society”…537 However, as evidenced by his early work, much of his research focused on 
industrial relations in Colorado and whether or not a conciliation board should be 
implemented.”538 Beyond an abstract desire to balance relations between labor and capital, the 
meaning of industrial relations to the Rockefeller Foundation was entirely opaque. King’s first 
actions on behalf of the larger investigation included creating a bibliography of works published 
on industrial relations and a survey of industrial relations that would allow him to “visualize” the 
entire field as he outlined its contours.
539
 The Rockefellers and King, this shows, were searching 
for a definition and scope of their industrial relations project, beyond its interest in CFI, even 
after it began. 
By the end of 1915 the Rockefeller Foundation had spent almost $20,000 on its 
investigation of industrial relations. King felt that if his study was to be relevant, then he would 
have to begin with industry in Colorado. He knew that his research and policy recommendations 
might be misconstrued due to his affiliation with the Rockefeller Foundation, but he believed 
that “the duty was imperative” and the results would “justify the effort.” Further, before visiting 
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Colorado, King took precautions. He first reached out to Seth Low who chaired a Commission 
put together by the U.S. President and to Secretary of Labor Wilson and the Governor of 
Colorado. He explained his association with the foundation and his planned investigations in 
Colorado and they supported his going to Colorado. 
540
 If the Rockefellers had been perceived as 
uncooperative before, part of King’s work was to repair that perception—that work directly 
benefited CFI, too. 
 
The USIRC Puts Foundations on Trial 
From 1913 to 1915, while King was developing his study, the USIRC was hitting its stride. 
Under Frank P. Walsh’s leadership, the USIRC undertook 154 days of public hearings calling 
740 witnesses. During its first year of operation the USIRC divided its work into two parts: 
public hearings and research. They called over five hundred witnesses to the stand as they held 
hearings at industrial centers around the country to gauge “public opinion” and to learn about 
industrial conditions locally.
541
 In their first Annual Report, the USIRC detailed its findings and 
plans for future research on unions; agriculture and land problems; and immigration.  
The consequences of industrialization that the USIRC considered pernicious included: the 
changing distribution of wealth, a rise in the cost of living, urbanization, the introduction of 
labor-saving machinery and new industrial processes, the continual reoccurrence of prosperity 
and depression, the rise of industrial and financial corporations, and the increasing influence of 
the working class.
542
 In the face of these realities of modern economic life, the USIRC would 
seek to understand whether the new relations between employer and employee were permanent 
and how the commission might suggest “the development of new agencies for maintaining peace 
and friendly relations between employers and employees, and justice and prosperity to all 
classes.”543 As they advocated for new social legislation, they explored national debates about 
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social insurance and workmen’s compensation, but USIRC leadership also asserted a broader 
interest in welfare work. “It is not to be forgotten that while the care of the weak, the sick, the 
old, and the fatherless constitutes an appeal to all the finer qualities of mankind, there is also a 
phase of the question that is entirely selfish, and which can be translated into dollars and cents,” 
the commission noted.
544
 Corporate welfare work, as it had the potential to benefit companies, 
was suspect to Walsh. 
As a result, Walsh planned to “go deep” into welfare work over the next two years, as he 
and the USIRC developed a vision for social legislation reforms. In their First Annual Report, 
the commission noted testimony taken at a hearing in New York by a representative of the IWW. 
The IWW representative indicated that the government was simply a “committee to look after 
and police the interests of the employing classes.” If that was the case, as the IWW 
representative asserted, the commission noted, radicalized labor would consider violence their 
best option.
545
 The USIRC planned to study this position in order to eradicate it “in the interest of 
society.” Corporate welfare was a key element of their investigations. However, as the 
Commission conducted its research on the “domination of social institutions by capital,”546 
members realized that investigating philanthropic foundations would allow them to dramatically 
increase the scope of their questions about corporate welfare beyond company housing, company 
stores, and wages.  
 
On December 3, 1914, Basil Manly, the Director of Research and Investigation of the United 
States Industrial Relations Commission, explained to his boss Frank Walsh that he was “having a 
great deal of difficulty” preparing for the upcoming set of hearings.547 Basil Manly was 
struggling to pull together hearings on a new subject: philanthropic foundations. At its Chairman 
Frank Walsh’s urging, the commission was expanding its interest in industrial welfare to include 
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“The Centralization of Industrial Control and Operation of Philanthropic Foundations.”548 While 
Basil Manly drew up a list of leaders in philanthropy, business, social work, and labor, including 
Samuel Gompers, J.P. Morgan, and the Rockefellers, to call to the stand at the Commission’s 
hearings, he wrote to Walsh of his difficulty in preparing for the content of the hearings 
themselves. The subjects of philanthropy and corporate welfare “are new and people have done 
very little thinking about them,” he explained.549 His difficulty in preparing for the hearings 
suggests that Manly was uncertain about how to narrate the connections between philanthropic 
foundations and industrial relations to the public. To address this problem, Walsh and Manly 
strategized about how to draw a connection between foundations and issues of industrial control. 
Frank Walsh hoped that their hearings on foundations could help the commission to 
“trace the responsibility” for industrial unrest “absolutely to its source.”550 For Walsh that source 
was the wealthy men who created the nation’s largest for-profit corporations, many of whom 
also created philanthropic foundations.
551
 He believed that foundations, created by the same 
wealthy individuals who profited from existing industrial conditions, could have no real interest 
in industrial reform, or at least their interest was highly suspect. In Walsh’s words, foundations’ 
interest in industrial relations was simply one of “benevolent control.”552 As Walsh announced 
the upcoming hearings on foundations, he suggested to the press that the withdrawal of huge 
sums of money from industry into large charities might be injurious to society, and secondly, he 
suggested that foundations might represent an effort to increase the powers of “predatory wealth” 
through private foundations that could “corrupt sources of public information.”553  
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Throughout the course of the hearings, which took place in New York and Washington 
D.C. in the winter and spring of 1915, Manly and Walsh publicly asserted a position staunchly 
against foundations, and they ignited a new series of debates about the meaning of social welfare 
and the roles that the government, business, and private foundations should play in defining and 
promoting it.
554
 Some observers were skeptical of a nefarious connection between the 
Rockefeller Foundation and the Rockefellers’ business interests. In truth, the boundaries between 
the Rockefeller Foundation and the family’s business interests were thin to nonexistent. In 
Rockefeller Jr.’s words, he and his father did not draw “sharp lines” between their “business and 
philanthropic interests.”555 They managed both sets of interests from one office, and multiple 
foundation trustees were also stockholders and directors in CFI. Those trustees had a “dual 
interest” in resolving labor issues at the company.556  
Despite these blurred lines, when trustees created their investigation of industrial 
relations, they maintained that they did not believe that it was the foundation’s role to interfere in 
the Colorado situation. However, they did think that it would be a social good to ascertain the 
“root causes” of the disturbance for the good of Colorado and the world. Even foundation 
trustees admitted that it was more complicated than that though. As Rockefeller Foundation 
trustees were large owners of corporate securities, they believed that the foundation should be 
“directly concerned in maintaining harmonious relations between the companies in which it is 
interested and their employees.”557 The foundation did not just have an abstract interest in 
promoting business interests. The foundation’s endowment contained CFI securities, so it had a 
financial interest in promoting the success of CFI.
558
 
 Rockefeller Foundation trustees’ rationalization of their interest in social and economic 
policy demonstrates the shifting boundaries of the public and the private in the early twentieth 
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century. The Rockefeller Foundation was a private foundation that strategically cast itself as a 
corporate body governed by the New York state legislature. Trustees engaged in “public 
service,” but they determined the terms of that service by managing and distributing funds from a 
private endowment. This kind of private action for the public good was quickly becoming 
outdated in the early twentieth century. The USIRC hearings demonstrate that executives such as 
Henry Ford, Daniel Guggenheim, and George Walbridge Perkins were newly distinguishing 
“just profit sharing” and “pauperizing charity.” Each of these executives distanced themselves 
from the “industrial despotism” of the Rockefellers while articulating their own commitment to 
assuming new controlling roles in their employees’ lives in the name of “profit-sharing” and the 
“welfare” of their employees. 559 
 Of course, even profit-sharing at large corporations could be articulated as a “semi-
public” endeavor. That’s how George Walbridge Perkins described it: “I have long believed and 
often publicly said that the larger an enterprise becomes the more semipublic it becomes, and the 
more important are its responsibilities to the public generally.”560 However, in contrast, many 
executives who testified deviated from Perkins’ vision of the “semipublic” nature of large 
corporations. Instead, they proposed that the nation was ready for the federal government to 
undertake basic social welfare initiatives that it would fund through the federal income tax and 
inheritance taxes. In this vein, Daniel Guggenheim and Louis Brandeis laid out a new, clear 
vision for separate social welfare responsibilities for business corporations, for private 
philanthropy, and for the government.
561
 
Despite these new visions of corporate responsibility and fears about pauperizing charity, 
the Rockefeller Foundation’s philanthropy was hard to eliminate because of its successes that did 
offer real public benefits. As the Rockefeller philanthropies grew and improved at their public 
relations strategy, their good deeds in public health were well known and harder to criticize. As 
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an article in the Boston Transcript framed the USIRC’s investigation into foundations: “why not 
carry the attack directly against the individual and not against the good that they may have 
done?” The idea that “these malefactors of great wealth” were a “menace” to the nation’s 
industrial interests and its “republican institutions” did not seem compelling. 562 As another 
Boston paper put it, anyone who has studied the foundations could see “that a tremendous 
amount of good has been done.”563 Further others were uncertain why other philanthropies were 
being included in the investigation. It seemed to authors at the Philadelphia Record that their 
inclusion was to mask a personal attack aimed at the Rockefellers during the strike.
564
  
 At the Commission’s hearings on foundations, they first sought to demonstrate 
foundations’ interest in influencing labor policy. In New York in January 1915, they called John 
D. Rockefeller Jr. and Jerome Greene of the Rockefeller Foundation to the stand in an attempt to 
show how philanthropy was born of self-interest or even of malicious intent to influence public 
opinion and public policy in favor of the interests of capital. To further link foundations to a 
theme of benevolent control, the Commission questioned J.P. Morgan, Andrew Carnegie, and 
John D. Rockefeller Sr. “on their industrial connections, their knowledge of the industries which 
they control, their labor policies and how they were formed, and how the industries were actually 
run by ‘hired men,’”565 In addition to the Rockefeller Foundation, they identified the National 
Civic Federation, the Russell Sage Foundation, the Cleveland Foundation, the Industrial 
Department of the YMCA, the Charity Organization Society, the Association for Improving the 
Conditions of the Poor, and the Hebrew Charities as philanthropic institutions investing in the 
investigation of industrial relations.
566
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While calling industrial leaders to the stand instantly gained the commission national 
press and attention, its leaders still struggled with how to directly link philanthropy and industrial 
violence. Walsh and the commission’s questioners attempted to use John D. Rockefeller Jr.’s 
management position in both the Rockefeller Foundation and Colorado Fuel & Iron to directly 
link the Rockefellers’ business interests to their philanthropy. Walsh passionately questioned 
Rockefeller Jr. about what he had known about the Ludlow Massacre and what the intent of the 
Rockefeller Foundation’s Industrial Relations Investigation really entailed.  
In Rockefeller’s remarks he claimed sympathy for labor and described his efforts to 
investigate labor relations through his philanthropy. However, he also strictly maintained that it 
was CFI’s officers’ responsibility to manage labor relations on the ground. As he described how 
the Rockefeller Foundation funded Ivy Lee and King’s salaries as they promoted both universal 
understanding of what happened in Ludlow and concrete publicity and reforms for CFI, this 
distinction was crucial.
567
 Rockefeller said that it was by witnessing the strike that he became 
convinced that the Rockefeller Foundation should study “the fundamental problems arising out 
of industrial relations.”568 And with even more affect, “I frankly confess that I felt there was 
something fundamentally wrong in a condition of affairs which rendered possible the loss of 
human lives…and brought suffering and privation upon hundreds of human beings, in struggling 
for industrial rights as they conceived them.”  
As Walsh tried to develop a sinister connection between the Rockefellers’ business and 
philanthropic interests, Rockefeller Jr. repeatedly drew his own connection between corporate 
welfare in business and corporate welfare in philanthropy. Rockefeller Sr. had written that the 
best philanthropy involved paying employees appropriate wages and in developing the nation’s 
resources at hand through business in his recently published autobiography.
569
 Rockefeller Jr. 
drew upon this philosophy to describe how CFI officers had not paid shareholders dividends 
more than once in over a decade in order to develop company property and increase wages.
570
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When Rockefeller expressed his belief that “the prosperity of this country is being best 
conserved by large combinations in industries,”571 Walsh pushed him to explain whether or not 
that involved developing national labor organizations. Rockefeller had previously described 
labor as key part of the corporate form.
572
 However, Rockefeller demurred; it was a “technical 
question,” which was beyond his expertise, he repeatedly explained. In the end, what had seemed 
like a straightforward connection between business and philanthropy proved nearly impossible 
for Walsh to make persuasively to a popular audience. 
Things were not so easy the next time around for Rockefeller though. In the second set of 
hearings on philanthropy in Washington D.C. in May and June of 1915, when John D. 
Rockefeller Jr. took the stand he had to be sure of what he did and did not know. He was in a 
bind. A few days prior to his testimony, Frank Walsh announced that he had unearthed 
correspondence between Rockefeller Jr. and CFI managers that would prove that Rockefeller Jr. 
was “in fact the directing mind through the struggle.” This coverage made Jerome Greene 
nervous, and he wrote to Ivy Lee to see what should be done.
573
 This advance notice gave 
Rockefeller Jr. time to prepare.  
 It also gave the press time to drum up interest in the upcoming hearings. The New 
Republic had been granted early access to the letters by Walsh, and its authors concluded that 
Junior had been kept well informed of the strike; however, what the correspondence really 
pointed to, they argued, was the fact that Bowers was “from a former economic age,” and 
believed he could balance “industrial despotism” with the right amount of paternalistic “welfare 
work.” He honestly believed, the authors scoffed, that “[t]he only agency for bettering the wage-
earning relation is the instinctive benevolence of the employer.” Further, while the 
correspondence showed that Rockefeller Jr. “deplored bloodshed,” it revealed that Bowers wrote 
of losses, victories, and enemies like a “war correspondent.” Bowers was only interested in 
crushing unions politically and economically. In fact, these revelations about Bowers callousness 
towards labor and his interest in “crushing unions” setup John D. Rockefeller Jr. nicely for his 
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time on the stand. During his testimony, Rockefeller Jr. maintained his own ignorance of on-the-
ground labor conditions. In the end, it was the expanding division between ownership and 
management that let Rockefeller Jr. escape the USIRC largely unscathed—and Bowers villainy.  
 
Throughout the spring of 1915, Walsh and Rockefeller Jr. exchanged blows in the press. Walsh 
accused the Rockefellers and their associates of trying to manipulate public officials after the 
Ludlow Massacre, and the Rockefellers accused Walsh of distorting their testimony to capitalize 
on the controversial nature of strikebreaking.
574
 Rockefeller staff meticulously catalogued the 
press’ response to the USIRC hearings in the winter of 1915. They calculated that out of almost 
four hundred articles, about two thirds of them were favorable to the Rockefellers interests. The 
farther west one went from New York, they noted, the less sympathetic coverage grew to their 
interests. But, overall, journalists favorably commented on Rockefeller Jr.’s talks with Mother 
Jones; and while J.P. Morgan’s testimony made some capitalists seem ignorant of labor 
questions, it also highlighted Rockefeller Jr.’s “disposition to become acquainted” with labor 
issues. Similarly, while Rockefeller Jr.’s statements about the responsibilities of directors were 
generally not well received, his “new attitude toward labor and his promise to go to Colorado 
and personally investigate the conditions there” were met favorably.575 Overall, Rockefeller’s 
time in the hot seat had done him a considerable amount of good.  
After the hearings the New York Times quoted Florence Harriman as asserting that the 
USIRC’s hearings most valuably gave labor the opportunity to see that their interests were “not 
in the hands of a ruthless and soulless corporation at 26 Broadway.” In fact, Harriman went even 
further, suggesting that the public had discovered “the true John D. Rockefeller, Jr.,” who proved 
to be a “thoughtful” and “very agreeable human.”576 Further, after the hearings, Ivy Lee 
recommended publishing questionnaires sent to the USIRC and the Rockefellers’ testimony 
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relating to their foundation. While he planned to remove content relating to Colorado, Lee 
believed that a “valuable statement concerning the Foundation” had emerged from the materials. 
They should place a volume in every library in the country, Lee thought.
577
 Rockefeller 
Foundation executives clearly saw the outcome of the USIRC hearings as a victory.  
The Rockefellers capitalized on this good press by creating their own publicity tour. 
Rockefeller Jr. finally went to Colorado. He and King visited together, and they announced a 
Plan of Industrial Representation and an Agreement respecting employment and living and 
working conditions at CFI that miners accepted by secret ballot by over 84 percent. In King’s 
words all of this work would not have been possible without “the work of the Foundation and 
relationships made possible through it.”578  
In the case of the USIRC, the aftermath was grimmer. Internal disputes produced 
multiple final reports, firings, and ongoing dissension. Before the publishing of the Final Report, 
at an open forum at a New York City public school, Walsh attempted to publicly draw out the 
connection between American foundations and industrial unrest once more. Walsh asked, 
“Would I be too radical if I should say we can never expect a proper fiscal policy so long as the 
banks handle the wealth of the nation purely to make it pay the largest dividends?” He continued, 
“In all those great industries that make the basis of our life, the ideal must be to deliver to the 
people the largest possible service at the lowest possible cost.”579 As Walsh publicly denounced 
foundations prior to the release of the USIRC’s Final Report, some questioned the judiciousness 
of him giving speeches and espousing personal opinions when his words would inevitably be 
associated with the commission’s work. Papers across the country accused Walsh of planning to 
run for office and of being quite rich himself while he believed himself to be a “crusader leading 
a war on poverty.”580 
                                                          
577
 Ivy Lee to John D. Rockefeller Jr., March 20, 1915, Folder 206, Box 23, Series Economic Interests II 2 F, 
Office of the Messrs. Rockefeller records (OMR), Rockefeller Archive Center. 
578
 Report by Mackenzie King, December 31, 1915, “The Genesis of the Investigation,” 1915, Folder 151, Box 
20, Series 900, Program and Policy, Rockefeller Foundation records, Rockefeller Archive Center. 
579
 “Great Foundations and the Industrial Unrest,” The Survey v. 33 (Jan 23, 1915), 437-438. 
580
 “Seeing Things!” Atlanta Constitution Feb 17, 1915; “Indiscretions of Chairman Walsh” Chicago Daily 




Walsh did not back down though. He said that what the commission had found in 
Colorado demonstrated that our “Republican form of government had absolutely broken 
down.”581 Walsh contended that industrial control of towns, as in Ludlow, was a “threat of 
control over the government of the United States.” In the case of Ludlow, the men who sat on 
Colorado Fuel and Iron’s board were exercising “foreign ownership” and practicing “benevolent 
despotism” in their provision of company stores, their limiting laborer’s political speech, and 
their monitoring of social norms in the town. In a speech in May 1915, Walsh continued to insist 
that CFI was really governed by 26 Broadway.  
From Walsh’s perspective, the Rockefeller Foundation, created for alleged philanthropic 
purposes, did nothing to address imbalances in industrial relations. True reform could only be 
achieved by addressing corporations’ relationship to profit. In Walsh’s formulation, corporations 
should be invested in service and industrial democracy to move towards justice.
582
 In another 
article, Walsh went so far as to describe foundations as a “menace to the welfare of society.” He 
believed the power to do good should be the prerogative of the state, lest the wealthy who gained 
their capital through exploitation be granted undue privilege. In his words, “even in the power to 
do good, no one man, or group of men, should hold the monopoly.”583 
 
Making the Private Foundation through Federal Regulation 
While Walsh may not have proven Rockefeller Jr.’s own villainy in the hearings, the 
Commission did make major policy recommendations to Congress regarding the regulation of 
philanthropic foundations. In the portion of the USIRC’s Final Report written by Basil Manly 
and supported by Walsh, he and his supporters argued that foundations had a “benumbing effect” 
on private citizens and public bodies and that if it were possible to differentiate foundations from 
“other forms of voluntary altruistic effort, it would be desirable to recommend their abolition.” 
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As identifying and abolishing foundations was not possible according to the authors, they 
suggested a series of reforms.
584
 Ironically they called for the federal chartering and regulation of 
all “incorporated non-profit-making bodies whose present charters empower them to perform 
more than a single specific function and whose funds exceed one million dollars.” Just a couple 
years earlier federal officials had been afraid of granting foundations too much national power, 
but by 1915 federal regulation seemed the best hope for reigning in the corporate power 
foundations had already amassed. The authors also noted that Carnegie’s and Rockefeller’s 
philanthropic efforts amounted to something like $250 million with annual revenue of at least 
$13.5 million, which was at least twice as great as the appropriations of the Federal Government 
for similar purposes. So they recommended that the government spend more on education and 
social services to counteract the power of foundations.  
In opposition to the Manly report, about half of the commission members issued a 
separate report.
585
 They cautioned against creating policy relating to foundations until further 
investigation of “endowed charities, endowments of religious organizations and universities and 
colleges” could be completed. They indicated that many of the new foundations “have a 
beneficial effect on the work of the State and Governmental institutions.” For example, they said, 
“Some of the investigations and reforms started by recent large foundations have already induced 
Congress and administrative departments to enter the same field and to extend it. In fact, almost 
everything that Government now does was done at first through private initiatives…” With this 
model in mind, they recommended the creation of a “Federal Fund for Social Welfare” so that 
“the Nation may compete with or displace private foundations in this vital matter.” They called 




Both of these reports called for a more dynamic investment in social welfare from private 
organizations and the federal government. So, although commissioners did not believe that the 
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state and private organizations should cooperate or subsidize one another’s projects, they argued, 
“the State should use its money to displace [foundations’ effects] by better and more universal 
charity. Instead of calling upon private foundations for help the Government should treat them as 
competitors.” This language suggests the development of an ideology that made room for private 
investment in public welfare, but one that advocated for the government to out-spend and 
morally guide private foundations.  
 
As the USIRC encouraged the government to separate its welfare work from foundations, the 
Rockefeller Foundation worked to separate its business and philanthropic activities. King’s 
employment by the Rockefeller Foundation officially ended February 1918. By that time, the 
foundation had no interest in directly associating itself with King’s findings on industrial 
relations. Instead, they arranged for King to publish his results personally with Houghton Mifflin 
Company.
587
 In the new foundation President’s words, King had planned to visit the leading 
countries of the world to make his investigation; however, the war prevented such efforts. 
Beyond that, the war “so completely changed the industrial situation in all countries” that King 
further modified his plan.
588
  
In 1917 Rockefeller Foundation trustees created a new position of Chairman of the Board 
for Rockefeller Jr., and they elected former University of Minnesota President, George Vincent, 
as the second Rockefeller Foundation President. Shortly thereafter, Vincent announced the end 
of the foundation’s industrial relations investigation, and he described the foundation’s 
investment in medical education, public health demonstration and war-cooperation programs as 
most urgent. He explained, the foundation was not:
589
  
[U]nmindful of the extremely sensitive attitude of the public mind toward any such 
inquiry conducted by institutions, especially those of a private nature, which are equipped 
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with unusually large financial resources. However sincere and single-minded any such 
effort may be, it is always liable to misconstruction. 
 
That misconstruction should be avoided, Vincent argued. To prevent misunderstanding of 
foundation activity, trustees would mainly devote resources to medical education and health 
activities. The foundation would continue to support “important war work, particularly those 
larger agencies which are operating under the direct authority of the Government.” However, 
Vincent concluded, the foundation’s trustees wished to devote their funds “to activities which 
can by no chance be conceived as having a political purpose.” The Foundation supported 
“neither a theory nor a state of social order...”590 In other words, the Rockefeller foundation was 
a private foundation that no longer sought to offer an alternative mode of governance for the 
nation. In the end, while the Rockefellers first imagined combining their commercial ambition 
with their vision for social trusteeship, they eventually drew distinctions between their 
commercial and philanthropic efforts. That distinction facilitated the development of a new, 
modern “corporate responsibility.” That corporate responsibility signaled the rise of private 
foundations over the public trust though, because it called for the separation of nonprofit, for-
profit, and government activity. 
Over time, the public-trust model of American philanthropy succumbed to forces even 
greater than private surplus wealth. As the USIRC’s Final Report indicated, the government was 
under increasing pressure to fund welfare work. And with the federal income tax established in 
1913 and the charitable tax deduction in 1917, it had a new engine to accumulate and apportion 
public and private provisions of social services across the nation. Further, with the rise of a 
distinguishable “nonprofit corporation,” it became easier—even advantageous—for businesses to 
argue for a new, narrower bottom line—the maximization of returns to shareholders. Businesses 
would continue to engage in corporate welfare—even expand it, but they had to articulate it as 
promoting a far narrower bottom line than national development. And finally, suspicions about 
the increasing public power of private wealth in society had grown to a level that resulted in the 
end of many public-private partnerships altogether. The public trust did not disappear; however, 
rather it became one tool in a wide array of foundations devoted to managing private 





philanthropy. Private foundations, however, would outpace the public trust’s development in the 








Corporate Power and the Public Trust 
 
 
This history of the public trust is essential to understanding the transformation of American 
philanthropy, because the superrich, contrary to the stories told in many histories of American 
philanthropy, did not begin by imagining their philanthropy as private and separate from public 
works funded by the government. And nor was it solely the prerogative of the rich to decide how 
to distribute their surplus wealth in society. As we have seen, state and federal legislatures 
repeatedly crafted special legislation to aid the nation’s richest citizens in distributing their 
surplus wealth without the restrictions that applied to more ordinary bequests and charities. 
Further, the entire endeavor of early philanthropic enterprise was anything but private. Indeed, it 
relied on public law and was largely imagined as a public enterprise, for and by the public—
through the public trust.  
This dissertation shows that for over a century before the federal income tax (1913) and 
the first charitable tax deductions (1917) concretely incentivized charitable giving, the state 
carved out a special role for private wealth in American society. However, the nation’s 
wealthiest citizens still needed the cooperation of Congress (or a state legislature) to launch a 
foundation. In order to create corporate vehicles to manage their trusts, they needed a special 
charter of incorporation, which could ensure that they would not pay taxes on the capital going to 
their trust. Corporate charters also ensured that public trusts would out-last the lives of their 
founders and trustees. To incorporate a public trust, trustees needed to apply for a charter from 
Congress or a state legislature. Assigning different kinds of charters—as well as the corporate 
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privileges they contained and their regulatory provisions—constituted a primary method through 
which the state regulated the distribution of private wealth.  
 
In this milieu, the transformation of American philanthropy, from public trust to private 
foundation, was hardly inevitable. It is tempting to see the Rockefeller Foundation’s federal 
charter as the ultimate failure of the public trust. In many respects, however, the extraordinary 
charter could be seen as the height of the public trust. Social workers—and even eventually the 
Rockefellers themselves—proposed creating the Rockefeller Foundation with a federal charter 
that would have allowed for increased government oversight. As Edward Devine had envisioned, 
the Rockefeller Foundation might have operated with the federal government having some role 
in the selection of its trustees, with the mandatory spending of the foundation’s annual interest 
income, and with the eventual spending down of the foundation’s endowment.591 For Devine, 
these proposed amendments would make the institutional structures of the foundation more 
democratic. This more democratic version of the public trust came closer to existence than many 
historians have acknowledged. The bill to incorporate the Rockefeller Foundation passed the 
House in 1913, after all.  
The public-private-partnership model that such a foundation could have propelled into 
the new century had deeper roots than we’ve previously acknowledged, too. It was not so strange 
that the Rockefellers sought a federal charter—many foundations had previously done so, and 
public officials had long served as trustees of the nation’s largest public trusts. Further, although 
the special charters granted to the nation’s largest public trusts frequently allowed them to exist 
in perpetuity and to accumulate their interest earnings, that was not the case for the majority of 
the nation’s nonprofit corporations that were created under more restrictive state general-
incorporation laws. In other words, the idea that the Rockefeller Foundation would have received 
a federal charter, even with all of Devine’s amendments—was not so extraordinary.  
What was extraordinary, however, was the fact that the private foundation model of 
American philanthropy took off with such rapidity in the early twentieth century. This 
transformation of American philanthropy is hardly a declension narrative in which the country 
lost out because private wealth triumphed over the welfare state. Indeed, in the early twentieth 
                                                          
591
 Devine, “Social Forces: The Rockefeller Foundation,” 902. 
173 
 
century, with the undertakings of the USIRC and the federal income tax, for example, 
Progressives were scoring major victories in the development of the welfare state. So, why did 
Congress decide not to federally regulate the nation’s largest foundations? It had the tools to do 
so at its fingertips—the federal charter was elastic enough to have facilitated such a practice.  
Frederick Gates offered a possible answer to this question when he described the new 
social, economic and legal realities of twentieth-century corporate capitalism. By the early-
twentieth century, in Gates’ estimation, “great corporations [were] to be feared.”592 Corporations 
did not “grow old and die” like human people, he explained. They existed at “colossal 
proportions,” and could acquire more power through the centuries.593 He continued: “Just so our 
corporation unites in itself the natural rights of men and certain supernatural rights or privileges 
brought about by government, which may be likened to the sons of God.”594 These supernatural 
corporate bodies that combined “the union of many men before the law into one legal body or 
person,” were immortal threats to millions of Americans as Gates described them. As such, they 
could not be creatures of the government anymore—such proximity would have threatened the 
integrity of government autonomy and ethics. Investing in government-funded social welfare 
seemed a far safer option—and one that could insight competition between foundations and 
government entities. 
Beyond their potential threat, though, Gates argued that with their superpowers, 
corporations were “capable of carrying civilization to heights utterly undreamed by the 
imagination of man.” In this way, despite the immortal threat they posed, corporations were to be 
the vehicles that drove American economic and social development. However, he also noted:
595
 
Is it not clear that these corporations, if they continue to grow and to flourish, will 
ultimately control entirely the commerce and manufactory of the whole world…and 
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ultimately control the whole social system of the is planet?  I am not saying this is 
desirable; I am saying that it will certainly bring about complete social revolution of one 
kind or another. It seems to me to inevitably grow out of the power of immortality. 
 
As Gates described the immortality of corporations, he explained what perhaps had grown so 
troubling about the public trust. While the Smithsonian was created from a bequest, and the 
Peabody Education Fund was created from a “living trust” with a limited lifespan written into its 
charter, later public trusts (and certainly private corporations generally) had gained the legal 
privilege to exist in perpetuity. With this privilege, the public trust had eternal life. Such a 
superpower, indeed, made the public trust and private corporation modes of governance that 
could compete with public officials and government institutions. They had the capacity to frame 
and execute national development strategies that would span generations and shape the lives of 
Americans beyond the immediate future. 
 In this dissertation, I have used the term public trust to refer to both the distinct legal 
form that philanthropic institutions have taken, as well as the social purpose they created for 
private wealth in the nation’s development. For the foundation-model of philanthropy to develop 
in the United States, I argued, Americans had to be able to legally and socially create a role for 
private wealth in the undertaking of the nation’s public works. Part of that process involved 
imagining the limitless growth of private capital in national and global markets. In the end, it was 
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